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ABSTRACT
An hypothesis was tested about the career paths of scientists and
engineers using retrospective survey data collected by the Bureau
of Census. The two-part hypothesis was that there are identifiable
mobility and earnings patterns in the labor market for scientists
and engineers, termed here as career paths, and that career paths
systematically mitigate the lifetime earnings of scientists and
engineers.
The results supported the presence of the hypothesized career
paths, that scientists and engineers follow all-technical or
technical then managerial paths that represent different sets of
future job opportunities. There was also support for the hypothesis
that over the course of their working lives, managers earn more and
their earnings growth declines less rapidly than is the case with
technical workers. However, much of the difference was captured
by the dummy variables representing path, suggesting that there are
aspects of this difference in earnings that do not occur gradually
over one's work history.
Thesis Supervisor: Prof. William Wheaton
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Chapter I
PREAMBLE
Introduction
In an economy such as ours which is becoming increasingly
reliant on sophisticated technology as a means of production, the
skilled professional labor needed to manage, maintain, and advance
that technology is an important economic resource. However, as valued
as skilled white-collar labor seems to be, this portion of the labor
market is one of the least studied by labor market analysts. A major
reason for this is that this sector of the market has not
traditionally been governed by collective bargaining agreements,
resulting in a dearth of readily accessible data. Consequently, there
is very little understanding of the empirical applicability of the
major labor economics theories to this sector.
The purpose of this thesis is to examine a portion of the
professional white-collar labor market, that of scientists and
engineers, to better understand the influences that shape the
labor-market experiences of this group of workers. In this chapter,
the major questions are stated and findings discussed, concluding with
an outline of the structure of the thesis.
I. What Was Asked
The two leading economic explanations of why a group or
individual has any particular tenure, earnings, or unemployment
experience are either that that experience is a function of that
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person's human capital investment, the human capital model, or that
that individual operates in a structured labor market where implicit
or explicit administrative rules govern wage levels and employment
stability, a segmented labor market model.
Human capital thoery is the more generalizable in that, empirical
difficulties aside, labor outcomes for any type of worker can be
understood as resulting from the combination of their human capital
accumulation and the changing value of that asset in the market place.
A distinction within experiential human capital is made between
general human capital that is of value in all firms and firm-specific
that is of use only in the firm where it was acquired.
Segmented market theory is an empirically based theory, initially
derived from observations of the blue-collar labor market. Labor
market outcomes are hypothesized to be determined by institutions that
have arisen for a variety of reasons, primarily to reduce uncertainty.
The most studied and well-understood institution has been labor
unions, where the rules that govern earnings, job security, and
mobility are often clearly articulated. The presence of an underlying
or implicit structure in the professional white-collar markets is a
relatively unexplored topic. This gap in our understanding is due in
part to the lack of appropriate data.
To approach this problem comprehensively, several types of
information would be necessary. To test the hypotheses that eminate
from the human capital hypothesis, information about the education,
experience, and personal characteristics of each worker would be
required. However, to examine the structural market hypothesis, both
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data about individual interfirm mobility and job content, as well as
information about the central administrative structure in the labor
market, the firm, would be needed.
Because no such complex data set is available, certain conceptual
accommodations have been made in the work done in this area to be able
to use what data are available. The nature of the data shapes the
questions that can be asked and answered.
One possible course is to use the individual firm as the unit of
observation and, using personnel data, examine earnings and mobility
patterns [see Medoff and Abraham,1980a,1980b]. This approach is based
on the assumption that the firm is a microcosm of the labor market,
and earnings and mobility patterns are examined and compared to what
would be expected in the absence of structural influences.
Another perspective to take, the one implemented in this thesis,
is to use individual survey information about human-capital attributes
and to develop an indicator of the structural factors that are
expected to influence earnings and mobility patterns. In this case,
human-capital attributes are assumed to prevail in the determination
of labor market outcomes, and hypotheses about how the market-
structure variables would behave in a system dominated by returns to
human-capital investment are generated and tested. How detailed a
structure can be hypothesized depends on what information about job
content, interfirm movement, and periods of involuntary unemployment
is provided in the survey.
The data set used in this was the National Survey of Scientists
and Engineers (PMS), a combination of retrospective and panel data
1-4
based on a random sample of self-declared scientists and engineers in
the 1970 Current Population Survey. The possible presence of a
structured market was proxied by a variable that measured career path.
Because the sample was limited to scientists and engineers, possible
career paths were represented by a dichotomous choice between two
paths, technical and managerial.
This choice of paths was motivated by several generally known
stylized facts about the labor force experience of scientists and
engineers. First, this group enters the labor force having made a
very large human capital investment in itself, which is going to
affect the initial experience in the labor market. Second, it is
common for workers who have entered the labor force as scientists and
engineers eventually to move to jobs involving more general business
functions, such as management, consulting, or sales. Third, there is
a tendency for this technical labor to have relatively flat earnings
functions. And, fourth, this type of labor, particularly engineers,
experiences a well known cyclical sensitivity (Bailyn and Lynch,
1982; Cain,Freeman, and Hansen, 1973; Sirbu, et al, 1978; Leventman,
1981).
Assuming a human-capital framework, the two paths were
hypothesized as offering different sets of human capital investment
opportunities that would result in different patterns of earnings and
employment stability. The primary difference between the two paths
was hypothesized to be that the managerial path represents a set of
primarily firm-specific human-capital investments, while the technical
track offers investments in mostly general human capital.
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The reason for this characterization of the two tracks is based
on the literature describing work experiences of scientists and
engineers, where they are confronted eventually with having to choose
between two conflicting work orientations: one to their profession and
its associated jobs that are of a technical problem-solving nature;
and, the other to the firm, where job content emplasizes the
management of firm resources. Bailyn, in her study of M.I.T.
graduates, finds that of those who fall into her engineering category,
which includes entrepreneurs, managers, business staff, consultants,
engineering managers, and staff engineers, only about 56% were in
technical jobs eleven years after graduation [Bailyn, 1979].
It is clear from the literature on scientists and engineers that
to reduce the number of possible career paths available to these
workers is an oversimplification, but one that was made to maintain
analytical tractability.
The major implication of the difference in investments between
the two paths rests on the rate of technological change that affects
the value of the worker in the market, and so rate of return, to the
two different types of human-capital accumulation. Because of its
technical nature, the general human capital acquired by those on the
technical track is more vulnerable to a rapid rate of depreciation as
technological change redefines the skills that are necessary to stay
technologically current. Firm-specific managerial human capital,
however, is hypothesized to be less subject to rapid depreciation
primarily because the skills needed to manage in a particular firm are
less likely to change rapidly.
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Translating these differences in investments into labor-market
outcomes, it was hypothesized that those on the managerial track would
have a higher lifetime-earnings schedule with a steeper slope that
flattens at at a slower rate than those of technical workers. This
was hypothessized not only because of differences in the depreciation
rates, but also because path choice implies a rigidity in worker
mobility and once a career path is chosen, the chosen path determines
the sequence of investment opportunities for the remainder of that
worker's career. So, the advantageous managerial investment
opportunities become increasingly preferable with experience.
Because the nature of paths is that they represent structures
within markets, workers cannot jump from one to another except at
certain decision points (In this simplified version of market
structure, there is only one decision point). Once a path decision is
made, each job along the path will offer investment opportunities that
are essentially exclusive to that job. As managers move from job to
job along their paths, they acquire relatively slowly depreciating
human capital and thus experience relatively greater rates of return
so that the earnings difference widens with experience. Because
managerial human capital does not depreciate as rapidly, managers will
have an incentive to invest for longer periods and thus their earnings
schedules will flatten less slowly.
Another labor market outcome that would result from the
differences in human-capital investment is the higher probability of
interfirm mobility by technical track workers and the higher
probability of involuntary unemployment. However, this aspect of the
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hypothesis is not explored in this thesis.
To summarize, the objectives of this research were first, using a
large data set, to establish empirically that career paths exist, that
is, that there are contraints on inter-job mobility patterns'that
allow some types of work experience but preclude others. And, second,
to explore the structural basis of these paths, where a series of
hypotheses about earnings were generated that were consistent with
human capital theory. Assuming career paths could be established, it
was expected that by identifying those points where the human capital
theory was supported or rejected would provide insight into the
determinants of earnings and mobility in white-collar labor markets.
II. What Was Found
A. Establishing Career Paths
The first major objective of this research was reached: using
the relatively crude indicators of career paths that could be derived
from this data set, the presence of managerial and technical career
paths was established. Because of the timing of the survey, three job
sequences were considered to be evidence of a path: all of an
individual's jobs were technical; all were managerial; or, the initial
jobs were technical and subsequent jobs were managerial.
Backtracking, going from a managerial to a technical job, was viewed
as inconsistent with the path hypothesis. Two versions of career path
were used, one based on the supervisory level of the individual
(SUPATH) and one using the self-declared occupational category
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(OCCMAN). Regardless of which definition was used, the careers of
over 90% of the sample could be described by the three job sequences
that were consistent with the hypothesis that scientists and engineers
enter the market on a technical path and eventually choose between
remaining on that path and moving to a managerial path.
In addition, using a simple earnings function, where types of
human-capital investment were undifferentiated from one another, it
was shown that earnings levels and growth rates varied systematically
with path. In the model of earnings level, the rate of return to
experience for managers was three times that for technical workers.
And, in the model of earnings growth , the managerial earnings growth
rate as experience increased was over twice that for technical
workers.
Together, these findings provide support for there being a
structure within this labor market that affects labor market outcomes.
By separating work experience into different components that
approximate the different types of human-capital investment, questions
about what determines these paths, specifically whether or not they
represent differences in investment patterns, can be examined.
Because two different definitions of career path were used, a
comparison was done of the values of the two variables to learn what
differences there might be that should be incorporated into an
interpretation of the results. One major outcome of this comparison
was that it was quite common for a worker to have significant
supervisory responsibility and yet describe himself as belonging to a
technical occupation. The reverse, a managerial occupation with low-
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level supervisory responsibilities, almost never occurred. Also,
those who described themselves as having a managerial occupation
tended to be somewhat older and more experienced than those who did
not. This suggests that there is a psychological component to career
path choice, where the shift from a technical to a managerial
orientation is gradual despite changes in actual job content.
B. Where the Paths Diverge
In the study of the contribution of different kinds of
experience, two types of models were used, models of earnings levels
and of earnings change. The earnings level models permitted an
examination of certain dichotomous variables that would be expected to
shift the entire earnings schedule, variables that would not appear in
the earnings change mdoel. The disadvantage to the earnings level
models was that there was no measure of individual economic ability
included, so that to the extent that ability was correlated with any
of the other variables, in particular path choice, the coefficient
estimates would be biased and inefficient. The earnings-change models
were assumed to correct for this problem because individual ability
was one of the shift parameters, in this case, a fixed-effect
variable, that was eliminated in the derivation of the change models
from the levels model.
Experience was broken down into three components, pre-firm (EXP),
same-firm, different-job (NONTEN), and job tenure (TENURE). Pre-firm
was assumed to measure general human capital, that which is of value
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across firms. NONTEN included both general and firm-specific human
capital. And, TENURE measured the combination of general,
firm-specific, and job-specific.
Two versions of each model was estimated, one where a path dummy
variable and a set of path-experience interaction variables were
included to measure the differential returns to experience by path.
And, a set of models was estimated where the sample was divided into
current managers and technical workers (using the SUPATH variable) and
the coefficients for each subsample were estimated separately.
In summary, although there is strong support for there being
differences between paths in lifetime earnings, the difference cannot
be clearly attributed to differences In the quality of human capital
investment. There is no difference between paths in the rates of
return to pre-firm general human capital, although it was expected
that technical workers would gain more from that experience.
Using the supervisory-based model, there is a small, positive and
significant advantage in the coefficient estimates for managerial
tenure. A set of diagrams showing the effect of tenure over time
shows a gradually increasing gap in earnings. When the earnings
curves begin to flatten, the drop is slightly more precipitous for
managers than technical workers. But, the drop begins sufficiently
late in the work history that managers effectively never lose their
advantage. However, the major difference does not appear to be
associated with the shape of the experience-earnings functions. This
is especially evident from the separate-regression change models when
the only substantial difference between the paths is in the intercept.
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There is also a very strong and positive shift effect associated with
the managerial path, evident in the path coefficient in the single-
regression, interaction model, and in the intercepts in the separate
regression models, for both the level and change models. This shift
effect is sufficiently large to counteract a lower rate of return for
same-firm, different-job tenure for managers. The rate of return to
the same-firm, different-job experience of managers is lower than for
technical workers, but the rate of growth does not decline for
managers while it does for technical workers.
That the major difference in path-earnings functions appears as a
shift effect raises many questions about what exactly motivates the
earnings gap. Two obvious unexplored possibilities are that earnings
growth occurs more often from job change rather than in the course of
a job; or, that technical workers experience more unemployment,
slowing their earnings growth. Answers to these and related questions
are the next step in understanding the dynamics of the white-collar
labor market.
The next two chapters of the thesis are reviews of the literature
on the labor market for scientists and engineers and the economic
literature on the relationship between experience and earnings. In
the fourth chapter, the model that is used to explore the questions
outlined above is developed. The fifth chapter describes the data set
that was used and the construction of the career-path variables. The
following chapter is a presentation of the estimate results, including
an empirical summary of the data set and a discussion of the two
definitions of career path. The thesis is concluded by a chapter
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summarizing the results and proposing future areas of research.
FOOTNOTES
Unlike the change model estimated later, using the experience
components, the continuous-experience change models were not derived
and have only exploratory value. Earnings change is over the course
of the current or most recent job, as it is for the components model,
but the only control variable for length of that job is the change in
the CPI, which is only an approximation of time. In addition, the
experience variables do not represent change in experience, but rather
total experience at the end of the job. so, the change in earnings
is, in effect, hypothesized to be a function of one's total
experience. Therefore, a model is presented where fixed effects are
omitted, but that exclusion is not really appropriate.
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON THE CAREER PATHS
OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS
Introduction
This chapter is a review of the literature regarding the labor
market experience of scientists and engineers. This review is not
comprehensive, but is sufficient to establish the importance of the
choice between technical and managerial career tracks and the need for
a theoretical understanding from a labor economics point of view.
This literature can be divided into two categories, that dealing
with the construction of supply and demand models and that addressing
problems of professionals in organizations, frequently with a focus on
the incidence of technical obsolescence.
The first set of literature best describes the entry level labor
market for technical labor, while the second set of papers concentrate
on the work experience of scientists and engineers after those first
few years. Based on the second set of literature, by mid-career,
which occurs sometime in the early to mid-30s, it is evident that many
technically trained workers run the risk of technical obsolescence and
turn to managerial careers. So, by mid-career, what was an apparent
homogeneity of labor at entry to the labor market has broken down. In
this thesis, a simplified distinction is drawn between those who
eventually pursue a managerial career track and those who pursue a
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technical career track.
I. Supply and Demand Models
The economic approach to the labor market for scientists and
engineers models the supply and demand for scientists and engineers,
usually incorporating the well-known lag between increases in demand
and availability of supply caused by the long training period
necessary for such highly skilled labor. These studies are frequently
prompted by the concern for the availability of technically skilled
labor. However, they tend to focus on occupational categories and
ignore the evolutionary process where some labor is trained in some
specialization but develops into a different type of labor after
several years in the labor market. Therefore, their results can only
describe entry-level conditions.
Two examples of the supply and demand analysis of the economic
approach are a monograph by Cain, Freeman, and Hansen [1973] and a
paper by O'Connell [1972]. Cain, et. al, noting both the long
training time needed to bring engineers into the labor market, as well
as the prominent role of federally funded research and development
programs in the demand for technically skilled labor, build a cobweb
model of the market. They assume that individuals make their training
decisions based on current demand and salary conditions, but that
those decisions do not affect actual
supply for four to five years,
when demand conditions may have
changed. Using a diagram similar b,
to Diagram 1, they assume
aI
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the economy to be in initial Diagram 1
equilibrium at Q1W1 . Demand shifts out exogeneously to D2, driving
wages up to W . Supply then shifts to Q in response to higher
wages. Increased supply drives wages down to W2, supply drops down to
Q2, and so on until wages and employment eventually converge at Q0W 0 '
According to the authors, the reasos the cobweb model is
appropriate for the engineering labor market is that a long training
period needed that prevents rapid equilibration. The assumption is
that the quality of labor is a constant throughout this long
equilibrating process. They acknowledge that this is an idealized
picture of how this market operates, but it is worth noting that their
model suggests the possibility of a very rapid exogenous demand shift
but requires a protracted supply response. While this is accurate,
they do not extend the discussion to incorporate the likelihood of
repeated exogenous demand shifts, which does seem to be one source of
volatility in this labor market.1
Having surveyed and developed a theory of the labor market for
engineers, the model which they actually estimate is a reduced form
equation earnings function. They justify this choice by pointing out
that "the salary rate...serve[s] to quide allocative decisions by
employers and workers" [1973,p.42]. However, as O'Connell notes,
interpretation of the estimated coefficients is necessarily ambiguous
in such a model.
They use data from the 1962 Post-Censal Survey of engineers.
The estimated relation is: E - F(P ,C ) + u,, where E is the
earnings of the ith individual; P are productivity characteristics,
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including education, training, years of experience, and experience
squared; and C are "compensating" variables such as geographical
area. They also add in a series of demographic variables such as age,
marital status, and father's occupational class. They estimate this
as a simple linear relationship using ordinary least squares (OLS).
One of their interesting results shows that, holding experience
constant, the peak year of earnings occurs at age 60-64 years, which
is not surprising. But, what is surprising is that when they examine
the rate of increase of salary with experience, the highest rate of
increase occurs around age 45-49, later than most studies of
engineering obsolescence would predict. It is worth noting, however,
that these results are based on cross-sectional data. Those in the
4-5-49 year age category would have entered the labor market towards
the start of the build-up for WWII, and their higher salaries might
reflect that initial shock to the labor market.
O'Connell [1971] uses two stage least squares (2SLS) to estimate
a two equation model of the engineering labor market. O'Connell has
three purposes in his paper: to develop and estimate supply and demand
functions for engineers, to examine equilibrating variables, and to
analyze substitutability and complementarity between engineers and
people in related occupations. His demand equation, which he
estimates as a log-linear function is: D = D(W ,W ,R&D,I,u), where D
is the quantity demanded; Wn is the price of engineers, expressed
relative to a common labor group; Wr is the price of related labor;
R&D, used instead of value added to capture the fact that labor is a
derived demand, is the level of R&D expenditures; and, I is the ratio
-0-
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of engineers to total male employment for 21 sectors.
His supply relation is S = S(w ,P,D,u), where w is absolute
n n n
rather than relative earnings for engineers; P is the age-education
composition of the population, a variable based on the assumption that
there is little occupational mobility into engineering; and, D is the
share of engineers of total number of college graduates. The unit of
observation is the state, and he is using 1960 Census data.
He notes two problems with his data that may be responsible for
his weak results. First, using a theoretical result developed by
Melvin Reder [1955] that when faced with a shortage of labor,
employers can either adjust wage rates or hiring standards, O'Connell
notes that he has no controls for the quality of labor in his model
and that this may lead to biased estimates. Also, because he is using
cross-section state data on employment levels, he is forced to assume
that each data point represents an equilibrium situation.
Despite these problems, he estimates his equations using both
OLS, thus assuming that wages are exogenous, and 2SLS, which allows
wages to be endogenous. His results are weak; however, he does find
some support for the complementarity rather than substitutability
between technicians and engineers, implying that upgrading technicians
will not increase the supply of engineers. And, it is interesting
that his model is least successful for civil engineers, suggesting
that their labor market may differ from that for other engineers.
Together, the monograph by Cain, et al, and the paper by
O'Connell demonstrate the difficulty in estimating a model of the
market for this labor. O'Connell's direct attempt fails to get strong
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results. And, Cain, et al, do not even attempt it, but rather assume
that wages determine both supply and demand behavior and so focus
their analysis on wages. In addition to the data deficiencies they
mention, part of the difficulty in modeling this labor market is the
failure to incorporate career stages into their model that would
reflect the existing heterogeneity of labor in this market. A model
such as O'Connell's would probably be more successful if it were
applied only to the new entrant portion of the engineering labor
market, where supply and demand more directly govern price and
quantity relations.
II. Professionals in Organizations
The second type of literature that is concerned specifically with
scientists and engineers emphasizes the problems of professionals
working in large organizations. This literature tends to take a
managerial perspective with a focus on identifying and reconciling the
inherent conflicts between individual and group needs. The problem
that is peculiar to scientists and engineers is described by Bailyn as
a dilemma faced by many of "either following one's technical bent but
becoming isolated and unrecognized within the organization, or moving
into management and losing contact with one's technical goals and
competence" [Bailyn, 1982c, p. 42]. This problem is sometimes
referred to as technical obsolescence and has been recognized by many
concerned with managing technically trained labor.
For the purpose of this review, this literature is organized
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into two categories. The first type is primarily empirical, where the
authors were prompted by a recognition of a tension between
technically educated workers and their employers to explore and
identify the nature and causes of the problem and develop empirically
based typologies. The papers in the second category each begin with a
theoretical presupposition about the inherent conflict between
individuals and groups, in this case technically oriented workers and
firms, and analyze the problems, particularly that of obsolescence,
and solutions in terms their view of that conflict.
A. Identifying the Problem
In this section, works by Bailyn, Dalton and Thompson, Leventman,
and Hall and Mansfield are discussed. Although each takes a different
perspective on the mid-career issues for scientists and engineers, all
begin by noting the discrepancy between the initial labor market
experience for those workers and their expectations for the future and
what actuallly takes place after several years on the job. All four
see this labor group as entering the market with an extraordinarily
high initial skill level. Bailyn and Leventman also discuss a kind of
glamour associated with these technical occupations that was generated
during the 1950s and 1960s, raising expectations for extremely
promising futures. What all four writers discover is that, for a
variety of reasons, those expectations are not met for many mid-career
scientists and engineers and that for some whose strength remains in
solving technical puzzles, this creates serious career problems.
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A major theme is Bailyn's several studies of scientists and
engineers at mid-career is their diversity and the absence of rigid
stages and career paths that can be used to predict levels or
performance, job satisfaction or work involvement. Having identified
the problem of worker alienation among scientists and engineers,
Bailyn's study of M.I.T. graduates at mid-career [Bailyn, 1980]
establishes that while much diversity of individual talent and
orientation exists among these workers, a similar variety of career
options within organizations does not exist.
In 1970, Bailyn surveyed M.I.T. graduates of the classes of 1951,
1955, and 1959 (N=2223, although working sample was 1351 men).
Bailyn's purpose was,.first, to identify occupational categories
within the sample that were both functionally based and captured the
dominant set of work values embodied in that occupation; and, second,
to examine individual reactions to these occupational roles, searching
for systematic patterns of work involvement and orientation to work.
Using job title and work activity information, Bailyn developed an
eleven occupation functionally based classification system:2 five were
considered managerial occupations, three staff occupations, two
educational, and other.
Using career data information, these eleven categories were
collapsed into two occupational clusters that formed the basic units
of analysis for her study. The first cluster, called engineering
based carrers (pattern E) included entrepreneurs, general and
functional managers, business staff, consultants, engineering
managers, and staff engineers. Those in this pattern tended not to
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have Ph.D.s, to have had average grades, and have started their
careers in staff engineering positons. The second cluster,
scientific-professional carrers (pattern SP) included both groups of
professors, science managers, and staff scientists. These tended to
have doctorates, good grades, and entered the labor market in other
than staff engineering positions. Of those in pattern E, 56% have
technical jobs, while 90% of those in pattern SP have technical jobs.
Her point here is that educational and initial job experience
influence the career path this labor will follow ten to twenty years
after graduation.
Next, she examined the job values associated with these
occupational clusters in order to identify what needs individuals
would like to have met by their work and determine which cluster met
which needs. The job characteristics included intrinsic values, that
is, those associated with the work content itself versus extrinsic
values that could be associated with meeting organizational
objectives, societal goals, and/or personal objectives. 3
While both patterns indicate an emphasis on intrinsic values,
such as "challenging work" and "freedom to be creative and original,"
those in the SP pattern exhibit those values somewhat more than those
in pattern E.4 But, those in the E clusters show a much greater
adherence to extrinsic values such as earnings and leadership
5
opportunities than do those in SP, establishing value differences
between patterns.
She then examines how these groups differ by organizational
level. Four types of technology-based careers emerge: engineering
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based with high organizational positions (E/H), engineering based with
low organizational position (E/L)(includes staff engineer and business
staff), scientific-professional based with high organizational
position (SP/H), and scientific-professional based with low position
(SP/L)(includes staff scientist). Bailyn's results indicate that both
occupational cluster and organizational level determine work
involvement. E/H and SP/L show an approximately normal work
involvement distribution; but those in SP/H are skewed toward high
involvement (38% are highly involved) and those in E/L are skewed
toward low work involvement (35% have low involvement) [1980,p.40].
Although there are many possible explanations for why SP/L would tend
to be more involved in their work than E/L, one plausible reason may
be that the myth that one is a failure if one has not made the
transition from a technical career into management may operate more
strongly on engineers than scientists.
Bailyn begins to set up her framework for policy analysis by
exploring the relationship between individual orientations and
occupational career paths. She identifies three different types of
orientation: technical, human, and non-work. Those in the
scientific-professional cluster show such similar orientations toward
technical work regardless of organizational level.6 When comparing
the percent with above average incomes (normalized within
occupational/organizational groups) by orientation, about 45% of both
SP/H and SP/L receive above average salaries (for their
occupational/organizational group), suggesting a similar reward
structure for orientation regardless of hierarchical position.
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Within the E/H group, the highest percent with above average
incomes are those with a human orientation, 41%, suggesting either a
predisposition or the switch that many engineers make as they rise
within organizations away from technical and toward managerial
problems. Within E/L, 63% of those with a technical orientation
receive above average salaries, as compared with 37% of those
technically oriented in E/H. Bailyn interprets this as indicating
that how workers are evaluated, as measured by relative salary,
depends on congruence of orientation and organizational position.
However, it is not clear from these data whether those in E/L with a
technical orientation are paid more than average for their group
because they perform best in their group or because they represent
those with the greatest job tenure who have not made the transition to
a human and therefore managerial orientation. That 29% of those in
E/L show the human orientation and make above average within group
salaries suggests that orientation is not highly valued at that
organizational level and supports Bailyn's congruence argument.
Among those in the engineering cluster, Bailyn notes a lack of
congruence between organizatinal rewards, career orientations and job
satisfaction, suggesting the severity of the problem of the
inflexibility of firms which do not recognize worker differences
[1982d,p. 43].
After identifying this mismatch, Bailyn interviewed technical
professionals in three high technology research and development firms
to determine the contributing organizational factors [Bailyn, 1982a;
1982c]. In all three firms, external market conditions were changing
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so that the firms were shifting emphasis from developing new
technology to production using existing technology. Four
contradictions emerged between management assumptions and those of the
workers that disrupted job satisfaction and efficiency: 1) the
misapplication of autonomy and the organizational controls, where
resarch scientists and engineers had relative freedom to select
projects but were subject to tedious firm controls during
implementation (those interviewed preferred the reverse, close
supervision in selecting projects which were consistent with company
goals and more discretion over how to carry them out); 2) the tendency
to reorganize company functions without attention to project group
efficiency, frustrating researchers because of new problems of
resource coordination; 3) lack of movement and involvement with a
specific project or problem for too long, leading to stagnation (This
proclivity.was reinforced by both managers and workers: managers
feared the loss of their most knowledgeable people, and workers feared
loss of salary and position during their relearning period); 4)
conflicting incentives where actions that might enhance productivity
and efficiency were not necessarily the ones that would provide
individual recognition and visibility and advance careers.
Bailyn recommends increasing firm flexibility, introducing
temporary assignments to reduce the danger of overspecialization,
using new career rewards other than hierarchical promotion to publicly
signal performance, providing opportunities to report directly upper
management, and rewarding productivity through the use of sabbaticals.
Dalton and Thompson also attempt to track careers paths of
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scientists and engineers and identify the sources and possible
resolution of the potential obsolescence dilemma faced by these
workers. Using management performance evaluations, Kopelman,
Thompson, and Dalton [1973] track the timing of the obsolescence
problem: average performance rises steadily from entrance into the
labor market in the early 20s to the early 30s, between the ages of 30
to 35. Performance begins to decline slightly until the late 30s,
then declines steadily with age. However, when workers are grouped
according to age, 21-30, 30s, 40s, and 50+, the high performers in the
oldest group do perform higher than the average for all other groups,
suggesting that some engineers retain technical competence.
In contrast to the age-performance relationship, salaries
increase with age until the early 40s, then plateau at that highest
level. Interpreted in terms of rate of salary increase, that rate
increases until the mid to late 30s, then begins to decline steadily
with age. Dalton and Thompson (1971] use this as evidence for why
project managers do not want older engineers on their projects: they
perform less well and cost more.
Dalton and Thompson then explore the question of whether
management evaluation is a valid indicator of performance, or does it
rather reflect a youth bias or some effort to rate young workers
highly and therefore retain them. Using complexity of job assignment
as a measure, based on the assumption that managers assign the most
difficult problems to their best performers, the peak age for
complexity of job assignment for technical workers is between age 26
and 30. It declines slightly until the late 30s, then plummets.
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When managers are included, the age-performance curve shifts
slightly upward and to the right, indicating that managers'
performance peaks at a somewhat later age, closer to the late 40s,
compared to the late 30s for engineers. That the shift is slight,
however, suggests that the problem with technical obsolescence cannot
simply he explained by better workers going into management, leaving
the less able in technical jobs.
Kopelman, Thompson, & Dalton examine the effect of education and
training on performance. For those holding a B.S. degree, the younger
the age when the degree was received, the higher the performance
rating. The highest pay-off to a degree was to those who received an
M.S. between the ages of 30 and 34. They find that taking courses did
not improve performance: the highest performers took the fewest
courses, and when the lowest performers took courses, there was no
resulting increase in performance, suggesting that they were taken too
late.
Kaufman's [1974] evaluation of university versus in-house courses
supports several of Kopelman, Thompson, & Dalton's findings.
Kaufman's results show that those who take university courses receive
higher salaries and more promotions. But, he also finds that there is
a tendency for younger engineers to take university courses and older
engineers to rely on the less rigorous in-house courses, so the
overall relationship between performance and in-house courses taken is
negative, because those courses are taken by the poorest performers
who fear obsolescence.
Thompson and Dalton and Dalton, Thompson, and Price use a
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subsequent survey of 200 scientists, engineers and managers to develop
a four-stage model of the professionally trained employee's career.
[Thompson & Dalton,1976; Dalton, Thompson, & Price, 1982]. They
contrast their model with the dominant existing models and show why
those models lead to failed policy solutions.
They discuss the pyramidal model of organizations, where career
development is synonomous with upward mobility and increases in all
rewards, pay, autonomy, and status, are attendent upon upward
movement. The failed policy solution based on this model is the dual
career ladder which fails because upward movement is not what
characterizes the development of a technical career. The other major
competing model they mention is the obsolescence model, where rapidly
changing technology makes the knowledge and skills of professionals
obsolete and shifts employer preferences toward recent graduates.
This model has prompted studies of the half-life of professional
education. The unsuccessful policy solution spawned by this model is
continuing education, both in-house and in universities.
In their model, they identify four stages of a professional's
career. Organizations can be evaluated by the way in which they
facilitate or impede passage through these states, the critical
variable for successful movement being job assignments. Briefly, the
four stages are: the apprenticeship stage, where one needs to balance
routine work and challenge seeking while learning from a mentor; the
start of independence, where one develops a technical or substantive
expertise, at the risk of overspecialization, and begins to make more
decisions; the mentor stage, which is when the tension between
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managerial and technical interests and responsibilities is most acute,
and one or more of three typical roles are played--the idea person,
the manager, and/or the informal mentor; and, the final stage, where
one becomes a higher level manager, internal entrepreneur, and/or idea
innovator, and is not directing the organization toward specific
goals. Not all workers can or do progress through all four stages.
But, they note that an individual must progress beyond stage two or
eventually be viewed as obsolete.
Hall and Mansfield [1975] take a psychological perspective on the
relationship between age and seniority and several career variables of
scientists and engineers [Hall & Mansfield, 1975]. The career
variables of interest were job involvement, perceived organizational
supportiveness, job challenge, and several personal needs, security,
affiliation, esteem, autonomy, and self-actualization. Their
methodology is somewhat questionable because they held two sets of
"group interviews" of nonmanagerial scientists and engineers in
twenty-two R&D firms in 1967 and 1969 and used the information from
those interviews as data for their study. It does not seem likely
that information gathered in a group setting could provide
sufficiently precise measures of the career variables they study.
Such a research methodology seems better suited to hypothesis
generation rather than testing. However, the external labor market
was tight in 1967 and loose in 1969, and the authors are able to
provide some interesting insights into the effect of the external
labor market on the internal labor market.
Briefly, they found that when external labor market conditions
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loosened, there was a relatively positive effect on older workers. In
1967, they found a positive relationship between aspiration for job
security and age. By 1969, there was no significant relationship, as
younger workers became equally concerned with job security in loose
labor markets. They also found that during bad times, in 1969, there
was a tendency for firms to better utilize older workers because they
had laid-off younger workers. In 1969, the level of job challenge
increased with age as compared to no relationship in 1967. In 1969,
older workers (age 50+) had higher job satisfaction than older workers
in 1967. And finally, the measured peak of self-fulfillment
opportunities on the job occurred for workers in their early 30s in
1967, but rose to those in their early 50 in 1969. Their conclusions
suggest that external labor market conditions may dominate the effect
of career stages and influence the utilization of human resources in a
way which contradicts the inevitability of obsolescence.
In Professionals Out of Work, Paula Leventman [1971] interviewed
300 scientists and engineers in 1971 and again in 1975 to examine the
effect of unemployment on these highly trained professionals. Her
sample distribution was: 6% were vice-presidents, 16% middle
management, 39% top level staff, and 39% staff personnel. Although
much of her book discusses how these workers coped with unemployment,
she examines several aspects of the labor market faced by scientists
and engineers and how these workers function in organizations.
She establishes what she considers to be the dominant feature of
this labor market, its dependence on federal government, particularly,
defense spending. For example, she notes that due to cuts in defense
11-18
spending and the NASA budget, 200,000 aerospace engineers were
laid-off between 1967 and 1972, with 10,000 scientists and engineers
laid-off in the Boston area. By 1975, defense spending was back up
again around route 128, but there was a shift away from research and
toward production, and what research was done was product oriented.
The importance of this dependence on federal spending was not just the
volatility in employment, but the observation that once a scientist or
engineer became involuntarily unemployed, career stability was never
restored: of those unemployed in 1971 in her sample, 24% were
reemployed and had that job in 1975, 34% were laid off and reemployed
twice by 1975, 4% started their own businesses, 16% were reemployed
three or more times, and 10% were never reemployed. Part of the
difficulty with reemployment was the implied relationship between
obsolescence and unemployment.
Based on respondent job descriptions, Leventman identifies six
sources of conflict between professional goals which she defines as
desire to use skills and understand context of job, and organizatinal
demands, which she defines as predictability and control. The first
is the microdivision of labor which results in skill underutilization
and eventual overspecialization. Frequently, of those directly
working on a project, only a project group leader would have some
control over tasks, suggesting one incentive for technical workers to
go into management. A second problem was a general problem of
organizational constraints on professional autonomy, a problem which
85% of those inteviewed described as inevitable. A third problem was
staff-line conflict where professionals viewed managers who did not
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fully understand technical problems as interfering. Many thought that
the opinion was mutual and that dual career ladders were set up to
keep scientists and engineers out of management.
A fourth problem was fear of obsolescence. Some viewed
obsolescence as inevitable in the face of rapidly changing technology.
Others saw it as a management induced problem where workers were
deliberately overspecialized to increase obsolescence so that the firm
could hire younger, cheaper labor. A fifth problem was a decline in
felt utility due to the high level of waste that accompanied defense
related projects. The high level of waste in defense related work
re-sulting in a lack of cost consciousness is cited as one of the
barriers to the mobility of defense engineers into commercial
engineering in a 1967 monograph prepared by the Stanford Research
Institute for the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
[Rittenhouse, 1967]. Eighty-one percent (81%) of Leventman's sample
had spent part of all of their careers working on defense or aerospace
contracts.
The final problem was a sense of the erosion of professionalism.
She cites a problem which is discussed in more detail by Goldner and
Ritti [Goldner and Ritti, 1967], the need to clarify the term
professional when applied to scientists and engineers. Both Leventman
and Goldner and Ritti note that unlike the prototype professional,
medical doctors and lawyers, scientists and engineers lack
independence, and the practice of the profession takes place in an
organizational context. This dependence on a work setting conflicted
with the orientation towards a profession learned during their
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training.
She develops a typology of how workers adapt to the conflict
between professional and organizational goals, where workers can be
arrayed along a continuum from orientation toward organizational goals
through professional orientation ending with a non-work orientation.8
Of interest is that only those with the strongest organizational
orientation, reflected in part by success in the hierarchy, was
significantly less likely to be laid-off during a downturn.
Aside from strong organizational orientation, she identified
several variables which were associated with the probability of
lay-offs. There was a positive relation between education and being
retained. Ceteris paribus, those with doctorates in science,
engineering or applied math were least likely to be laid-off.
Scientists were less likely to be laid-off than engineers. There was
a positive relationship between age and lay-offs. Also, certain types
of subspecialties, such as reliability engineers, were laid off.
B. Theoretical Approaches to the Conflict between Professionals and
Firms
In the previous section, the papers discussed explored career
issues facing midcareer scientists and engineers and attempted to
provide paradigms of their career stages. In this section, the papers
are directed toward providing an explanation for the tension between
scientists and engineers and the organizations which employ them.
Goldner and Ritti [1967] evaluate the use of dual career ladders
as a forum for discussing the relationship between professionalism in
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large organizations and career mobility. Their thesis is that
professionalism is an inappropriate concept to apply to scientists and
engineers working in large organizations and is synonomous with career
immobility within organizations. The ideology of professionalism, is
based on autonomy and loyalty to the profession rather then employing
organization. Presumably, autonomy rather than upward mobility within
an organization is part of the professional ethic. Using the results
of attitudinal surveys of new engineers (N=676), Goldner and Ritti
report results similar to Bailyn's [Bailyn, 1980], showing a strong
orientation toward organizational goals, indicating that engineers
themselves tend to have an organizational rather than.professional
orientation.
According to Goldner and Ritti, the application of the term
professional to scientists and engineers in large organizations is an
attempt to redefine failure to enter management in successful terms:
firms have recognized that everyone can not rise in the hierarchy, and
that there are non-managerial jobs within the organization which have
to be done and which require skill and a high level of commitment to
be done well. In an effort to reward technical competence, firms have
tried to set up a reward structure that parallels the managerial
hierarchy, the dual career ladder system.
The technical career ladder fails for several reasons, according
to the authors. First, the technical career ladder is set up to
reward individual performance by increasing autonomy. However, the
nature of technical work is that it is frequently performed by a group
of specialists who require coordination. In that setting, autonomy
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could mean the loss to a project of a needed skill. Therefore, the
work setting for many scientists and engineers does not allow for the
autonomy usually associated with professionalism.
The second reason for dual career ladder failure is the lack of
power associated with it. As professionals working solely on design
problems, most engineers have no opportunity to decide upon the
direction of project or company resources. According to a survey
within a firm, entry level engineers view promotion into the two
ladders as approximately equally attractive. As they approach the
choice in their own careers, 71%, as compared to 29%, view promotion
to the management ladder as more attractive, because, according to
Goldner and Ritti, they recognize that control over resources is
associated with management.
Although Goldner and Ritti view the dual career ladder as a
failed experiment, they conclude with the optimistic view that the
dual career ladder represents an early stage in the development of
alternative non-hierarchical definitions of success.
Bailyn [Bailyn, 1982b] views the alienation of midcareer
technical professionals as the result of two conflicting myths about
the expectations of engineers. The first is the academic myth, that
engineers can expect a continuing technical challenge. This directly
conflicts with the industrial myth that by age 40, a successful
engineer has left technical work for management. The difficulties
with these opposing myths are, first, they overgeneralize about the
talents and preferences of engineering labor. And, second, adherence
to one or the other myth leads many engineers to make less than
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optimal career choices: to either strive to remain competent to
technical challenges through continuing education, which has shown to
be less than effective [Kaufman, 1974; Kopelman, Thompson, & Dalton,
1973]; or to move into management, which for some is not the best use
of their talents. The reconciliation of these two myths depends in
part on engineers themselves recognizing their own orientations, but
also on firms providing what Bailyn calls "more imaginative career
paths than are commonly found in major firms today"[Bailyn, 1982b,
p.5 ].
Bailyn's assertion that part of the responsibility of technical
obsolescence belongs to the firm is supported by many authors. Dubin
[Dubin, 1973] makes the point that obsolescence, per se, can only
exist in a larger context; in other words, the organization defines
obsolescence. Leventman cites this problem when she notes that there
was no apparent relationship between number of journal articles
published or new patents issued and probability of lay-off. That
organizational factors are a major determinant is also reinforced by
Bailyn's results [Bailyn, 1980] that of those in the
scientific-professional pattern with high organizational positions,
most of whom are university professors, 77% are technically oriented,
compared to 22% of the highly positioned engineers. Given each group
represents comparable age cohorts, and so any age-obsolescence
relationship would hold equally for both groups, it appears that the
university structure encourages continuing technical competence but
the firm organizational structure does not. While technological
change is an important external factor in obsolescence, firm
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organization which discourages the use of a wide range of skills and
does not reward the continuing development of technical competence
force the choice between management and obsolescence.
Miller [1974] sees four different types of obsolescence: 1) that
due to lack of use of a specific skill; 2) functional obsolescence,
when a technology becomes obsolete or a firm changes its technological
direction; 3) motivational obsolescence, where an individual decreases
work effort; and, 4) obsolescence due to a built-in bias toward youth,
where experience limits rather than increases opportunity. According
to Miller, variety of job assignment is the key variable to reduce the
probability of obsolescence. Although some of these types are more
amenable to firm control, firms must recognize the dynamics of the
problem and show a commitment to resolving it.
Davis and Davis and Trist [Davis,1974; Davis & Trist, 1974] see
the problem of obsolescence as firm failure to recognize that work is
done in a sociotechnical system. The two basic premises of
sociotechnical theory are that, first, work output is produced jointly
in a social and technological system, and efficient production
requires joint optimization of these two systems. And, second, each
sociotechnical system is embedded in the firm's culture and value
system environment. Sociotechnical theory rejects the concept of
technological determinism in the organization of work which they claim
is the basic underlying assumption made by firms that generates
obsolescence. They cite an example of a firm in the aerospace
industry faced with problems of high engineer turnover and cost.
overruns. Analysis of the problem showed that engineers had developed
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an industry rather than firm orientation to avoid stagnation and, as
such, were not concerned with firm specific cost controls.
Recognition that fear of obsolescence was the underlying cause, the
firm restructured its personnel allocation so that an immediate job
represented the intersection of both task needs and career needs.
Pettigrew (Pettigrew,1973] sees the obsolescence problem as a
dynamic process. His case study of programmers, which will not be
detailed here, describes how one group of technical specialists,
computer programmers, threatened by technological change and the
firm's increasing use of systems analysts to bridge the gap between
organizational objectives and the programmers' output, attempt to
shelter themselves from loss of independence. The programmers'
strategy was to declare themselves to be professionals and imitate
prototypical professionals' efforts to safeguard their profession:
claiming a unique knowledge base and attempted control over
recruitment and training. In this case, the programmers isolated
themselves into obsolescence. Pettigrew's analysis is consistent with
points made by Goldner and Ritti who argue that professionalism is an
inappropriate concept in an organizational context, and by Bailyn, who
notes fear of movement as leading to stagnation [Bailyn, 1982c].
The final two papers take the perspective that obsolescence is
the result of firm efforts to control the workplace. Both examine the
use of computer programmers, but the tendency toward
overspecialization that they document can be applied to scientists and
engineers.
Unlike some of the other authors cited here, Greenbaum and Kraft
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(Greenbaum,1979; Kraft,1977] view the application of the term
professional to technical labor as eminating from firms as a means to
avoid unionization. Greenbaum sees firms as encouraging
overspecialization as a means to decrease worker mobility and gain
control over task definitions and the pace of work. Like Davis and
Trist, Greenbaum rejects technological determinism, but rather sees
the organization of work as the outcome of the struggle for control
over the workplace. She describes the problem with programmers as one
where managers supervise lower level workers with higher level
expertise, thus disrupting the firm's hierarchical structure.
Overspecialization, or deskilling (the deliberate attempt by firms to
increasingly divide labor thus reducing the skill needed by any given
worker to perform a task) was the firm response.
Both Greenbaum and Kraft regard dual career ladders as control
mechanisms. Greenbaum sees the establishment of technical ladders as
a way to duplicate for technical personnel the method of control that
has worked so well with managerial personnel, minute stratification to
create the illusion of mobility. Kraft, on the other hand views the
creation of dual systems as a way to channel "'acceptable' people into
'appropriate' jobs" [Kraft, 1977, p. 87]. According to Kraft, those
on the managerial career ladder receive higher salaries and are more
mobile because they become generalists which is a prerequisite for
upper management and, he thinks, more interfirm movement. He sees the
technical ladder as a palliative.
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III. Issues Raised by this Literature
As was mentioned earlier, this literature review had two
purposes, to establish the midcareer dilemma faced by many scientists
and engineers between remaining in technical work and choosing
management, and to indicate the need for an understanding of this
problem in a labor market context.
That the implications of this career choice are not well
understood in terms of labor market theory is clear from this
literature review. Only two of the papers directly refer to the role
of the external labor market in affecting career path outcomes. Hall
and Mansfield note the effect of external market changes on job
content and satsifaction of older technical workers. And, Leventman
notes the differential lay-off and reemployment effects between those
who are strongly oriented to firm goals and those who are not.
The human capital hypothesis would predict differences in
outcomes as due either to an unwillingness of technical workers to
continue to make the needed on the job human capital investment, or
due to the fact that there is a ceiling on how much on the job
experience can contribute to the productivity of a technical worker
which reduces the difference between the productivity of younger and
older workers. In fact, this theory would predict that experience
would increase the productivity of managerial workers due to their
increase in firm specific knowledge, but might actually decrease the
productivity of technical workers due to external rates of
technological change.
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In the next chapter, the human capital literature is discussed as
well as several papers that suggest that the productivity-wage may be
mitigated by firm structure and implicit agreements between firms and
workers about production, job security, and earnings.
FOOTNOTES
1 Beyond their brief presentation of the cobweb model, the theoretical
discussion is primiarily limited to a survey of approaches to
estimating the supply and demand sides of the engineering labor
market. They devote an entire chapter to a discussion of choosing
appropriate occupational categories: they argue for the use of
categories which capture the concept of substitutability of inputs in
the production process. But, they do not make use of this concept in
their own selection of occupational categories.
In their discussion of modeling the demand side of the market,
they emphasize the important role that marginal product plays in the
demand function, which is characteristic of thie type of study. By
assuming that the marginal revenue product function of labor is the
same as the demand schedule for that labor, they are forced to also
assume some kind of intra-marginal homogeneity of labor. Other
literature about engineers suggests that the career phase of a
particular engineer strongly influences what that worker can produce
and so challenges the assumption of homogeneity of labor within
occupational categories. So, to be consistent with the model, any
measure of Q should really be a measure only of new entrants to the
engineering market and dQ should refer to those in, say, a queue of
recently graduated engineers. Although they do not acknowledge this,
their theoretical model really only applies to the new entrant portion
of that labor market.
On the supply side, they present three different methods of
analysis, all based on the human capital occupational choice model.
The first is a straight forward calculation of rate of return on the
investment made in an engineering education. They raise several
questions about this method, one being the likely positive correlation
between unmeasured ability and education, biasing the education
coefficient upward, and another, which they fail to incorporate into
the demand side discussion, that occupational status does not stay
fixed over time.
The second method is a recursive method, where salary
expectations are formed based on the current year, but the supply is
not affected for several years. Using this approach, the lag
structure is estimated. This method of estimation explicitly only
applies to new entrants to the engineering labor market. They note
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that to estimate the total supply schedule, which would also allow
either for horizontal shifts or upgrading of technicians.
The third estimation approach is to construct a simultaneous
model of the quantity of workers supplied and demanded in an
occupation. The paper by O'Connell presents such a model, so comments
about this method will be reserved for the discussion of that paper.
2
The categories include: entrepreneur, general manager, functional
manager, science manager, engineering manager, staff scientist, staff
engineer, business staff, science professor, engineering professor,
and consultant.
In order to be certain that she was associating job values with
actual occupational roles rather than just individual preferences, she
used only the answers from that part of the sample which described
themsevles as successful (N-314).
76% of E rate challenging work as "very important" compared to 84%
of pattern SP; 56% of pattern E rank freedom to be creative and
original as "very important" compared to 86% of SP; and a sense of
accomplishment is "very important" to 77% of pattern E compated to 86%
of SP. Again using the percent rating a value as "very important",
47% of E versus 13% of SP valued opportunity for high earnings, 68% of
E versus 35% of SP valued opportunity for advancement; 57% or E versus
25% of SP valued opportunity for leadership; and, 60% versus 39%
valued contribution to organization [Bailyn,1980,p.26-27].
5 In addition, she attempts to test a very important concept, whether
those values which were exhibited are the result of preselection or
career socialization. Her test is based on an admittedly questionable
assumption that Ph.D.s, whether in science or engineering, have a
similar value orientation upon graduation. Sorting the sample of
successful respondents into E-no Ph.D., E-Ph.D., and SP-Ph.D., she
looks at the percent of each category which exhibit intrinsic versus
extrinsic falues and finds support for the socialization concept.
The role of socialization is either implicitly or explicitly
important in this literature which addresses the choice between
technical and managerial career paths. The power of a dominant myth
which Bailyn and others identify, that engineers, in particular, must
become managers or be viewed as failures, depends in part upon the
extent to which workers are socialized into adopting extrinsic rather
than intrinsic values.
6 Of the sample, only 727 show an unambiguous orientation. Of those
whose orientation could be identified, the groups with the largest
share with a technical orientation were SP/L and SP/H, with 81% and
77%, respectively showing a technical orientation.
7
The group with the strongest human orientation was E/H , with 44%.
And, the group with the strongest non-work orientation was E/L, with
54%.
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8 Bailyn's [Bailyn, 1982b] four sources of stagnation encountered by
those who continue on a technical career track parallel Leventman's
paradigm. 1) a tendency toward overspecialization, due to both "burn
out" after working on a narrow task too long, and, that as a
technology itself becomes obsolete, it is difficult for an engineer
with overly narrow skills to make the transition to new technologies.
2) the lack of firm rewards to and recognition of technical
accomplishment. where the technical career ladder in a dual career
ladder firm is perceived as and often is an alternative position for
those who attempted but failed to rise on the management ladder. 3)
the lack of scope, area over which engineers have responsibility.
Unlike Goldner and Ritti who see as unreconcilable the problem of
technical workers needing managerial coordination, Bailyn thinks that
there are technical planning and coordination aspects of projects over
which engineers can have control as they gain experience. 4)
oversupervision: as engineers gain in experience, they should be
permitted to monitor their own work and be accountable for a broader
range of tasks.
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CHAPTER III
Review of the Literature on
the Relationship between Earnings and Work Experience
Introduction
Since the early 1960s, when the idea that individuals invest in
themselves, or accumulate human capital, to become more productive was
introduced, an enormous amount of literature exploring the theoretical
implications for and empirial effects of this investment decision has
been generated. Gary Becker's monograph, Human Capital [1964],
devlops, among other topics, a theory of on-the-job human capital
formation, distinguishing between two types, general and firm-specific
experiential. Becker provides an explanation of the difference
between general and firm-specific human capital and hypothesizes
different labor market outcomes associated with each type of
investment. Firm-specific training is a key concept in reconciling
the human capital and institutional approaches to the labor market,
because certain explanations of the existence of internal markets rest
on the importance of specific training. The human capital focus is
on who pays for and receives returns on that investment and how that
affects wages and turnover/tenure. The institutional approach
emphasizes the institutions which emerge to protect this investment.
For example, Wachter and Williamson [1978] see firm specific skills as
being so central to the labor market that bilateral monopolies result,
and both workers and firms have strong incentives to minimize turnover
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and bargain over wages.
However, there is some debate about the actual importance of firm
specific training. Sherwin Rosen argues that the importance of firm
specific training depends only on transaction costs and so has only a
short term effect unless a formal structure arises to institutionalize
those costs [Rosen,1977]. In an attempt to establish the point that
the efficient operation of some internal markets may involve
substantial turnover, Hall argues that it is possible that firm
experience may be a prerequisite for a job, but has no economic value
[Hall,1981]. In other words, no firm-specific human capital is
acquired through experience.
The major difficulty in determining the effects of these two
types of training is that the distinction between them rests on the
relationship between wages and the marginal product of labor. Once
the period-by-period assumption that wages equal the marginal product
of labor is abandoned, the unobservable nature of the marginal product
of labor complicates any empirical efforts. With the exception of
Becker's monograph, the papers in this review in one form or another
address this problem of the unobservability of the central human
capital variables and the theoretical and empirical problems that
arise from this feature of the hypothesis.
The literature review begins with a discussion of Becker's
hypothesis. Rosen's 1977 survey of the literature best describes the
major points and gaps in the human capital literature up to that
point, and so the highlights of his survey will be reviewed.
Additional pre-1977 papers and more recent papers addressing Rosen's
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points will be integrated into that section. Section III is a survey
of the turnover literature which concentrates on estimating returns to
mobility and to tenure. Those papers represent efforts to separate
the effects of aging and experience as a way of estimating the returns
to specific human capital. In the final section, papers are discussed
that challenge the link between productivity and earnings and argue
that institutional arrangements determine wage and turnover patterns.
I. Becker's Analysis of Human Capital Investment
Although there had been previous studies of the economics of
education, the first comprehensive statement of the human capital
approach was Gary Becker's 1964 monograph, Human Capital. Becker's
work is rich, spawning much subsequent research. The primary advance
of the human capital theory was to characterize individual labor
market outcomes as determined by individual decisions to forego
present gains by investing in themselves, augmenting their human
capital in order to receive greater income in the future. Previously,
expenditures on education, health, migration, etc. were viewed as a
form of consumption and analyzed in a utility-maximization framework
[Blaug, 1976]. In developing his human capital investment approach
where the internal rate of return was the decision-making criterion,
Becker was able to begin to explain such phenomena as education,
search for job information, and on-the-job training (OJT) in a
rational economic framework, which did not rely heavily on individual
tastes and utility.
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Becker enumerates several different forms of human capital
investment, but he restricts his own analysis to the calculation of
the rate of return to investment in formal education and OJT. He
begins his discussion of OJT with the equilibrium condition that would
hold in a perfectly competitive market where the demand for labor is a
derived demand: MP=W, where MP is the marginal product and W the wage
rate. That condition is altered to MP =W , where t is the tth period.
But once OJT is introduced, it is necessary to depart from this
period-by-period equilibrium condition and consider the effects of
present expenditures on future receipts. Human capital investment is
characterized by the willingness to accept lower present earnings with
the expectation of greater future gains. And, firms are seen as joint
producers of both goods and services and training. The new
equilibrium condition, which explicitly includes the relationship
between present training costs and future returns, is
MP +- (MP /(1 + i)t) = w + k + - (w /(1 + i)t0 t=l t 0 t=l t
where k is the actual outlay on training and the subscript, 0,
signifies the initial period. That equation can be rewritten as
MPO' + G = w0 + c
where MPO' includes foregone production, G = ((MPt - w )/(l +0 t=l t t
i)t), and is the difference between future receipts and future
expenditures; and, c is the sum of opportunity costs of training and
k, the actual outlay for training.
At this point, Becker makes a major distinction between two
different types of training that occur on the job, general and
specific. The key difference between the two is that the first has
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value in firms other than the firm where the training took place; that
is, general training would increase the worker's marginal product
elsewhere. And, the second only has economic value within one
specific firm. This is an important distinction, because limitations
on where an individual can realize returns on training related human
capital investment affects mobility patterns and increases the
hardship associated with involuntary unemployment.
Becker's observation about the difference between these two
types of training has inspired a large quantity of theoretical work.
For example, the development of internal labor markets is often
attributed to the presence of specific training. However, the
separation of these two types of training has been difficult to make
empirically, leaving the link between training and labor market
outcomes, such as earnings and tenure patterns, in dispute.
A. General Training
Becker's argument for the concavity of the earnings function
begins with the observation that, given that general training can be
used in any firm, there is no incentive for firms to invest in general
training if zero or even negative returns on their investment are
likely due to turnover. Workers, and not firms, pay for that type of
training. Putting that into an equilibrium framework, G = 0, so MP0
= w + c, which can be restated as MP = w - k, and therefore: w =
MP - k; or, wages equal marginal productivity minus training costs.
Training is assumed to take place early in one's career in order
to have the longest period over which productivity can be increased,
and because, as productivity increases, the foregone costs of
-- -- --------- 
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investment rise. So, wages are less than the opportunity marginal
product at the beginning of one's work life. After training is
completed, a worker's earnings rise to the value of the new, higher
marginal product. The higher the initial training costs, the steeper
the earnings function during that transitional period. Diagram 1
shows this relationship, where TT is the earnings function of a
trained worker, UU is that of an untrained worker, and T'T' is the
earnings function which underlies TT.
Diagram 1
B. Specific Training
Specific training is training that increases worker productivity
only in that firm that provide the training and so is not useful in
other firms. Therefore, a worker's opportunity wages are independent
of the level of specific training.
Training and Turnover. Becker's discussion begins with the
observation that the rational worker will pay for specific training
only if that worker receives all the returns from that investment in
the form of higher wages. Becker's point is to show how specific
training affects the wages/marginal product relationship and how that
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relationship depends upon the probability of turnover. If the firm
were to pay all the costs, it would expect to receive all the returns.
The equilibrium condition is: MP0' + G = w 0 + c, where G =
(t ((MP -Wt)/(l + i) ). Letting w be the opportunity wage, G is thetl=l t
net present value of the returns on the training investment. Assuming
that G = C, initially, wages will equal the opportunity rather the
actual marginal product of labor. Once specific training, paid for by
the firm, begins, the worker's productivity will rise. But, the firm
will capture the benefits of that increased productivity because the
firm paid for the training. So, wages will not equal the marginal
product of labor, but will continue to equal the opportunity wage.
But, it is also possible to have an alternative arrangement,
where workers pay for some or all of the training and share or collect
all of the benefits. Here is where the probability of turnover
becomes important: the willingness of either workers or firms to pay
for specific training will depend upon the probability of turnover.
Whoever pays for specific training will lose returns on that
investment if turnover occurs. This then introduces the possibility
that training costs are shared, and that these shares are determined,
in part, by the probability of quits and layoffs.
Applying this argument to the question of the relationship
between wages and marginal product, Becker starts with the previous
equilibrium condition, MP' + G = w + C. Then, letting G' equal the
share of returns going to employees, G'' (= C) be the full equilibrium
level of returns, and a be the share of G'' collected by firms, so
that G + G' = G'' and G = aG'', the previous equilibrium condition can
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be written as: MP' + aC = w + C or w = MP' - (1-a)C. So, wages are
diminished by the share of their own specific training for which
workers pay.
Becker uses this conclusion about the relationship between wages
and marginal product to develop a theory of turnover. Essentially,
his argument is that first, a rational firm will pay generally trained
workers their opportunity wage and specifically trained workers more
than the external market wage. He makes the case in some detail that
firms will have an incentive not to lay off specifically trained
workers and will keep tham even if their marginal product temporarily
falls below their wage rate due to some temporary decline in product
demand. Firms will use techniques such as increasing wages or
offering high post-training wages to reduce turnover. His discussion
of what workers would do is very brief and is summarized by the
conclusion that changes in the employment level in response to the
business cycle will be less dramatic for specifically trained workers
than for those with general training.
Implications of the Training Distinction. This concept, that
there are two different types of experiential training is important
for several reasons. First, it provides an explanation which does not
depend on the firm being a monopsonist of why wages may not equal
marginal product even in an efficient labor market. Second, it
provides a basis for a theory of turnover because, since specific
training is not costless and yields positive returns only in a
particular setting, whoever pays for the training will be hurt by
turnover.
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Third, it implies that there will be differential rates of return
to firm tenure and interfirm mobility depending upon the relative size
of the investment shares of specific and general training. A worker
who has invested primarily in firm specific human capital should
realize greater returns to tenure than an individual who, other things
being equal, invested more in general training. And, a generally
trained person should receive relatively higher rates of return on
mobility than one specifically trained.
And, finally, Becker's conceptualization recognizes that firms
are joint producers of both goods and services and training. And,
that as such, the firm must operate along some training production
function.
II. Rosen's Survey
In his 1977 survey of the empirical research done on human
capital, Rosen enumerates several flaws and gaps in existing work.
His discussion centers around efforts to address two types of
problems: methods to estimate unobservable variables and the
derivation of behavioral models with explicit structural foundations
that explain the optimum investment choice.
The basic human capital investment equation is: max V = (Z
/(l+r) ), where Vt is net present value, Z is the accounting
identity, the difference between two income streams, Zt =t t and r
is the interest rate. The internal rate of return, i, is found by
replacing r with i and setting Vt = 0. The investment choice then
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depends on whether i>r.
Immediate problems occur because once the assumption of the
homogeneity of labor is dropped, r is expected to vary with the
individual and is therefore unobservable. In addition, comparison of
the earnings streams by extrapolation requires strong assumptions
about differences in life-cycle earnings patterns. Choice of an
appropriate comparison group to proxy Xt and Yt is complicated by the
likely effect of self-selection. And, there is some debate about
whether earnings is an adequate measure of income. So, although in
this simple model the criteria are conceptually clear, individual
choices about education and investment in on-the-job training are not
simply estimated because the major variables cannot readily be
measured.
A. The Ability-Schooling Problem
Although Rosen is discussing the education decision rather the
on-the-job training decision, his sample model underscores the
self-selection problem. He begins with an earnings function:
Y=f(s,A), where s is years of school, initially a slope predictor, and
A is ability, a shift parameter, exogenously given. The problem is to
choose the level of s which maxmizes the discounted value of future
income: V(s) = y(s,A)e-rt dt. The decision rule again is to choose s
so that r = i. Diagram 2 shows the relationship: V/s - r, with v(s)
and f(s,A) being tangent at i = r.
1\f5)
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Diagram 2
The major problem with estimating this is that r and A are not
independent and, therefore, the model is underidentified. Rosen notes
that if separate measures of r and A were available, then the model
would be exactly identified and thus could be estimated recursively.
The primary implication of this interdependence between r and A is
that a self-selection bias occurs in the schooling choice. Those who
are more able are thought to face lower education costs. Therefore,
what appear to be returns to education are actually returns to
ability.
Much effort in the human capital literature has gone into
controlling for this probable bias. A recent breakthrough in the
resolution of this issue has been the recent availability of usable
longitudinal data which cover a sufficiently long period of labor
force experience.
Several efforts have been made to measure ability directly in
order to eliminate the bias on the education coefficient. Taubman and
Wales (1974) use the NBER-Thorndike sample of 75,000 males from the
WWII Army Air Corps to attempt to estimate an unbiased rate of return
to education by proxying ability and the interest rate, r, using
several variables: education, test scores on general and mathematical
ability, personal biographical indices, health, and father's
education. They also test the screening hypothesis, that education is
used as a sorting mechanism by employers and not because it provides
necessary "affective" skills.
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A recent paper that implicitly addresses the self-selection
problem is by Randall Filer, who maintains that the structure of real
human capital is poorly defined. He constructs and estimates a model
that he argues reveals the underlying structural relationship between
the different components of human capital and earnings. His model is
a two equation model: Y=f(K,z ) and K=g(s,x,z2 ), where Y is income, I
is a vector of human capital stocks, s is education, x is experience,
z is a vector of other variables which influence wages, and z2 is a
vector of other variables affecting human capital stock. The first
equation is an hedonic wage equation and the second an implicit human
capital production function.
He claims that, ordinarily, because of lack of data, a third
reduced form equation is estimated: Y=h(s,x,z ,z 2). Filer uses a
linear specification, and after testing for simultaneity with the
Hausman specification test, estimates his model using OLS. Because of
his unique data set that includes multiple personality and background
measures, Filer can estimate what seems to be a more complete version
of his second equation.
A possible criticism of his paper is that he is relying on
indices of subtle personality traits that are difficult to measure
such as objectivity, friendliness, and thoughtfulness. And, while
many of these personality variables are statistically significant,
their contribution to the explained variance is negligible in
comparison to that from the conventionally used human capital
variables.
In a paper by Nickell, a longitudinal data set is exploited to
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control for unobservable variables that could bias estimates. He is
studying the determinants of occupational success in Britain, using a
human capital framework. Occupational attainment is a function of
individual characteristics, such as ability and family background, and
explicit human capital investment variables (education, training,
experience, etc.). His model is: Y = B + B. X.. + f + uit Ot j=1 jt Jit i it$
2
u = u + e, q q < 1, and e "N(0,- ), where Y is earnings forit it it$ it it
individual i in time t, Xit is the set of j observable human capital
variables, and f. is the set of unobservable human capital
characteristics.
He estimates two sets of equations, one using data from the
starting and ending points of the survey period (1965 - 1975) and one
using the full set of longitudinal data. His two point model is the
difference between the earnings equations for two points in time:
Y - Y = (B -B +100w ) + S-(B -B. )X + a. X +21 ii 2 1 2 j j2 j1 jil J j2 ji2
%(d. -d.j)Z.. + 20w e + (u -u ), where e. is experience and f. are3 32 131 2 12 12 11 i
fixed personal characteristics. The affect of all fixed effects,
including the unmeasurable f i, can no longer be identified.
To use the full set of data, he estimates a log-linear model:
ln Yit = B + BXijt i + u uit = uit- + e it, E(f uit 0.
He tests for this last assumption, that f "N(O, 21), but has to reject
it. He therefore uses an instrumental variable technique to correct
for that problem.
After identifying the difficulties of estimation of educational
effects due to the interdependence of r and A, Rosen points out an
alternative interpretation of the earnings function that Mincer
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articulates in his 1974 monograph, Schooling, Experience and Earnings
[Mincer,1974]. Under Mincer's interpretation, labor productivity is
not measured in marginal units, but rather each level of education
teaches a discrete set of skills, and there is no substitutability
between these different skill sets. Therefore, different earnings
profiles represent the different rental rates to these different
discrete skill groups. And, while individual ability, which in this
context can be seen as aptitude for different types of skills, may be
correlated with educational level, given the discrete nature of the
different skill levels, it does not create an estimation problem.
Under this "equalizing difference" hypothesis, ln(y) = ln(E0 ) + rs
describes a behavioral not reduced form, relationship.
B. Human Capital Investment on the Job
Rosen's criticism of the investment framework used by both Becker
[1964] and Mincer [1962] is straight forward. Individuals are again
maximizing net present value. Here, the cost or investment is equal
to the opportunity cost of the nearest alternative so that zt = y t
x r:c - cT. Rosen shows how this formulation can be converted
tT
into an earnings function where earnings depend on the share of each
period spent investing rather than on earning. However, he notes the
lack of constraints that make the model inadequate theoretically. The
difficulty is that once the realistic assumption of a finite working
life is imposed, the model is underidentified even with the assumption
that cN, the level of investment in the final period of work, equals
zero. To solve the problem, the value of r is usually imposed
exogenously.
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According to Rosen, the difficulty with this type of calculation
is that imposing r exogenously is essentially the same as constraining
the marginal interest rate to equal the average rate, and that the
assumed identity, V = C , is essentially the same as assuming the
marginal costs, average costs, and marginal returns are all equal,
disallowing over or under investment by individuals. He argues the
need for restrictive assumptions about the unobservables (see Bartel &
Borjas, 1978, for an example of the restrictive cost assumption).
The chief criticism of the models presented so far is their lack
of ability to allow for estimation of the underlying structural
parameters. According to Rosen, optimum accumulation models are
preferable because they result in estimates of lifetime earnings
trajectories that arc through a series of earnings functions where
earnings are a function of embodied knowledge K and K'(=dK/dt). By
introducing what amounts to a learning production function, underlying
parameters of the investment decision, such as r and learning
depreciation can be estimated.
c. Optimum Investment Models
Two examples of optimum human capital investment models are those
by Ben-Porath [1967] and Rosen [1972]. Ben-Porath uses a production
function approach where individuals use human capital to produce human
capital and are constrained by rising marginal costs. Individuals are
assumed to be able to allocate their time between the production of
human.capital and the production of earnings in each period. He shows
that because the marginal costs of human capital production increase
over the life-cycle, the observed age-earnings profile of low earnings
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early in life with earnings increasing at a decreasing rate until T,
the last period of work, can be explained.
In Ben-Porath's model, earnings are a function of units of human
capital employed in producing earnings and the rental rate: Yt = a0 t'
where Yt is earnings in time t, a0 is the rental rate, and Kt is the
service unit of human capital in time t. The human capital production
function is: Qt= B0(stKt B DtB , where BI and B2 > 0, B + B2 1'
and O<s <1. Q is the flow of human capital produced; D is the
t
quantity of purchased inputs at price P; and, st is the fraction of
time available in period t for the production of human capital.
Investment costs have two components, opportunity costs and
direct costs: I = (a s K ) + (P D ). Individuals want to minimize
t O tt d t
their investment costs subject to some desired level of human capital
production, Qt, and possible limits on the amount of time in each
period that can be spent on the production of K, st.
What he shows is that when the individual decides on the optimum
course of investment, the relative price of investment (a0  d), does
not change the quantity of human capital produced, because an increase
in a0 increases the value of human capital by an equal amount.
Therefore, the marginal investment (or human capital production) cost
curve from is stationary over time. And, assuming that s, the time
available for production, can vary from period to period and so does
not act as a constraint, the demand for K is perfectly elastic and
moves down over time as P increases. The series of intersections
between the demand curves and the marginal cost curve define the
optimal investment path for the individual.
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Ben-Porath does not differentiate between general and firm
specific knowledge, and unless a restrictive assumption about lifetime
firm tenure were made, the perfectly elastic demand curves would apply
only to general human capital.
Rosen's paper also considers only general human capital. His
purpose is to explain the lifetime earnings profile. To do this, he
uses a model where jobs have various levels of training opportunities
associated with them, and firms essentially sell jobs to workers. He
hypothesizes that workers select jobs based on their demand for
learning which depends on the cost of investment. Using Ben-Porath's
conclusion, he sees that cost as increasing with age as opportunity
costs of learning increase due to increased embodied human capital
stock. He describes worker choice as a series of job switches, where
workers progress to jobs with ever diminishing learning opportunities
and thus higher earnings.
He then discusses firm incentives to provide a series of learning
opportunities. His argument is based on the production function of
the firm and the relative prices of employing some level of human
capital.
Although his model provides an interesting framework for
examining worker job choice, his treatment of the costs associated
with firm-specific human capital and its effect on job choice and
earnings profiles raises a question about this approach being able to
explain completely earnings over time. Rosen minimizes the role that
firm-specific human capital plays in the long run and argues that in a
competitive market, its importance depends upon the presence of
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transaction costs and perhaps the degree to which those costs are
institutionalized. As a result, although Rosen argues for the need
for an exactly identified structural model, his own survey only
cursorily mentions elements of training supply, that is, firm
decisions about training. Individuals are assumed to make autonomous
decisions about the optimum level of human capital investment, given
some exogenous level of firm costs of supplying training.
III. Turnover
Becker explicitly links turnover and firm specific human capital
in his discussion of the sharing of investment costs between workers
and firms. The rational individual would not pay for firm specific
skills. However, these costs are shared because of the non-zero
probability of turnover and that the rate of investment in firm
specific human capital depends on the probability of turnover. As in
the case of the education decision, the cost of on-the-job training to
the individual is equal to foregone earnings, where these earnings are
hypothesized to be equal to the marginal product of labor.
Unfortunately, the investment costs, the opportunity wage, and
the marginal product of labor are all unobservable. Consequently,
studies of returns to turnover provide the current best means of
estimating firm specific human capital: returns to job tenure can be
used as a first approximation of returns to firm-specific human
capital, and turnover can be thought of as either a loss of that
capital or an indication that an investment was never made. Not all
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of the papers mentioned in this section are explicit about this
connection between turnover and firm specific human capital, but are
included because of interesting techniques used or particularly
relevant results.
Effect of Interruptions in Labor Force Participation. Two
studies that address the question of firm-specific human capital
accumulation are those by Mincer and Ofek [1982] and Lazear [1976].
Mincer and Ofek use longitudinal panel data on married women from the
National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) to examine the rate of depreciation
and rrestoration of human capital that occurs after an interruption in
labor force participation. They assume that, after returning to
employment, wages of leavers are less than those of stayers due to
foregone general human capital. But, if return wages are lower than
exit wages, the difference is due to loss of specific human capital.
Diagram 3 shows the hypothesized relationship.
Diagram 3
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AB is flatter than JK if the interruption is anticipated.3
Mincer and Ofek estimate two earnings functions, one using
retrospective (pre-1966) data and one using the panel data. Their
model is: ln W = as + Be + Ce + Dh0 + Eh + ux, where e0 is past
labor force participation, e1 is current participation; and h0 and h
are past and present non-participation. s and x are schooling and
"other variables". Letting T equal the reentry time, eI becomes 0 and
so: ln W = as + Be + Dh0 + Eh + uxT is estimated using retrospective
data. They find the long-run effects of experience (B) and withdrawal
(D) to be significant The short-run effects (C and E) are also
significant and much larger than the long-run, supporting their
hypothesis.
They then use the panel data to estimate sections of their model
separately, ln WT - ln WV, and ln W 74, the effect of withdrawal on the
return period. The results on the first panel data estimation confirm
the estimates made with retrospective data. They find that
depreciation occurs only on general human capital and that the loss of
specific human capital is a "once-for-all" occurrence resulting from
job separation.
In his paper, "Age, Experience, and Wage Growth," Lazear looks at
the effect of employment interruption on earnings as a means of
separating the effects of aging from labor force experience. He
expects that earnings growth will be based not just on age but on time
spent on the job. He uses the NLS sample of young men and looks at
the period 1966 to 1969. His model is: W691 = AW66i t + u where W69
is the wage rate for individual i in 1969, W661 for 1966, A is a shift
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parameter reflecting cohort effects and the business cycle, it is the
T" 2
rate of wage growth, and u "N(O, I). Because ;it is a function of the
changes in schooling and in job-related human capital, he works
through a process to approximate a measure of the unobserved changes
in OJT generated human capital.
Lazear's purpose is different from that of Mincer and Ofek in
that he is not trying to separate general from specific human capital,
but examines whether interruption in employment has a single shift
effect or continues to influence subsequent earnings. He finds that
an individual not working for one year out of the three in the survey
period will experience a $.148 per hour loss of earnings which will
continue over the working life of that person. In addition, the
job-experience effect resulting from foregone capital accumulation due
to work interruption will affect the rate of earnings growth. He
finds that the negative effect of work interruption on earnings is
greater for younger workers, who are investing at a much greater rate,
than for older workers who invest less with time.
Returns to Turnover. Three papers which examine returns to
turnover are those by Bartel and Borjas [1978], Borjas and Rosen
[1980] and Blau and Kahn [1981]. Bartel and Borjas in their study of
the relationship between wage growth and turnover examine the
difference in returns to quits versus layoffs. Specifically, they are
interested in two questions: does mobility pay and is there a
relationship between turnover and wage growth within the job. The
argument they are making in this second question is that while it is
accepted that mobility often acts as a shift parameter, they
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hypothesize that for a given individual, tenure will lead to a steeper
slope. This second question has implications for the cpecific human
capital hypothesis because if those with longer tenure do indeed have
steeper earnings profiles, that lends support to the hypothesis that
the rate of firm specific human capital investment depends upon the
probability of turnover.
They compare wage changes for movers versus stayers for two
groups, older and younger males. Using a migration framework, they
hypothesize that wage change is: dw (and dln(w)) = f(quits, layoffs,
5
reasons for quits, push factors, pull factors, X.). In order to
control for self-selection, they partition the survey time into three
periods, 1967-69, 69-71, and 71-73, and restrict their sample to those
who did not change jobs at all from 1967 to 1973 and those who moved
only between 1969 and 1971. They then make the assumption that
movers' earnings in the period from 1967 to 1969 can be extrapolated
throughout the survey period to provide a definition of the
alternative not taken.6
Bartel and Borjas derive their estimable model using a human
capital investment framework and hypothesize that investment costs are
a function of prior experience,Tr, current job tenure, e n, and initial
experience in the first job COn: (3) Ct = COn -n 1n n en To
estimate C On hey assume that it is positively correlated with the
* *
probability of separation: Con = + ft ,where t is actual tenure
* 7
as an approximation of expected tenure: t = e + Rn. Their final
n
model is: dY = (rnAn +n + r ) - rn nW + r (n n )n + rnenR .
Their results allow them to conclude that, first, there is a
111-23
difference between age groups. Mobility pays for younger workers but
not for older. However, if either move for "pull" reasons, that is,
finding a better job, both experience wage gains. For younger
workers, movers gained more than stayers. However, if holding labor
force participation constant, there a strong positive relationship
between tenure and positive lifetime earnings growth. Borjas [1978]
also finds strong support for this result.
Borjas and Rosen [1980], aware of the support for the finding
that movers tend to have flatter lifetime earnings profiles than those
with more stable job histories, examine whether turnover is or is not
an efficiency mechanism. In effect, they are examining two empirical
questions: whether or not expectations of earnings affects the
probability of turnover; and, to what extent does mobility pay off to
movers in comparison to stayers and tenure to stayers in comparison to
moving.
They estimate both a structural and reduced form model. They
start with a statement of expected wealth of each alternative
depending upon future marginal product: V =1r +2(rr s/(1 + r.) )
si 0i i i
compared to Vi Ir0 +1_( /(1 + r )) - Mi. Earnings are assumed to
grow at a constant rate, . They construct a structural probit
model: I = ln(r - si) - ln(r - fci) + ln[1-m (r -r ci)], where
I= ln(V ci si) and r ,,f-i'fci, and m, are all random variables,
and m = (M fr or mobility costs measured in terms of time.
Taking a Taylor series around the mean values, this is simplified to:
I =d' + +leci +A2si 3r +A 4m, where theo s can be expressed in
terms of es cP, r and m.
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They then address the fact that cs, r and m are all
unobservable. They hypothesize that r and mi can be expressed as
functions of family background variables. And, they proxy s and c
with wage growth: r1 = z1 ,q +Cr , m, = z, ' + mi, c, = X- B +6 .
In order to estimate the structural probit equation, they first
construct a reduced-form equation for the probability of turnover.
This permits them to get estimated values for r and mi . To obtain
estimates for(. and 9 c., they observe that expected productivity is
conditioned on the alternative chosen and that because (- include
individual effects, E( ) is also conditioned on the chosen
alternative and is not equal to zero. To get unbiased estimates of
the coeficients, they estimate the conditional values of from the
reduced-form model, which enables them to get predicted values forp ci
and s, and estimate the structural model. Interestingly, the results
of the structural and reduced-form probit equations are not
significantly different from one another. Their results support their
hypothesis that turnover is an efficiency mechanism as well as their
assertion that the quit-layoff distinction is not important in
predicting the rationality of turnover.
Blau and Kahn [1981] examine propensity to quit as well as
returns to quitting by sex and race. They combine search and human
capital approaches in their model. Compared to Borjas and Rosen,
their reduced form turnover probit model is quite simple: p(q) =
f(o,c,sc,Y,L,J) where q is a dichotomous variable; o, the
characteristics of the external wage-offer distribution, c is search
costs, Sc is specific human capital, Y is present discounted earnings
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in the current job; L is the layoff probability in the current job;
and, J is other job characteristics. They use non-stochastic proxies
for unobservable variables and so can estimate the quit equation
directly with probit analysis.
In their wage equations, they estimate both long- and short-run
returns for quitting, using an instrumental variable technique to
correct for the bias that exists due to a correlation between the
error terms and the quit variable. In contrast to Borjas and Rosen,
they find greater returns to quitting than staying for all of their
sample. They attribute this difference in finding to the fact that
they use a sample of only young men and women and so are unable to
compare returns to staying and quitting for older workers.
The contrast between the relatively complex formulation of Borjas
and Rosen and the simple model estimated by Blau and Kahn raises a
question of the value of structural versus reduced-form models when
their focus of study is comparative rather than absolute rates of
returns.
IV. Institutional Approaches to the Relationship between Earnings and
Experience
The papers described so far begin with the premise that skills
are acquired on the job that increase productivity.and that there is a
link between productivity and earnings. The nature of that connection
is then explored. In the papers in this section, it is accepted that
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earnings usually increase with experience, but challenge the
intermediate connections between experience and productivity and
productivity and earnings. In this section, there is a brief review
of the well-known internal labor market literature, followed by a
discussion of several empirical papers that raise questions about the
productivity-earnings relationship.
A. Internal Labor Market Theory
Origins. Doeringer and Piore's book, Internal Labor Markets and
Manpower Analysis, [1972] sets forth the basic concepts that compose
internal labor market theory. An internal labor market is defined as
"an administrative unit, such as a manufacturing plant, within which
the pricing and allocation of labor is governed by a set of
administrative rules and procedures" [p.1-2]. Thus, a key difference
between internal labor market theory and human capital theory is that
earnings and employment levels are administratively determined rather
than solely dependent on differences in human capital investment.
Doeringer and Piore argue that the internal labor market arises
for technological reasons where workers use firm specific rather than
exclusively general skills on the job. Skill specificity is acquired
by OJT which is provided in part to new workers by experienced workers
and in part by trial and error and experimentation. Because the
nature of skill specificity is such that skills learned on the job
have limited or no value outside the specific firm, there is a vast
reduction in turnover, creating a stable work environment. Out of
this environment, both worker and firm expectations about how work is
organized, what the wage structure is, what the career paths are, what
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the basis for promotion is, and what rules govern involuntary turnover
solidify, so that customary law becomes one of the supporting
mechanisms of the internal market. Workers are thought to prefer this
stability because of the increased job security and advancement
prospects, and employers prefer it because of reduced turnover costs.
This description highlights another major difference between
internal market theory and human capital theory, that of the role of
career paths within firms. Within the human capital literature,
intra-firm mobility is essentially ignored with the exception of
Rosen's theory of job switching as a means of securing earning
8
opportunities.
Wachter and Williamson [1978] describe the evolution of internal
labor markets as a bargaining solution. They observe that the
reliance on firm-specific skills results in a bilateral monopoly.
Within the bargaining environment created by this bilateral monopoly
there are transaction costs, specifically, "bounded rationality" and
"hazards of opportunism" which can be minimized through the choice of
a particular, efficient contracting scheme. Bounded rationality refers
to the fact that the complexity of any given bargaining problem is
beyond the human capicity to comprehend, so rational decisions are
made with incomplete information.9 Hazards of opportunism refers to
the potential in any.situation for one party to use guile or
misleading information for personal gain; opportunism must be
controlled by the creation of a governance structure which prevents
this type of expoitation. They show that this kind of governance
structure can be generated by several different contracting schemes,
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the best being obligational market contracting which is sufficiently
long-run to overcome the costs of recurrent spot contracting and
creates the needed governance structure. In a labor market setting,
the internal labor market with its structured employment relationships
and rules is a form of an obligatinal market contract.
Mobility Patterns. Using Doeringer and Piore's description of
the allocative structure, internal allocation rules cover the degree
of openness of the internal market, including ports of entry,
criterial for entry, and ports of exit, and the scope and structure of
the internal market which includes the mobility patterns within the
internal market. Ports of entry refer to the points of contact
between the internal and external labor markets; the more ports of
entry to the internal market, the more open it is. A rigid internal
market would be open primarily at the lower entry level jobs and
vacancies elsewhere within the market would be filled from the
internal labor force. Doeringer and Piore describe mobility patterns
within an internal market in terms of mobility clusters, groups of
jobs related by similarity of skills and/or levels or commonality of
function. Mobility can be vertical, and thus defined by skill
differences, or horizontal, reflecting the degree of specialization or
division of labor at any given level. Both ability and seniority
determine internal movility patterns and rules governing involuntary
exits. Seniority rights dominate the order of involuntary lay-offs
and interact with ability and training in promotion patterns.
Paul Osterman [1978] adapts the blue-collar based theory to
white-collar markets. He argues that employment structures within
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white collar firms can be divided into three categories, industrial,
craft, and secondary subsystems. Firms, because of their preference
for stability of both factor prices and supply, are described as
frequently in the process of trying to convert craft subsystems into
either industrial or secondary subsystems. Osterman, therefore,
envisions firm manipulation of work structures as an effort to
stabilize factor prices or supplies.
B. Empirical Challenges to the Earnings-Productivity Relationship
In the papers discussed below, the earnings-productivity
relationship that is the basis of human capital theory is challenged
empirically. In two of the papers, those by Lazear [1979] and Hall
[1980; 1982], the authors accept the human capital premise that
earnings depend on productivity, but argue that the intemporal aspects
of that relationship generate institutional arrangements that explain
more about worker earnings levels and mobility patterns than
individual productivity. Medoff and Abraham [1980a; 1980b], examine
the productivity-experience relationship, providing evidence for a
stronger counterargument to human capital theory, that there is no
relationship between experience and productivity and so the
explanation for the positive experience-earnings relationship must be
found elsewhere.
Lazear (1979] develops a rationale for the use of mandatory
retirement in terms of the intemporal deviation from the human capital
identity that wages equal the value of the marginal product. Briefly,
his argument is that firms prefer to pay a worker less than the VMPL
to a younger worker and more to an older worker, because that payment
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scheme reduces the incentives to workers to "cheat" and not work hard.
Workers who expect to receive the greater share of their earnings
later in their careers will not want to risk involuntary separation
from the firm. The difficulty with this payment scheme for the firm
is that the older a worker becomes, the greater the difference between
the VMP and earnings, and so the less likely that worker will want to
leave the firm at the optimal point when lifetime marginal product
equals lifetime earnings. Lazear argues that the date for mandatory
retirement is set to be equal to that optimal point and is instituted
to assure that workers leave before their earnings exceed their
product. The implications of his paper are first, that increased
earnings are not necessarily due to increased productivity, but rather
to an administratively determined payment scheme; and, second, he
establishes a rationale for firm attachment and low turnover that does
not depend upon firm-specific human capital.
Taken together, Hall's two papers establish both the longevity of
the relationship between workers and their employing firms and how
firms can adjust output to changing macro conditions without changing
either wage levels or employment levels. In "The Importance of
Lifetime Jobs in the U.S. Economy," [1982] he uses an age adjusted
probabilistic framework to calculate expected job tenure and is able
to show that, contrary to what has been thought to be the case, what
is essentially lifetime firm tenure is a common phenomenon for
American workers. And, the reason that average firm tenure has
previously been thought to be relatively short, three to four years,
is due to a small, very mobile group of workers. He is able to show
111-31
in his paper, "Employment Fluctuations and Wage Rigidity," (1980] that
the high incidence of lifetime tenure does not necessarily impose
efficiency constraints on firms in their ability to adjust to macro
fluctuations. The purpose of the paper is to examine the macro
efficiency of worker allocation in the economy. His question is
triggered by the empirical observation that during macroeconomic
fluctuations, wages appear to remain relatively stable, while
employment levels adjust. His major empirical result in this paper is
to discover that while employment levels of many firms remain stable,
the intensity of work effort varies with macro conditions. The
remainder of the paper is a discussion of the costs of this type of
adjustment mechanism.
Medoff and Abraham, using firm microdata, test the hypothesis
that productivity increases with experience. In "Experience,
Performance, and Earnings," they use company administered performance
evaluations as a measure of productivity. In addition to performance
rating information, they also have educational and pre-firm experience
data, as well as the current job grade level. Therefore, they are
able to distinguish between the effect of being within a particular
grade and performance levels. When grade level is excluded from their
earnings models, the returns to education is positive and large.
However, when grade level variables are included the explanatory power
of education declines substantially, suggesting that those with more
education earn more because they are put into grade levels associated
with higher earnings. Inclusion of the performance rating variables,
however, does not affect the coefficients on the human capital
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variables, suggesting that education and experience do not proxy
productivity as measured by performance ratings. In "Are Those Paid
More Really More Productive?", in addition to conducting a
cross-section study of the productivity-earnings relationship, they
use longitudinal personnel data as a means to control for variation in
individual ability. Their longitudinal results supported those from
the cross-section models: time in the firm has a greater effect on
salary position than it does on performance level; and, while there is
a growth in relative earnings with firm tenure, there is no similar
growth pattern in performance.
Conclusion
The human capital hypothesis provides a framework for the
analysis of the differential employment outcomes associated with
career paths. Given the nature of human capital formation, that it
can be general or firm-specific, that it can be accumulated at
different rates, and that it can depreciate, it is possible to
construct a model that hypothesizes that these different elements of
human capital vary systematically with career path. However, the
papers in the latter section of this review raise the quation that
observed differences in career path may not be due to human capital
but the result of agreements, in the case of scientists and engineers,
implicit agreements, about earnings schedules and mobility patterns.
In the next chapter, a model of earnings is presented that is based on
the human capital hypothesis and, as much as is possible, separates
firm-specific from general human capital to determine if differences
in earnings are due to differences in patterns of human capital
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formation associated with each path.
FOOTNOTES
1 According to Becker, before his development of the human capital
investment framework, turnover was ignored in neoclassical theory.
2 He makes an interesting observation about his selection of this
specification, rather than one using a lagged endogenous variable.
His point is that if an individual "lucks into" a higher occupational
category than would be expected, the two equation model, with <1,
allows for that person to stay longer in that occupational rank to
counteract that initial luck. A lagged endogenous variable would not
be able to predict that. He also notes that he cannot make the
restriction that E(X ,f i) = 0, but given his estimation method, the
lack of that restric on in inconsequential.
3
_ Note that FG is parallet to KL, an hypothesis that is tested and
rejected by Bartel and Borjas [1978] and Borjas [1981].
The model which is estimated in the second section is:
In W = as + Be + Ce + Dh + F(TEN) + ux. Wage growth in the74 i 0 1 0
post-interruption period is then the sum of B, C, and F. Examination
of the results shows that of the post-interruption wage growth, only
about one-third can be accounted for by tenure, meaning that growth in
earnings is due primarily to returns to general, not specific human
capital. D, the coefficient on h0 , can be interpreted depreciation of
human capital.
There is some debate about whether a distinction between quits and
layoffs is necessary. Bartel and Rosen argue that turnover is an
efficiency mechanism and so who initiates it is not important.
Mortenson (1978) argues that unless the cost sharing results in a
corner solution, both workers and firms have an incentive to set up a
structure to protect their investments. So, the distinction does not
matter. Although intuition suggests some difference, the layoff
decision is complicated, and empirical results are difficult to
interpret.
Hall [1972] examines males ages 45 and older and distinguishes
between voluntary and involuntary turnover. Using a transition
probability estimation approach, he examines the relationship between
voluntary and involuntary unemployment and a set of personal
characteristics. He finds that both quits and layoffs are move likely
early in job tenure and for the first three years, the probability of
quitting is two to three times more likely than layoffs. But, after
that, the probabilities of turnover for either reason begin to
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converge to within the small range of between 1.2 and 2.6. This
suggests both that most movement takes place early in a job and that
after some point, a joint decision (often implicit) is made by workers
and firms to minimize turnover. While he does estimate returns to
turnover without distinguishing between quits and layoffs and so does
not address the question of whether both types operate as efficiency
mechanisms, his results suggest that the probability of turnover
declines with tenure, which is a necessary condition for specific
human capital investment.
6 Kalachek and Raines [1967] and Mellow [1980] use a technique to
measure individual deviation from market wage (wage differential) that
could be adapted to control for individual propensities to move.
Their method is to construct an hedonic wage equation, where wages are
regressed on a vector of various human capital and demographic
variables. The residual is then defined as the individual wage
differential and is put into a turnover equation by Mellow and serves
as an explanatory variable for wage structure by Kalachek and Raines.
Using longitudinal data, a similar technique could be used to capture
those unobservables that contribute to propensity to move by defining
the residual to the pre-move period earnings equation, ui, as: u =
p. + e where emN(0, I) and p is the unobservable variables that
contribute to propensity to move. u can then be substituted into the
post-move wage equation.
Borjas [1982] tests a similar hypothesis: he examines whether
mobility has both a shift and slope effect on subsequent earnings.
His hypothesis is that labor turnover provides a disincentive for
specific training, so that workers with a high propensity to move will
have a slower rate of within-job earnings growth. A difference between
this and his paper with Bartel is that he attempts to specify expected
tenure as stochastic.
He models investment intensity, K = + pTt - where-T
i is previous experience,t it is expecteg completed duration of job i,P
i is the importance~of specific training, i is the effect of aging.
It is given that t = e + R, where e is previous time in job n, and
R is the remaining time. He hypothesizes that R = 1+ e , where
those with a higher invest more and so have a longer R. This
relationship allows him to argue that t has a binomial distribution,
where it equals e if i<n and equals A 4S e , where 4= 1 + , if i=n.
He can only estimate with panel data,nwhich allows actual
duration to be observed. The obvious problem with this type of
approximation, as wall as that used by Bartel and Borjas, is that
expected and actual duration are not the same phenomenon.
A preferable specification for remaining tenure should include a
stochastic element, such as t0 = E(t 0) + u , where t0 is observed
tenure and u = x + e, where X are a set of perosonal and 2
employment characteristtcs that predict turnover and e."N(0,g ). But,
Bartel and Rosen [1980] note the simultaneity problem In the
relationship between the probability of separation and investment.
Bartel and Borjas' results on the coefficient for Rn are probably weak
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because e + R does not proxy expected tenure, especially over such a
l onrelatively short actual period of time, six years (1969 - 1973.
8 Examples of stylized theoretical attempts to incorporate intra-firm
mobility are: Ioannides and Pissarides [1981] and Oswald [1981a,
1981b]. In all three papers, the number of types of jobs available
within a firm was limited to two to maintain theoretical tractability.
See Katz and Sabel [1979] for a discussion of earnings levels as
having an indeterminant solution, the resolution of which requires a
bargained solution.
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Chapter IV
MODEL FRAMEWORK
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a model that explains
the variation in lifetime earnings of scientists and engineers. From
the literature about the careers of scientists and engineers surveyed
in chapter II, it is clear that many of these professional workers who
enter the labor force with valuable technical skills eventually face
the dilemma of having either to move away from primarily technical
problem-solving jobs to more managerially oriented jobs, continuously
update their skills to remain technically current, or risk stagnation.
A- plausible characterization of this experience is that there are
specific career paths in this professional labor market, each with a
different set of potential labor market outcomes, and workers
eventually must choose which path to follow.
From the perspective of labor-market theory, there are two major
competing explanations for these paths: the human-capital and the
segmented-market hypotheses. As described in chapter III, according
to the human-capital hypothesis, labor-market outcomes depend upon
individual human-capital accumulation and investment decisions. The
segmented market hypothesis rests on several possible explanations,
including mutual preferences for employment stability by both workers
and firms, the evolution of bilateral monopolies, and the efforts of
workers to shelter themselves from changes in the labor market, all
reinforced by custom.
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The model presented here is based on the theory of human capital.
Specifically, it is hypothesized that there are different patterns of
human capital formation associated with different career paths. And,
given external market conditions, the career path one follows can
mitigate the effects of previous human capital investment, causing
systematic differences in the rates of return; because, once a path
choice is made, that choice determines the nature of the subsequent
experiential human-capital investments that can be made.
While there are undoubtedly many alternative paths available to
scientists and engineers, the path choice here is reduced to a
stylized dichotomous choice between a technical career path and a
managerial path. A sequence of models is developed where first, in
order to establish that path affects labor market outcomes, earnings
are hypothesized to be a function of experience on each path. Then
work experience is redefined to measure the different types of human
capital investment, general and firm-specific, to determine if these
paths represent different investment opportunities offering varying
rates of return.
The hypothesized effect of path choice on earnings growth is that
workers on the technical track will have a flatter lifetime-earnings
schedule than those on the managerial track, holding initial human
capital investment, economic ability, and market conditions constant.
That there should be this difference in lifetime earnings growth
is supported by the literature on the careers of scientists and
engineers. It is common for this labor to enter the labor market with
a high level of technical skills and for their initial jobs to be
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primarily oriented toward technical problem solving. Eventually, many
of them leave the technical jobs and start on a managerial career
path. The reasons most frequently cited are fear of obsolescence
resulting from rapid technological change or overspecialized job
definition, and the structure of firms that rewards worker orientation
toward firm rather than professional goals.
Putting this in terms of human capital investment, the model
presented here hypothesizes that each career path represents a
different set of investment opportunities, with different costs,
depreciation rates, and rates of return. Of the workers in this
sample, all enter with a high level of technical human capital.
However, it is hypothesized that the investment in technical human
capital is likely to depreciate more rapidly than managerial human
capital. This is expected because the depreciation rate of
experiential human capital is directly related to, among other things,
the rate of technological change. As technological advances occur,
the technical skills of scientists and engineers become less valuable
unless they continue to invest in themselves and update their
knowledge. However, it is rare that the structure of a firm will
change so rapidly that firm-specific managerial skills will quickly
depreciate. In addition, it is likely that the investment costs of
updating managerial skills would be less than for technical skills.
So, managerial skills would tend to depreciate more slowly than
technical skills.
In his discussion of the cost sharing of human capital
investment, Becker makes the point that firms are reluctant to invest
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in general human capital where there is a high probability of
turnover. A rapid depreciation rate is analogous to a high turnover
probability in that in both cases, the period over which investment
returns can be collected is truncated.
For this reason, the technical track represents a set of
investment opportunities where costs are high and initial returns are
high, but rapid depreciation necessitates a continuous level of high
investment costs that the firm is unwilling to share. The managerial
track offers a different set of opportunities: while the investment
costs and rates of return to experience should be lower, the
human-capital depreciation rate should be relatively small, and firms
will be more willing to bear the cost of training.
Therefore, it is hypothesized that over their work lives,
technical workers will have a flatter earnings curve that will also
flatten more quickly than that for managers. Managers will experience
a greater return to firm tenure than do technical workers and so have
a steeper earnings curve. And, the rate of investment in firm
specific human capital will decline more slowly for managers than for
technical workers.
In the first section, the functional form for the earnings model
is developed. In the next three sections, the continuous experience
and earnings components level and change models are discussed. In
each section, the specific variables to be incorporated into each
model are discussed, including an elaboration of the human capital,
external market, and career path elements.
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I. Functional Form for the Earnings Equation
In his survey of empirical human capital research, Rosen [1977]
argues that because earnings functions represent a reduced-form
relationship, their results are difficult to interpret. However,
Mincer, in his paper, "The Distribution of Labor Incomes," [1970] and
in his monograph, Schooling, Experience, and Earnings [1974],
maintains that an earnings function, properly specified, represents a
behavioral relationship.
The schooling model provides the prototype used by analysts to
examine returns to experience. Because investment implies foregone
present earnings for higher future earnings, V(s), the schooling model
is usually expressed in terms of the net present value of an
individual's earnings, Y(s), at the start of school, discounted at
some market rate of interest, or:
41i_ tV a t=-+1 (1/(1+r))t (1)
Individuals are thought to compare alternative discounted earnings
streams and select that level of schooling that provides the highest
net present value of future earnings, given the interest rate.
Because alternative paths are unobservable, and individuals are
assumed to be rational, this can be rewritten as:
ln Y = ln YO + rs, (2)
which states that the percent increase in earnings is a linear
function of years of schooling.2
Because individuals continue to invest in their own human capital
after leaving school, the fit is greatly improved with the inclusion
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of experience in the model.3 A simple statement of the relationship
describing net earnings in the initial entry period, is:
YO = Es ~ 0 (3)
where Y is initial earnings, Es is the opportunity level of earnings
given some amount of schooling, s, and C is investment costs in the
initial period. This generalizes to:
Y =E r C -C =E -C (4)j S t t t j j j
for period j. Gross earnings can be written as:
E E +'- r C .4 (5)j 5 t t t
The use of time equivalents, that is, the fraction of time rather
than money spent in investment, permits the use of observable
experience as a measure for the unobservable rate of investment, and
also permits the logarithmic transformation of the earnings function.
The ratio of time spent in investment in period t, kt, is defined
as:
kt = (Ct/Et). (6)
So, investment costs are some proportion, k, of gross earnings.
Because in each period, t, gross earnings are the sum of the gross
earnings level in the previous period and the rate of return to the
investment in the previous period,
Et - Et-1 + rCt-1 (7a)
SE(t-1(1+rk ). (7b)
Observable, or net, income, Yt, is equal to earnings in period t minus
investment costs in t, or
Yt - Et t (8)
Assuming that r is the same for all periods and earnings in a
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particular period are a function of the investment level in the
previous periods, a multiplicative model can be specified:
E =E l + rtkt)5 (9)
Equation (9) can be approximated as:
ln E lnE t a rtk (10)t 0 t=0 t t
If -' k = K, and education is reintroduced into the model, the result
t t
is: ln Et = lnEO + rs + rK. (11)
The assumptions in this formulation are that the percent increase
in earnings is a linear function of K.6 As was discussed in the
literature review, the life cycle model of optimum investment (see
Ben-Porath [1967]) disputes that view of investment, arguing that
investment declines as experience increases both because of
increasingly shorter periods over which to reap benefits and
increasing marginal costs of investment. The concavity of the gross
earnings function, that is, that earnings grow at a decreasing rate,
can be seen to depend upon net investment increasing with experience
but at a decreasing rate. The slope of the gross earning function is
positive:
since E. i Y. + C , and (12a)
dY = r.C - (C - C.), (12b)j iij j+l j
dE = dY + dC. (12c)j j 3
= r C - (Cj+1 - C ) + (Cj+ -C) (12d)
= r C > 0. (12e)
In other words, the slope of the gross-earnings schedule is
positive as long as investment levels are positive. And, the rate of
growth declines with time, as long as the investment rate declines
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with time:
d2E. r dC < 0 (13)
J iiJ
(The net earnings profile is usually concave, although it is possible
that it is convex early in a career if net investments grow at a
faster rate than the rate of return, r). This declining rate of
investment is incorporated into the model by expressing K as a
function of time. In this case, investment is assumed to decline
linearly with time. That is,
kt - k0 - /T)t, (14)
where T is the total period of investment (See footnote 6 for a
discussion of alternative assumptions). Net earnings can be written
as:
lu Y -n E + r s + :!- K + ln(1 - k.), (15)it . s t-0 t
(15) can be restated as:
ln Yit - ln E + rsis + f((t/k , rti + , (16)
where r and r are the rates of return to schooling and post-school
investments, k is the initial post-school investment, and 4 is the
rate of decline in investment. Because information on individual
levels of investment and rates of return is not obtainable, average
rates of return, initial investment and decline of investment are
estimated instead. Because investment increases at a decreasing rate,
the earnings function is parabolic. This can be approximated using a
second order Taylor series, estimated in the following form:
ln Yt - a + b1s + b2t + b3 2 + v, (17)
where a ln E - k (1 +(k /2));
0 0 0
b- r > 0;
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b = r k + (k /T)(1 + k ) > 0; and,2 t o o o
b =-[(rtko/2T) +(k 2/2T ] < 0.3 t /oT o
II. Behavioral Framework for the Model
Two types of models are presented, one where human-capital
investment is a continuous function of experience, and one where
investment is expressed in terms of job, firm, and pre-firm
experience. The purpose of the continuous experience model is to
establish that there are systematically different earnings outcomes
associated with each path, while the experience components model
permits examination of how the different types of human capital
investment contribute to that earnings difference.
A. Continuous Experience Models
What follows is a description of the variables that are thought
to influence earnings and a description of the continuous experience
earnings level model.
1. Career Paths
The argument that underlies the model presented in this thesis is
that human-capital investment is an important predictor of earnings
variation, and the structure of the internal market, as measured by
career path, is of primary importance in the relationship between
human-capital formation and earnings. In the previous section,
several variables were discussed which were to serve as indicators of
the stability of the external market, based on the assumption that
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external market conditions will influence the structure of the
internal market. A more direct aspect of the internal market is the
nature of the career paths within the firm that various workers might
follow. Differences in career paths are hypothesized to represent
differences in the opportunity for investment in experiential human
capital, in the types of skills that are valued and rewarded, in the
upper limit on
earnings, in the potential for mobility, and in the vulnerability to
involuntary unemployment. In the case of the scientists and engineers
in this sample, the range of possible career ladders has been
collapsed to two, the technical path and the managerial path.
Although the use of only two paths is an oversimplification, it is
expected that this stylized version of the alternatives open to this
labor group will capture the major implications of the choices that
actually are available.
The workers in this sample are hypothesized to enter the labor
market with a relatively large stock of educational human capital. If
a comparison were made to other workers, the intercept for scientists
and engineer would be higher than for most other workers. Because of
their large initial human capital investment in education, their
beginning earnings are at A as compared to A' for workers of
comparable ability but who do not possess the initial human capital
(e.g., individuals with a B.A. level in humanities are less likely to
possess skills offering a high rate of return immediately upon
entering the labor force; see Diagram 1). During the early stages of
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Diagram 1
their careers, technical workers are hypothesized to have relatively
homogeneous careers with a technical orientation. They are investing
in both firm specific and general human capital.
Eventually in their careers, most scientists and engineers are
faced with the decision to either continue on a technical track, that
is, continue to work on technical problems and therefore invest in
human capital associated with a particular technical problem that may
or may not be specific to their firm; or, to start on a management
track, where skills that are of broader use within the firm are
developed and investment is thus in more firm specific experiential
human capital.
There are several possible reasons why such a career path split
occurs. First, particularly for those fields where there is a high
rate of technological change, it is possible that the value of the
educational human capital of scientists and engineers depreciates
rapidly, and the rate of investment in experiential human capital
needed to maintain an upward sloping earnings curve is too high to be
realistically sustained. This phenomenon is referred to by some
authors as obsolescence, and there is some debate about its
inevitability for scientists and engineers.
Whether obsolescence is a real or imagined danger, there is some
consensus that those who stay on the technical track beyond a certain
age are viewed as not having had successful work lives and that the
move to the managerial track is a prerequisite for economic success.
That this may be the case can be explained by the pyramidal structure
- '661100114w -' -
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of most firms and that in most firms, as explained in the introduction
to this chapter, differences in the depreciation rates of human
capital lead to greater economic rewards for managerial, not
technical, activities.
After the split occurs, it is hypothesized that the rate of
earnings growth for those in managerial activities will be greater
than for those on the technical track. The major reasons for this can
be described in terms of the nature of the human-capital investment
that is made. Although different technical skills will depreciate at
different rates, it is hypothesized that all of them will depreciate
faster than non technical managerial skills, because of technological
change.
Two forces suggest that technical track workers will not invest
at a high enough rate to overcome depreciation and experience wage
growth that is comparable to that of managers. One is a life-cycle
phenomenon that suggests that as the length of time over which to
collect returns shortens and the marginal cost of investment
increases, the rate of investment decreases. That is, as workers gain
more work experience and increase their human capital stock, their
marginal product increases. They are more valuable and can command
higher wages. Since the major cost of experiential human capital
investment is foregone income, this cost, the time spent learning that
could be spent producing and earning, is greater the more potentially
productive a worker. In addition, as a worker ages, the period of
time over which returns to human capital investment can be received
decreases. So, from a human capital investment perspective, there is
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an incentive to decrease investment rates as experience increases.
Also, from the perspective of the firm, there is a disincentive
to offer investment opportunties to workers to accumulate human
capital that will rapidly depreciate if the firm has to share in the
cost of that investment. Becker discusses investment cost sharing
between firms and workers as a function of the probability of
turnover. The underlying concept is the probable duration of time
over which either investor can collect returns. The rate of human
capital depreciation raises the same consideration for workers and
firms. To the extent that human capital is firm specific, there is
little incentive for workers to bear that cost. However, technical
human capital is costly to accumulate and if it is expected to
depreciate rapidly, firms also do not want to pay for it. Depending
on the rate of advances in a particular technical area, it may be less
costly for firms to purchase current technical human capital from
those in the early stages of their careers where wages are relatively
lower, and allow more experienced workers to continue producing using
skills that are becoming increasingly outdated, leading to eventual
technical obsolescence.
So, given some level of initial human capital and willingness to
invest, opportunities to invest and depreciations rates vary so that
there is a systematic difference in earnings growth rates.
2. Human Capital Variables
The basic impetus behind human capital theory is that variation
in individuals' earnings depend upon differences in the level of
investment made in individual human capital. The two primary types of
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human capital investment are those made in education and during the
course of work experience.
Education. As discussed so far, education has been expressed as
a continuous variable, as years of education. The implication of this
specification is that relatively small changes in the time spent in
school can have a marginal effect on human capital accumulation that
will lead to some increment in earnings. An alternative hypothesis is
that it is degree level rather than years of education that affects
earnings. Under this hypothesis, sometimes referred to as the
credentialling hypothesis, employers view the attainment of a degree,
rather than the number of years in school, as a signal of productivity
and reward workers accordingly. In this case, education would be a
discrete dummy variable which shifts the intercept of the earnings
function rather than affecting its slope. In this case, the
specification with dummy variables is used because it is assumed that
degree attainment rather than years of school stratifies this labor
force because of its professional orientation.
Experience. As discussed in the literature review, the major
components affecting the relationship between experientially acquired
human capital and earnings are: the rate of investment; the nature of
that investment, that is, whether it is general or firm specific; the
rate of depreciation; and, the rate of return. None of these
components are directly observable. In order to derive an estimable
function, time equivalents can be used as a proxy for investment and a
series of assumptions about the rate of investment, nature of that
investment, and rate of return can be made depending upon the
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specification of the earnings function (See footnote 6).
Because the effect of path on earnings is of interest, work
history is initially described in terms of experience on each path,
where total experience is the sum of technical and managerial
experience. The earnings function can be written as:
ln yt - a b1s + b2tm + b3tT + bt2 + b52 (18)
where t and t are the individual's managerial and technical
m T
experience, respectively. The rate of return to the time spent on
both types of path is expected to be positive, and the investment
rates for both are expected to decline with time, but based on the
literature on scientists and engineers, it is expected that b2>b3 and
b >b . It is expected that the lifetime earnings schedule associated
with the managerial path is more steeply sloped and flattens more
slowly because of the gradual accumulation of a type of human capital
that does not depreciate rapidly. This is compared to the human
capital of the technical workers that is initially valuable, but is
expensive to augment and depreciates rapidly.
Geographic Mobility. Geographic mobility is considered to be
another type of human capital investment. Individuals forego the
present equivalent of the cost of the move (in both money and psychic
terms) with the expectation of higher earnings in the future. In
order to control for the effect of this type of investment, a dummy
variable will be included that will equal 1 if a geographic move
occurred between jobs, zero otherwise.
B. Labor-Market Conditions
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Human-capital investments represent the rational individual's
best guess about which time and resource allocation strategy will
bring the greatest return. Given some level of human capital
accumulation, the yield will depend in part on the market in which the
human capital is utilized. Market rigidities, secular changes in
demand conditions, and geographic disparities in prices can affect the
rate of return.
Industry Structure and Product Demand. As is the case for any
type of labor, the demand for scientists and engineers is a derived
demand. Therefore, the external labor market conditions and the
opportunities for the utilization of their human-capital investments
will depend in part on product demand, product price elasticities, and
input (wages, in this case) elasticities. The rate of technological
change and the effect it has on the use of labor as an input in the
production process is a factor for any labor group, but is often a
salient aspect of the demand for scientists and engineers. And, a
rapid rate of technological change can distort both investment
patterns and rates of return.
A peculiar aspect of the labor market for scientists and
engineers is its dependence on contracts from the federal government,
particularly defense contracts and occasionally non-defense space
related research. There are several hypothesized effects of this
heavy dependence on federal contracts. First, of course, there are
funding cycles, where, for instance, defense spending will be a
government priority, then be sharply reduced due to a policy change.
Second, this variable aspect to defense spending is hypothesized to
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distort elasticities of factor demand. During peak demand periods,
the demand for skilled scientists and engineers will be highly
inelastic at a very high wage rate. When demand falls, that curve
shifts downward, but remains inelastic.
A third hypothesized effect of federal funding is that for
security reasons as well as production speed, there is a tendency
toward an overly narrow specialization of labor on weapons development
projects. This overspecialization would have two effects. First, it
would permit only partial utilization of the existing skills of a
worker. And, second, it would influence the nature of the
experiential human capital investment a worker could make, limiting
future inter-firm and inter-project mobility.
Another factor that will affect the rate of return to any human
capital investment will be the structure of the internal labor market.
This will vary from industry to industry, and probably to a somewhat
lesser extent from firm to firm and occupation to occupation. The
internal structure will be partly dependent on the factors mentioned
above. Stable demand and a relatively even rate of technological
change would generate a different internal labor market than would a
cyclically volatile demand pattern where the demand for labor and
ability to pay and willingness to train it would vary from period to
period.
Geographical Location. Because scientists and engineers are such
a highly skilled group, their labor market is national, and they are
usually thought of as highly mobile geographically. Therefore, wage
rates would be expected to be comparable across regions. However, it
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is possible that there are differences between regional wages which
reflect compensating differentials such as differences in the cost of
living or local amenities.
The elements mentioned above, industry structure, rate of
technological change, division of labor, overspecialization and
reasons for compensating wage differentials, even ignoring problems of
data availability, are difficult measure. For that reason, the
variables that are used here to control for these effects are: dummy
variables for industry and occupation category; the annual level of
research and development spending by the federal government (in the
change equations only); whether or not the particular job project was
federally funded; and, dummy variables for geographical region.
11
4. Hypothesized Coefficients
The behavioral relationship described so far can be summarized
as:
Yt = Y(EXPMANG, EXPTECH, ED, IND, OCC, GVTFND, REGION, GEOMOVE, R&D)
Oft
(if),
where career path is incorporated into experience. Table 1 shows the
specific variables included in the model and their expected sign.
Table 1
Continuous Experience Model Variables
Variable Definition Sign
EXPMANG2 Total years managerial experience +
EXPMANG Total years managerial experience squared
EXPTECH Total years technical experience +
EXPTECH Total years technical experience squared
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EXPDK Total years experience, path unknown 1
EXPDK Total years experience, path unknown, squared 1
MOVEY Dummy variable for geographic
move (=1 if move occurred) +
MOVEDK Dummy variable if geographic
move could not be determined
BS Dummy variable for education (1=BA)
MS Dummy variable for education (l=MS) 0
PHD Dummy variable for education (l=PhD) +
EDC Years of Education +
OCCENG1 Dummy variable for Aero.,Astro,Agric,
Nuclear, & Other Engineer (1 if yes)
OCCENG2 Dummy variable for Chemical,Metal & Mat. 1
Mining & Petro. Engineer(1 if yes)
OCCENG3 Dummy variable for Elec. & Elec.
Engineer (1 if yes)
OCCENG4 Dummy variable for Mech.Enginr.
(1 if yes)
OCCENG5 Dummy variable for Civil & Arch.,
Envir & San. (1 if yes)
OCCOMP Dummy variable for Computer
Scientist (1 if yes)
OCCMANG Dummy variable for Managerial &
Administrative (1 if yes)
OCCNASC Dummy variable for Natural
Scientists (1 if yes)
INDWAR Dummy variable for Defense industry
(1 if yes)
INDBASE Dummy variable for Elec. Mach, Fab.
Metal, Prim.Metal(1 if yes)
INDCHEM Dummy variable for Chemical (1 if yes)
INDSERV Dummy variable for Business, Finance,
Trade, & Eng. Serv. (1 if yes)
INDPRO Dummy variable for Prof.Soc. &
Res. Inst. (1 if yes)
INDOTH Dummy variable for Other ind (1 if yes)
INDKNO Dummy variable for Can't Tell (1 if yes)
INDMANU Dummy variable for Other MANU.(1 if yes)
RESDEV Annual level of fed. R&D spending +
GVTFND Dummy variable for job supported
by Federal Government funding +
1 No apriori hypothesis.
The linear human capital variables include MOVEY and the
education variables. A geographical move is hypothesized to be a
positive human capital investment, as is EDC, years of education. In
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the actual estimation of the models, MS is omitted to avoid
collinearity, and the coefficients for BS and PHD are interpreted as
relative rates of return compared to MS. As is consistent with the
hypothesized positive coefficient for EDC, the coefficient for BS is
expected to be negative and that for PHD to be positive.
The industry and occupational dummy variable coefficients are
shift parameters that indicate the relative earnings advantages of
being in a particular industry or occupation. GVTFND, the presence of
federal government funding support is also a shift parameter and is
hypothesized to have a positive effect on earnings.
III. The Earnings Models
Two types of models are presented here, an earnings level model
and a model of earnings change over the course of the job. The
earnings level model represents a framework which explains the
earnings of an individual at some point in time as a function of their
human capital formation up to that point, certain external market
circumstances, and career path.
Components of Experience. Experientially acquired human capital
is composed of firm specific and general skills, F(t) and G(t),
respectively. Incorporating this into the model, the earnings
function can be rewritten as:
InY t - l0 + r2F(t) + r3G(t).
The difficulty is that the F(t) and G(t) functions are unobservable:
individuals are assumed to invest in both throughout their careers,
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but how the investment is shared is not known. To approximate these
different kinds of investment, experience is separated into that in
the current firm aId that prior to the current firm, t and t , during
C p
which F(t ), G(t ) and F(t ), G(t.) were invested, respectively.
c c p p
Substituting this two-period notation into the earnings function
results in:
In Yt - In Y0 +,r s + r2 (F(t p)+F(t c)) + r3(G(t ) +G(t C)) (20)
Because firm specific skills are of value only in the firm where they
are learned, it can be assumed that any returns on t are on general
human capital only, even if both kinds of investment were made during
work experience prior to coming to the current job. Therefore, F(t )
= 0. Expressing investment as a quadratic function of experience, the
log of earnings can now be rewritten as:
ln Yt - lY 0 + r1s + r2EXP + r3EXP + r CTEN + r5 TEN , ())
where EXP is pre-firm experience, the time equivalent for investment
in general human capital; and, CTEN is tenure in the current firm, a
measure of both general and firm specific human capital.
Because of the focus on career paths, CTEN is further divided
into two parts: TEN, current job tenure, and NONTEN, tenure in the
current firm that preceeded the current job. This delineation is made
because it is assumed that path switching often occurs within firms,
and in order to examine differences in human capital investment and
returns by path, it is necessary to be able to distinguish between
jobs that while in the same firm may have been on different paths.
The earnings function can now be restated:
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In Yt = In YO + r s + r2EXP + r3EXP2 + r TEN + r5TEN +
r 6NONTEN + r NONTEN. (ZZ)
The difficulty with this model is that it is not possible to
include an adequate measure of individual ability and so, at best, it
produces biased coefficients. The earnings change model corrects this
problem; however, many variables which are assumed to affect earnings
but have a constant effect throughout the course of the job can not be
observed in the within-job change model.
A. Earnings Level Model
To summarize what has been said so far, the following model has
been hypothesized:
InYit 1 B0 + B1ED + B2EXP + B3EXP + B TEN + B5TEN + B6NONTEN +
B7NONTEN2 + B8MOVE + B9IND + B 10CC + B1 REGION + B1 2 PATH +
B 13GOVT + ABLE + 1it'
where ED is educational level; EXP is prior experience; TEN is current
job tenure; NONTEN is pre-job tenure in current job; MOVE is whether a
geographaical move occurred; IND is industry category; OCC is
occupational category; REGION is geographical region; PAth is wheterh
a job is on the managerial track; GOVT is whether the current job is
government funded; and, ABLE is economic ability.
This model is an earnings level model, where the log of earnings
is a linear function of a set of human capital investments, career
path, and external labor market conditions. There are two alternative
mathods that can be used to test the hypothesized effect of career
path, separate regressions for each path and a single regression with
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interaction variables. Table 1 lists the variables included for the
separate regressions, their definitions, and their expected signs.
Table 1
Earnings Level Variables
Variable Definition Expected
Sign
TENURE Tenure in current job, in years +
TENSQ TENURE squared
NONTEN Tenure in current firm preceeding
the current job +
NONTENSQ NONTEN squared
EXP Years of Experience prior to
current firm +
EXPSQ EXP squared
EXTEN Interaction b/n EXP and TENURE
NONTNTEN Interaction b/n NONTEN and TENURE
The three experiential human capital variables which have a
nonlinear relationship with the log of earnings, EXP, TENURE, and
NONTEN, are hypothesized to have the same directional effect on
earnings. That is, the coefficients on the linear expression of those
variables will be positive, and the coefficients for the square of
those variables will be negative. Also included in the model are two
current job tenure interaction terms, one with pre-firm experience,
EXTEN, and one with NONTEN, NONTNTEN, both of which are hypothesized
to have negative effects on earnings.
The second method, estimating a single regression, includes a set
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of interaction variables between path and the components of
experiential human capital. Table 1A shows the expected signs fi
those variables are includes.
Table 1A
Path Interaction Variables
PATH Dummy variable for managerial or
technical job (=1 if managerial) +
PATHTEN Interaction b/n PATH & TENURE +
PATHTENSQ Interaction b/n PATH & TENSQ +
PATHEXP2  Interaction b/n PATH and EXP2  0
PATHEXP Interaction b/n PATH and EXP 0
PATHNT2 Interaction b/n PATH and NONTEN2 0
PATHNT Interaction b/n PATH and NONTEN 0
The advantage to the separate regressions is that it is easier to
determine to what extent the overall model describes the determinants
of earnings for the different paths. It also permits the interaction
of all of the predictor variables with the path variable. The
advantage to the single regression with the interation variables is
that it permits statistically reliable comparison of the returns to
the different types of human capital to the two paths.
The path variable is expected to have a positive effect,
indicating that being a manager shifts the earnings level upward. -In
addition to an intercept effect, a positive slope effect is
hypothesized: the coefficient for the interaction between path and
tenure is expected to be positive because it is expected that workers
on a managerial career path have the opportunity to invest in human
capital which leads to a relatively higher rate of return. This
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hypothesized better investment opportunity for managers is reinforced
by the further expectation that the interaction between path and
tenure squared will also be positive. Omitted from the model is the
fixed affect economic ability variable. This omission is assumed to
bias the coefficient estimates.
B. Within-Job Earnings Change
An alternative focus of investigation to the earnings level is
the rate of change in earnings that occurs over the course of a job.
The unit of time over which earnings growth is measured is one job, so
the dependent variable becomes dln Y (- n Y it-ln Y iO).
Economic Ability. Individual differences in what Becker calls
"economic ability" can affect earnings. Economic ability can include
cognitive intelligence, willingness to invest in human capital,
attitudes, and the ability to work with others. It is necessary to
control for those differences to be able to discern the true effects
of investment and career decisions on earnings. In particular, in the
context of the model being discussed here, in order to learn whether
differences in the earnings growth between managers and
professional/technical workers are due to the nature of their career
ladders or because of differences in ability, ability must be
explicitly incorporated into the model.
If as is hypothesized here, ability and career path are
independent of one another, the ommission of the ability variable will
not have any effect on the career-path coefficient. It is likely,
however, that there is a partial relationship between the two
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variables. If that is the case, and the economic ability variable is
not included, then the path coefficient will be biased.8
Economic ability is widely recognized as important in explaining
earnings' variation, but there is a lack of consensus about how best
to measure this variable. Becker suggests that, after holding
investment variables constant, those workers with greater ability will
have higher earnings. In other words, the variation in economic
ability would be part of the residual. In some cases, personal
background variables, such as father's education or socio-economic
status, are included, as an indicator of motivation, exposure, and/or
ambition. However, if the major influence of family background occurs
through the investment decision or path choice and makes little
independent contribution to earnings variability, then the inclusion
of background variables will produce collinearity and add little to
the explained variation.
Frequently, test scores, such I.Q. tests or math and verbal
aptitute scores are included as measures of economic ability (see
Taubman and Wales [1974] for an example of this). Also, because it is
thought that personal variables other than intelligence, such as
attitude, self-discipline, and ability to work with other people are
important, scores on personality and attitude tests are also sometimes
included in the earnings function.
In the data set used here, with the exception of some information
about family background (father's education, occupation), none of
these direct measures are available. However, there is currently no
consensus about the validity of test scores as measures of the
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intangible, but important, economic ability.
There are two major alternative assumptions that can be made
about unobserved ability. First, it can be assumed to be a fixed
effect that if omitted will violate the least-squares assumption that
E( ) - 0 and result in biased estimates.9 The alternative is to
assume that economic ability is a random variable and has a
distribution. According to Hausman, the assumption that unobserved
ability is a fixed effect when it is actually a random variable will
violate the orthogonality assumption of OLS and result in biased and
inefficient estimates.10
Economic ability is assumed to have a fixed effect in the models
to be estimated here, which enables the assumption that economic
ability is controlled for in the change model.
Real versus Nominal Wages. Because the length of tenure varies
from observation to observation in this data set, it is necessary for
comparability to express earnings in real rather than nominal terms.
Rather than deflate earnings using one of the standard deflators, the
CPI index will be entered as a variable. This is equivalent to
assuming that earnings' changes are proportional to changes in the
consumer price index, but that that proportion is not necessarily
equal to one.
The model for earnings at the end of a job is essentially the
same as for the levels equation:
lnYit - B + BIED + B2EXP + B3EXP2 + B4TENt + B5TENt2 + B6NONTEN +
B7NONTEN + B8MOVE + B9IND + B 10OCC + B 1REGION + B 13GOVT +
ABLE + B RNDt + B 15CPIt + B 16EXTENt + B 7NONTNTENt
IV -28
+ B 18PATHEXP + B 1PATHEXP2 + B 20PATHNT + B 21PATHNT2 +
B 22PATHTENt + B 23PATHTENt 2 it
Earnings at the start of the job can be written as:
lnYit = B0 + B1ED + B2EXP + B3EXP2 + + B6NONTEN + B7NONTEN + B8MOVE +
B9IND + B 10OCC + B 1REGION + B 13GOVT + ABLE + B RND +
B15 CPIt + A it*
Subtracting the second equation from the first, where t is the
number of years of tenure and 0 represents the starting year (and
suppressing i):
InYt - nYO = t% ld RND + 2dln CPI + y TEN + WTEN2
+ 5EXTEN + NONTNTEN +
Table 2 lists the variables used in the model and their expected
signs.
Table 2
Earnings Change Variables
Variables Expected Sign
d RND +
d in CPI +
TEN2  +
TEN
EXTEN
NONTENTN-
As can be seen, the unmeasured ability variable is netted out,
which is the equivalent to assuming that the effect of ability is
constant throughout the length of the job. The coefficient estimates
in this equation should be unbiased. Other variables whose effects
can no longer be discerned are: MOVEY, ED, OCC, IND, GVTFND, EXP 2
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NONTEN , PATH, and REGION. The effects of EXP and NONTEN can be
examined through the coefficients of EXTEN and NONTNTEN.
BTENURE is expected to be positive and BTENSQ is expected to be
negative, corresponding to the usual hypothesis that human capital
stocks increase at a decreasing rate.
The external market variables which change over the tenure
period, t, include the change in the CPI index and the change in the
level of federal spending for research and development. It is
expected that there is a positive relationship between earnings growth
and the growth rates of these two variables.
Again, it is possible to combine the regressions into a single
equation with the inclusion of interaction variables between path and
other variables with are expected to vary with path. In that case,
the final model would be:
InY t - InYO t0) + d RND + 22dln CPI + 3TEN + 4 TEN
2
+ 5 SEXTEN + 6 NONTNTEN + S 7 PATHTEN + S 8 PATHTEN2
where it is expected that [7>0 and 8 >0. The interaction between path
and tenure is expected to have a positive effect because of the
expected relatively higher rate of human capital accumulation by
managers. The interaction between path and tenure squared is also
hypothesized to be positive, indicating a slower rate of earnings
growth decline for managers.
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FOOTNOTES
1 In this case, rationality implies that the individual has a
realistic estimate of r and so knows V and V . Mincer (p.10-1l)
shows how earnings differences depend upon r:a1 V = Y (1/(1+r)) ,
the present value of earnings with s years of school; 21 put into
continuous terms: V = Y 5 er dt - ((Y (e -e ))/r; 3) an
alternative plani bin school (s-9) years:
V s-d (Y /r)e -e ; 4) to compare the alternatives and
assue ixed workingdlife, their ratio is: k (Y I )-d(eurS 4i) -rs rd ss-ld s s-d
(e )/(e ) e This shows that the clioice between
alternatives will depend on the size of r, which is thought to vary
with the individual and the differences between the alternatives.
Since the alternativep5 are not known, the usual alternative used is
d=0, so that ks 0 = e
2 Filer argues that this is an overly simplistic formulation if
aggregated because it would permit the rate of return to, for example,
two eighth grade graduates to equal that of one college graduate.
This discussion follows closely Mincer's discussion in Schooling,
Education, and Earnings, NBER, NY, 1974, p.1 9-20 .
4 This can be rewritten io describe h distrigujion of 2arniygs
before investment as: (ln E ) = r (s) + s (r) + (s) (r).
5 See Mincer, op.cit., p. 19 -20.
6 Using, alternative assumptions about the lifetime investment
function, Mincer develops several ways to transform the unobservable
investment costs into a form which can be estimated. He considers
four different cost specifications: linear and log-linear net dollar
investments, C , and linear and log-linear "time-equivalents"
investment ratios, kt
C - C -(C /T)t C = C e-Bt
k - k - (1c0/T)t kt = k -Bt
where the subscript 0 describes the initial period of experience, t=
0; T is the total period of net positive investment; and, is the rate
of decline of investment. Putting the earnings function in continuous
terms, the linear version is: Et - E + r / C dj, and the
logarithmic version is: ln E - ln E + rt5 kJ dj. By substitution,
he is able to derive four diferent empiricall estimable functions
(Mincer observes that r is unobservable and, once the assumption of a
perfectly competitive labor market is relaxed, varies with the
individual. However, he is satisfied with using some average value of
r and letting individual differences be part of the residual).
First, he develops the gross and net earnings functions under the
assumption that the rate of investment ij linearly declining. Gross
earnings are: Et - Es + rC0t - (rCO/2T)t ; and net earnings are: Yt
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(E - C 0) + C (r + (1/T))t - (rC /2T)t , where t is years of
ex0erience, e effect of experience is both linear and also enters
in a quadratic form, resulting in an earnings profile concave from
below.
Next, assuming a linear decline in the investment ratio, he
develops Jhe gross log-earnings function: ln Et = ln Es + rk0t -
(rk0 /2T)t2 ; and the net log-earnings function: in Y - n E + rk0t -
(rk0 /2T)t + ln(1 - k ). In the linear case, dEt/dt and dYs/dt are
linearly declining (dit/dt = (rC0 (T-1)/T)t and dln E /dt = trk 0 -
(rk 0/Tt), but dln Et and dln Yt are only approximately linear.
Substituting the cost equations where investments are assumed to
decline exponentially rather than linearly, he develops his last two
relationships. In the case of the linear earning relationships,
gross earnings are E - E + (rC /B) -_ CO/B)e ; and net earnings
are: Y = E + (rC 0/) - f(r+B )80/B)e . He shows that the logt o
the inbrement of earnings is linear, since: dY /dt = (r + )C e .
screte form: Y - Y - ((Y = E +B r0/ ) ((r + )80), and subtract (r4B)CO B3t s-) If e= and E =
E +(rC0 /B) where E is peak earnings, then Y t+- Y - (1- )(E - t) or
Ysl = (1-B)E P+ t , indicating a first order linear auto-regfessive
reltionship.p
Finally, he develops the case where the investment ratio declines
exponentially. The earnings functions here are:
in E - ln E + (rk /B) :frkoe B /B) and ln Y = in E + (rk /B) +
(rk Be /B) ln(i - k e )o He notes that dtln Et)/t is
exponential and d(ln Y )/dt is approximately linear. The earnings
relationship where investment is expressed as a time equivalent ratio,
which declines at an exponential rate can also be expressed in
auto-regressive terms, adhering to a Koyck lag adjustment structure.
The assumption behind the Koyck distributed lag structure is that the
dependent variable is a function of past values of the independent
variables. This can be simplified to the assumption that the
influence of the coefficients decline geometrically. The functional
specification for this is to include the current value of the
independent variables and one lagged value of the dependent variable.
Nickell handled this auto-regressive functional form differently
and more flexibly. See the text, p. 11-5.
See Mincer, op. cit., p.91.
8 That is, if the misspecified model were: in Y - b + b path + e;
and, the true model should igclude: path - lability pati' and e =
lability + u , where u "N(0, g); then, the true model should be:
ln Y = B I (B (() + )ability + path' + u . In the case of the
misspecified model, because ability is part of the path variable and
also of the residual, cov (Xe) ne 0, leading to a bias on b. Even
when ability is explicitly incorporated into the model, if there is a
relationship between ability and path, the coefficients on both
variables may not be consistent. This can be seen where the specified
model is ln Y = A + BPATH + CABIL + u, but career path depends in part
on ability, PATH - GABIL + PATH . So the model should be in Y - A +
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DPATH + (BG + C)ABLE, where C is the direct effect of ability and BG
is the indirect effect that operates through path selection. It is
likely that there is some relationship between ability and path and
unless further corrections were made, there would be a consistency
problem.
9
If it can be accurately assumed that ability is a fixed effect, so
that its only estimation effect is to bias the expected value of the
residual, this non-zero mean can be subtracted from the error term and
added to the intercept, biasing that estimate, but removing the bias
from the remaining coefficients.
10 Hausman [1978] developed a test for the fixed effect
specification. The earnings model is estimated twice, once with the
fixed effects assumption, where the variables are expressed a
deviations from the mean, and again using an instrumental variable
estimator. The null hypothesis is that no misspecification is
present. If the null hypothesis is not true, the fixed effects
estimator is unbiased and consistent, but not efficient. The IV
estimator is unbiased, consistent, and efficient. Both are
consistent, unbiased, and efficient if the null hypothesis is true.
By comparing q = B -B with the variance of the difference in
estimates, M(q) =- B 'T - M(Bi), the relative efficiency can be
determined. The test statistic is: m = q'[M(q)] q, which has a
chi-square distribution.
11 Whether or not the job was located in an SMSA was excluded from the
model because nearly 90% or the sample worked in an SMSA.
CHAPTER V
DATA SOURCES AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
1. 1978 National Survey of Natural and Social Scientist and Engineers
(NSSE)
With a few exceptions, all of the data analyzed here were
collected as part of the National Sample of Scientists and Engineers,
a biennial survey conducted by the U.S. Bureau of Census. The
National Science Foundation (NSF) sponsored this longitudinal sample
survey, in order to learn about the nature and availability of
technical labor, The first survey was administered in 1972, and the
respondents were resurveyed in 1974, 1976 and 1978. Of the 1970
Census of Population, 20% of the population provided information on
labor force status, occupation, and education. Selected occupations
in that twenty percent became the survey sample, and educational and
career-related characteristics were reported for those in the
following occupational groupings: Operations and Computer Specialists,
Engineers, Mathematical Specialists, Life Scientists, Physical
Scientists, and Social Scientists. After careful comparison of the
different questionnaires and their responses, problems of
noncomparability arose so that only the data from the 1972 survey are
used in this analysis. The noncomparability issues are discussed in
Appendix 2.
The 1972 Survey. The survey, then called the Professional,
Technical, and Scientific Manpower Survey (PMS) was conducted in 1972.
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Five categories of information were collected: (1) demographic
background (including age, sex, marital status, nationality, father's
education and occupation, professional affiliations, and number of
children); (2) education and training (including number of years of
education, areas of course work, degree level, major field, and other
nondegree training, including that provided by the employer); (3)
employment status during the week prior to completing the
questionnaire; (4) employment history (including current status,
detailed information about the most recent as well as two previous
jobs, occupation, industry, pay, distribution of activities on the
job, how the job was found, reasons for leaving the jobs previously
held, and geographic location; and 5) the number of weeks worked and
earnings in 1971. Questionnaires were mailed in the winter and spring
of 1972 to 101,835 people. The response rate was 73.1%, yielding a
sample size of 74,483. Table 1 shows the occupational distribution of
those sampled and the response rate by occupational category.
Table 1A
SAMPLE DISTRIBUTION
Occupation (1970) % Sample Size1  Rate of Return3
Computer Specialist 6.52 72.0
Engineers 24.68 74.7
Mathematical Specialists 2.94 74.0
Life & Physical Scientists 10.31 79.3/79.52
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Operations & Systems
Researchers & Analysts 2.94 73.0
Social Scientists 6.49 73.1
Engineering & Science
Technicians 17.03 68.6
Other 29.09 n/a
1 Calculated from: "1972 PostCensal Manpower Survey List of Sample
Groups," Characteristics of Persons in Engineering and Scientific
Occupations: 1972, Bureau of Census, technical Paper #33, April, 1974,
p.120-1 2 1.
2 79.3 refers to Life Scientists, and 79.5 refers to Physical
Scientists.
3
Source: "Analysis of Response in the 1972 Professional, Technical,
and Scientific Manpower Survey by Occupation and Education in 1970 and
Age in 1972," in ibid., p. 146-147.
In 1972, each respondent answered one of three questionnaires,
here referred to as PMS1, PMS2 and PMS8. The PMS1 and PMS2
questionnaires contained eight pages, covering the five types of
information mentioned above. The PMS8 questionnaire was two pages and
was sent to an additional sample from the 1970 Census to gain a wider
longitudinal survey base. Although the PMS1 and PMS2 questionnaires
are similar, each was sent to a different group. The PMS1
questionnaire was sent to those classified as scientists and
engineers. PMS2 was sent to those whose Census occupation was coded
as an engineering or science technician. Of the 50,093 respondents in
the in-scope sample size, 21,090 were administered PMS1, 4,956
received PMS2, and 24,047 answered PMS8. In this study, because of
the interest in white collar markets, only respondents to PMS1 were
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included in the sample. Appendix 3 contains a copy of the PMS1
questionnaire.
Only those respondents who could be classified as belonging to
one of the seventeen in-scope fields were included. Those seventeen
fields are:
Computer Specialists (1)
Engineers (2)
Mathematical Specialists
Mathematicians (3)
Statisticians (4)
Life Scientists
Agricultural Scientists (5)
Biologists (6)
Medical Scientists (7)
Physical Scientists
Chemists (8)
Physicists and Astronomers (9)
Other Physical Scientists (10)
Environmental Scientists
Earth Scientists (11)
Atmospheric Scientists (12)
Oceanographers (13)
Psychologists (14)
Social Scientists
Economists (15)
Sociologists and Anthropologists (16)
Other Social Scientists (17)
Source: "Selected Characteristics of Persons in Mathematical
Specialities: 1978," Special Studies, Series p-23, no. 120, Bureau of
Census, Washington, D.C., Sept., 1982, p. 30.
II. Sample Selection
Because the focus of this research is on the employment
experience of professional scientific and technical labor, certain
nonrandom criteria were used to determine which cases of the NSSE
sample would constitute the sample for this research. The sample
selection process had several steps. In the first stage, the
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following criteria were used: completeness of information provided;
educational level; scientific and technical field; industrial group;
occupational category; and country of origin and employment.
The first criterion, complete information, referred to the fact
that a particular respondent had answered all four survey
questionnaires, and that as far as could be simply determined, the
information provided in each was fairly complete (See Appendix 2 for a
discussion of the procedure used to determine comparability which
ultimately resulted in the use of the 1972 data only). 2
The second criterion, educational level, was used to select cases
because the emphasis of this research is on professional level
scientific and technical labor. Although there are some older
engineers who do not have a bachelor level degree and are still
considered to be professionals rather than technicians, the assumption
made in this study was that the absence of a bachelor's degree would
probably be a serious barrier to upward mobility for most workers,
regardless of age. Therefore, only workers who began their
professional labor market experience with a minimum of a bachelor's
degree were included in this sample.
Scientific and technical field was used to limit the sample to
natural scientists and engineers and exclude social scientists and
other types of workers. This was done in order to maintain the
clarity of the critical question to be explored in this research, the
move from a technically based to a management based career path.
Although it is expected that this issue has relevance for many types
of workers, the question is most easily explored by using types of
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labor for whom technical work activities are easily identified. Table
2 lists the included scientific and technical fields.
Table 2
Scientific and Technical Fields
Computer Specialist Chemist
Engineer Physicist/Astronomer
Mathematician Atmospheric Scientist
Statistician Earth Scientist
Agricultural Scientist Oceanographer
Biological Scientist Other Physical Scientist
Medical Scientist
The fourth criterion, industrial group, was used to eliminate
government workers and secondary school teachers. These workers were
deleted because their pay structure and unemployment patterns are
frequently governed by civil-service rules or collective-bargaining
agreements and so might not reflect the effects of making a choice
between a technical and a managerial career. Referring to Table 3,
the included industrial codes from the 1972 survey were 701 - 711 and
716 - 726.
Table 3
Industrial Codes
Industry Title 1972 Code 1974-78 Codes
Manufacturing
Aircraft, aircraft Engines,
parts 701 701
Chemicals & Allied Products 702 702
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Electrical Machinery,
Equipment & Supplies,
Electronic Apparatus
Electronic Computers,
Office Machinery 703 703,704
Fabricated Metal Products 704 706
Machinery, Exc. Electrical 705 707
Motor Vehicles 706 708
Ordnance 707 709
Petroleum Refining &
Related Industries 708 710
Primary Metal Industries 708 711
Professional & Scientific
Equipment 709 712
Other 710 713
Educational Institutions
College or Universities
(at least B.A. level) 711 714
Junior Collete or
Technical Institute 712 715
Medical Schools 711 716
Other 713 717
Health Services
Hospital or Clinic 714 718
Other Medical or Health
Services 715 719
Other Kinds of Business
Agriculture, Forestry,
& Fisheries 716 720
Business, Personal, &
Repair Service 717 721
Construction 718 721
Engineering or Architectural
Services 719 723
Finance, Insurance, &
Real Estate 720 724
Mining & Petroleum Extraction 721 725
Private, Non-profit Orgs.,
Other than Ed. Inst.
& Hospitals &
Professional & Technical
Societies 722 726,727
Research Institutions 723 728
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Retail & Wholesale Trade 724 729
Transportation, Communication,
or Other Public Utilities 725 730
Other, n.e.c. 726 731
Public Administration
Uniformed Military Service &
Federal Public Administration 727 732,733
State Public Administration 728 733
Local Public Administration
& Other Government 729 735,736
Occupational category was used to provide a more definitive
separation of engineers and natural scientists from those in other
occupations. Besides those in the obviously nontechnical or
scientific occupations, the specific occupations that were excluded in
this sample were: social scientists, teachers and academicians,
medical doctors and technicians. Social scientists were eliminated
for the reason discussed above, the difficulty of identifying a
technically based job in contrast to a managerial job. Teachers and
academicians were eliminated because they frequently work in a
formally structured internal labor market, where tenure is an
important intervening variable that cannot be discerned from this data
set, and where the pay structure is unusually flat. In addition,
those workers often have a protracted technically based career in
comparison to workers in the private sector. Medical doctors were
excluded both because of the relatively flat pay structure and the low
propensity of having to make the technical-managerial choice.
Technicians were excluded for the reasons discussed in the paragraph
on educational field and level. The occupational codes included in
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the sample are 401 to 428 and 453 to 457 for the 1972 survey.
Table 4
Occupational Codes
Title 1972 Code 1974-1978 Code
Engineers
Aero. & Astro 401 401
Agricultural 402 402
Civil & Architectural 403 403
Electrical & Electronic 404 404
Industrial 406 406
Mechanical 407 407
Metallurgical & Materials 408 408
Mining & Petroleum 409 409
Nuclear 410 410
Environ. & Sanitary 411 411
Other 412 412,413
Computer Specialists
Computer Programmer 413 414
Computer Systems Analyst 414 415
Computer Scientist 415 416
Other Computer Specialist 416 417
Mathematician & Statistician
Actuary 417 418
Mathematician 418 419
Statistician 419 420
Operations Research Analyst 420 421
Natural Scientist
Agricultural Scientist,
including foresters &
conservationists 421 428
Biological Scientist
including biochemist &
medical scientists 422 429-433
Chemist 424 422
Earth & Marine Scientists,
including geologists,
oceanographers 425 423
Physicists 427 424
Other Physical Scientists 428 433
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Administrators, Managers, & Officials
Administrator or manager,
scientific & technical R&D 453 458
Administrator or manager,
production & operations 454 459
Administrator or manager,
all other, exc. self-employed 455 460
Self-employed proprietor 457 462
Accountant 458 463
Attorney or Judge 458 463
A final category that had to be considered was foreign workers
and those educated or employed out of the United States. Although
many degrees granted by foreign educational institutions were
comparable to those given in the United States, no information was
provided in the data set about in what foreign country the degree was
earned. And, it could not be assumed that all science and engineering
degrees were comparable world-wide. So, those educated out of the
U.S. were deleted. This also eliminated all U.S. citizens who studied
abroad.
Also it was possible that foreign employment structures and the
choice between managerial and technical career paths differ from those
in the U.S. However, it was also possible that employees of United
States firms could work out of this country, but function in a
domestic employment structure. Examples would be petroleum engineers
working at foreign drilling sites or civil engineers designing
infrastructure elsewhere but employed by domestic companies. To keep
these cases in the sample, the assumption was made that those who were
born and educated in the United States, but who worked out of the
country, were employed by U.S. firms.
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Using the above criteria to limit the sample, the resulting
sample size was 7276.
Next, it was decided that because the majority of the sample were
white males, it would be simpler to control for the effects of race
and sex by limiting the sample to white males. So, all but white
males were deleted from the sample.
The elimination of inconsistent cases and the limitation of the
sample to white males trimmed the sample size to 3364.
III. Generating a Work History
The PMS contained both retrospective and panel data that had to
be restructured into a format that described individual work
histories. The 1972 survey provided retrospective information about
three jobs. And, the subsequent surveys were panel data describing up
to five additional jobs. So, if information from all four surveys was
used, a work history could contain a maximum of eight jobs. As
discussed in Appendix 2, it was not possible to derive a measure of
career path that was consistent across all surveys, so that only the
retrospective data from the 1972 survey were used.
The 1972 survey provided retropsective information about three
jobs. Because respondents sampled in 1972 were at various stages in
their careers, the number of jobs described in the survey across
individuals. Older workers would be more likely to describe three
jobs, but younger workers may have had only one job by 1972. The
number of jobs described depended upon career stages and individual
propensity to move. Because respondents were asked to describe their
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current (or most recent) job and the two immediately preceeding jobs,
a zero start date was assumed to indicate that no job existed.
The work histories were constructed using the starting dates for
each job described. Jobs in the 1972 survey are referred to as JOBC,
JOB2T, and JOB3T for the current, second to last and third to last
jobs, respectively. If the start date for JOB3T was not equal to
zero, it was assumed that all three jobs in the 1972 survey existed.
If it did equal zero, the start date for JOB2T was examined; and, if
that equalled zero, JOBC was designated as the first job.
Of the sample, about half, 53.5% of the respondents described
their first job in the survey. The rest had had more than three
professional jobs prior to 1972.
IV. Variable Creation
These include human capital, external market, and career path
variables.
A. Human Capital Variables
Education. In the 1972 survey, individuals were asked to
describe their most recent formal university training (ED72A), plus
the two preceeding it (ED72B and ED72C). The variables selected from
the survey to describe education were degree level, major and
graduation year.
In order to determine the degree level at the time of a
particular job, the dates of the job and degree were compared. The
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highest degree granted before a particular job start date was defined
as the degree level for that job. The disadvantage with this method
was that if an individual received a degree before a job ended, the
new higher degree level was not recognized until the next job began.
In addition to listing degrees, respondents were also asked to
indicate their highest degree held in 1972. If degree information was
missing the default value was the 1972 degree level. This is
equivalent to assuming that individuals with graduate degrees
completed their educations before entering the labor market.
In the earnings growth model estimtated here, dummy variables for
three levels of education, bachelors, masters, and doctorate were used
rather than years of school. The use of dummy variables is preferable
given the nature of this data set. Because the sample represents a
relatively homogeneous group that is highly skilled, it is likely that
actual degree level is a more important credential than years of
education. And, that education operates as a shift parameter,
particularly early in one's career.
Experience and Tenure. In order to separate firm from non-firm
experience and also be able to associate each job with a career track,
total work experience was divided into three parts: EXP, pre-firm work
experience, TENURE, current job tenure, and NONTEN, tenure in the same
firm but in a different job. To measure these, total work experience
was first calculated. Then interfirm moves were identified so that
pre-firm experience could be subtracted from total experience. Job
tenure was simply the ending date minus the start date, and NONTEN was
the residual.
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To make these separations, the following procedure was used. In
the 1976 survey, respondents were asked how many years of professional
experience they had had up to 1976. If this variable, PROFEX76, had a
value then professional experience in 1972, PROFEX72, was set equal to
PROFEX76 minus 4. If PROFEX76 had a missing value, then PROFEX72 was
set equal to the individual's age in 1972 minus 25. If this yielded a
negative number, PROFEX72 was set equal to zero.
If the individual reported all three jobs in the 1972 survey,
experience prior to JOB3, EXP33, was defined first. First, EXP33 was
set equal to PROFEX72. Then a variable describing whether or not an
individual had changed firms before the current job, FIRMOV, was
introduced.
The variable BNJOB (described in Appendix 2) provides information
on the activity immediately preceeding the job. If BNJOB was either
missing or equal to employed, FIRMOV was coded as undefined.
Otherwise, it equalled yes, a move took place. If FIRMOV was
undefined, a variable, HOWJOB, describing how the current position was
acquired, was applied to that case. If the response to HOWJOB was
internal promotion, then FIRMOV was set equal to no interfirm move.
Otherwise, it remained undefined. Next, a list of reasons for leaving
the previous job was applied to those cases where FIRMOV was
undefined. If the response was positive for any of the following
reasons, FIRMOV was set equal to yes: lay-off, armed forces,
retirement, family reasons, spouse's job, move to new geographical
location, return to school, move closer to family, and other. If
FIRMOV was still undefined, it was set equal to missing.
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Having defined FIRMOV, if FIRMOV33 (move before JOB3) was equal
to yes, EXP33 was set equal to PROFEX72 minus tenure in JOB3,
TENURE33. Tenure was simply the end year minus the start year for
each job. If tenure equalled zero, it was set equal to one. If it
was missing because one or both dates was missing, it was set equal to
the missing.
If no move occurred before JOB33, then EXP33 was set equal to
PROFEX72 minus the sum of the tenures for JOB3 and JOB2. If FIRMOV23
(move before JOB2) was equal to no, the EXP33 was set equal to
PROFEX72 minus the sum of tenure for all three jobs. If no move
occurred before JOB1, experience was set equal to zero if the first
job described the individual's first job in the labor market (an
explicit question in the survey).
EXP23 and EXP13 were calculated using the same method. If
calculated experience was less than zero, it was set at zero.
Geographic Mobility. Whether a geographic move (DIVCHG) took
place before a particular job was an explicit question in the survey
and required no restructuring beyond incorporating it into the job
history data set format. Two dummy variables were created for
geographic move: MOVEY was equal to one if a move occurred, zero
otherwise; and, MOVEDK equalled one is DIVCHG was missing.
B. Labor Market Variables
These include industry, occupation, R & D spending, the presence
of government funding, geographic location, and the level of the CPI.
Industry and Occupation. The industrial categories were recoded
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into thirteen dummy variables, and the occupational categories were
recoded into ten dummy variables. Table 5 shows the dummy variables
and the categories which compose them.
Table 5
Occupational and Industrial Dummy Variables
Occupation Industry
Aero & Astro (401)
Agric. (402)
Nuclear (410)
Other (412)
Chemical (433)
Metal & Mat.(408)
Min. & Pet.(409)
Elec. & Elec(405)
Mechanical(407)
Civil & Arch.(404)
Envir. & San.(411)
All Computer (413-
414)
Actuary (417)
Mathematician(418)
Statistician(419)
Ind. Eng. (406)
Op. Res. (420)
All Nat. Sci(421-
(428)
Managers &
Administrators
(453 - 457)
INDWAR
INDBASE
INDMACH
INDCHEM
INDMANU
INDED
INDWELL
INDCON
INDSER
INDPROF
INDMINE
INDTRANS
INDOTHER
Federal Research and Development Expenditures.
Aircraft (701)
Motor Veh.(706)
Ordnance (707)
Elec.Mach.(703)
Fab. Metal(704)
Prim.Metal(708)
Elec. Mach(705)
Prof. Equip(709)
Chem (702)
Other Manu (710)
.College (711)
Jr.College (712)
Other Ed. (713)
Hospital (714)
Other Med.(715)
Agriculture(716)
Construct.(718)
Business (717)
Finance (720)
Eng.Serv.(719)
Prof .Soc. (722)
Res. Inst.(723)
Mining (721)
Transport.(725)
Other (726)
The change in
Research and Development (R & D) expenditures for a given job was
calculated by subtracting the level of federal R & D expenditures
during the first year of the job from that for the last year. The
earliest start date for the job in the sample is 1901, and there were
OCCENG1
OCCENG2
OCCENG3
OCCENG4
OCCENG5
OCCOMP
OCCMATH
OCCOPRES
OCCNASC
OCCMAN
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no consistent time series data sets for R & D expenditures that
covered the entire period, so several different sources were used,
and, in some cases, expenditure levels were estimated from existing
data.
Research and development is defined here as basic and applied
research in the life and natural sciences and engineering, and
development activities. Using the National Science Foundation
definitions, basic research is research with
the primary aim of the investigator being a
fuller knowledge or understanding of the
subject under study, rather than a practical
application thereof ... [where] ... original
investigations [are] for the advancement of
scientific knowledge ... which do not have
specific commercial objectives.
Applied research is "directed toward practical application of
knowledge." Development is
the systematic use of scientific knowledge
directed toward the production of useful
materials, devices, systems, or methods
including design and development of prototypes
and processes.
Development excludes product testing, quality control,
experimental production and training and information dissemination.
R & D funds include current operating costs, both direct and
indirect, as well as depreciation. Federal expenditures is the
aggregate of R & D expenditures for the separate federal federal
agencies, and due to accounting practices of some agencies,
represents obligations rather than actual expenditures in some cases.
In the series used in the earnings models, federal expenditures
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on R & D plants is also included. Expenditures for 1971-1972 are from
the NSF publication, Research and Development in Industry (see the
bibliography for full citations of these references). Information for
1952-1970 is from Historical Statistics of the United States.
Expenditures for 1940-1951 are from an OECD publication, Country
Reports on the Organization of Scientific Research. Data for
1920-1939 came from the Vannebar Bush report, Science, The Endless
Frontier. In this source, the data exclude R & D plant expenditure.
To account for this difference, the ratio of the 1940 expenditures in
Country Reports to that in the Bush report. That ratio was 1.17. In
addition, information was missing for 1920-1922 and for 1933 and 1939.
Expenditures for 1933 and 1939 were estimated using linear
extrapolation. Estimates for 1920-1922 were done by assuming that
federal R & D expenditures changed at the same rate as industry R & D
expenditures for those three years. No data were available for 1901
through 1919, so the average growth rate from 1920 to 1930 was assumed
to be the same for 1910-1919 and the mean value was used. The same
rate was applied to the 1910-1919 expenditures to make estimates for
1901-1909. Of the sample, .2% started jobs before 1919, so this
rather crude estimation method should have little effect.
If one of the job dates was missing, so that the change in R & D
expenditures could not be calculated, the case was deleted.
Government Funding. In all of the surveys, workers were asked if
their work was supported by U.S. government funds. They were asked to
indicate the areas of government supported work for each of the three
jobs, choosing three from a list of twelve areas. Their responses
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were recoded into four dummy variables representing different
agencies/areas: defense, space, energy, and other; and, the question
of government support was kept.
For the purpose of the earnings models, government funding
support was recoded into a single dichotomous variable. If the
response to the question of government support was yes, then the dummy
variable for government funding, GVTFND, was set equal to yes. If
not, the four dummy variables for government agency/area support were
consulted. If any of them equalled yes, GVTFND was set equal to yes.
Otherwise, it equalled zero.
Geographical Region and SMSA Status. In all of the surveys, the
location of the job site and whether or not it was in a standard
metropolitan statistical area (SMSA) were explicitly asked. There
were 10 geographical regions: New England (ME, NH, VT, MA, RI, CN);
Middle Atlantic (NY, NJ, PA); East North Central (OH, IN, IL, MI, WI);
West North Central (MN, IA, MO, ND, SD, NB, KS); South Atlantic (DE,
MD, DC, VA, WV, NC, SC, GA, FL); East South Central (KY, TN, AL, MS);
West South Central (AR, LA, OK, TX); Mountain (MT, ID, WY, CO, NM, AZ,
UT, NV); Pacific (WA, OR, CA, AK, HI); and, outlying areas (Puerto
Rico, Guam, Virgin Islands).
Changes in the Consumer Price Index. As was the case in R & D
expenditure levels, changes in the CPI index depended on the starting
and ending job dates. The CPI index for the years 1901 to 1970 was
taken from Historical Statistics of the U.S., and that for 1971 and
1972 from Statistical Abstracts (1973). Because percentage rather
than actual change was of interest, the logarithmic value of the CPI
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index for each year was used, the value for the starting year being
subtracted from that for the ending year. If either date was missing,
the case was deleted.
C. Defining Career Paths
The primary hypothesis of this thesis is that the earnings
schedules and mobility patterns of scientists and engineers depend on
what career path they follow. The major path distinction is between
managerial and technical paths. There were three different variables
in the the data set that could be used to define career paths:
on-the-job activities, supervisory level, and self-defined
occupational category.
Respondents were asked to describe their supervisory level for
each job in the 1972 survey. The question about supervisory level
allowed five possible responses: 1) supervised no personnel; 2)
responsible for indirect or staff supervision (no line authority); 3)
supervised team, unit, project, or section; 4) managed major
department or division; and, 5) general management of organization.
Supervisory level information was provided only in the 1972 survey.
Information about activities on the job was provided in each
survey, however, the format of the questions differed from survey to
survey. Appendix 2 provides a detailed discussion of these
differences. In the 1972 survey, where the current and two previous
jobs were described, respondents were asked to provide the percentage
distribution of their time among twelve activities in addition to
noting their supervisory level. Those activities are listed below.
V-21
Activity
1. Teaching and Training
2. Research
3. Development
4. Clinical Diagnosis
5. Design
6. Quality Control, Testing
7. Operations
8. Distribution
9. Statistical Work
10. Consulting
11. Computer
12. Other
As is discussed in Appendix 2, two management activities were
included in the activity lists for the survey, and the attempt was
made to make that information consistent with the suupervisory level
information provided in the 1972 survey. In addition, several tests
were made to determine if Distribution and Consulting should be
considered managerial or technical activites.
In addition to the activity and supervisory variables,
respondents were asked their occupation in each survey. Table 4,
above, shows the list of occupational codes for all surveys. If the
occupation was one on the list below, the job was defined as
managerial. Otherwise, the job was technical.
Occupation Code
Administrator or Manager, scientific
& technical research & development 453
Administrator or Manager, production
& operations 454
Administrator, Manager, or Official,
all other, exc. self-employed 455
Self-employed Proprietor 456
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Accountant 457
Attorney 458
After several unsuccessful attempts were made to generate a
consistent measure of career path that allowed use of all of the
surveys, it was decided that the analysis would be limited to the 1972
survey data only. Two definitions of path were used, that using
supervisory level and that using the self-declared occupation. Again,
after several tests, it was decided that only those who managed a
major department or division (SUPATH = 4) or were part of general
management of the organization (SUPATH = 5) should be counted as
managers. Chapter VI includes a discussion of the differences between
the two measures and the likely biases each contains.
FOOTNOTES
1 Respondents to the 1972 survey were divided into categories: those
considered to be "in-scope," or in one of the fields of science and
engineering in 1972; and, those who were "out-of-scope", or not in a
field of science and engineering in 1972. The in-scope sample size
was 50,093 and became the sample for all of the subsequent surveys.
Survey responses from the 1974 PMS were matched with the individual
survey response from the 1972 PMS; responses from 1976 were matched to
those from 1974; and 1978 responses were matched to those from 1976.
So, longitudinal information is provided. Of the 50,093 people
sampled, 41,133 returned useable responses. An additional 362 cases
were deleted because either occupation or professional
self-identification had to be imputed from other information provided
in the questionnaire.
2 The first type of case to be deleted was those without a starting
date for the current or most recent job in 1972. Although the survey
describes people at different stages in their careers, this is the one
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job which should be common to all respondents.
An exemption in this category was made for those with post-doctoral
appointments. In PMS74 and PMS76, whether or not a particular job is
a post-doc is explicitly asked. If a job is a post-doc and that is
that individual's only academic job, then that case is kept.
Otherwise, it is deleted. For the 1972 survey, the assumption is made
that if what is described as an academic job (by industry and
activity) lasts more than one year, then that individual is assumed to
be a college teacher and is dropped from the sample. Because the
ending date for the current job in the 1978 survey is not available,
all of those defined as academicians must be assumed not to be
recipients of post-doctoral appointments.
U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States,
Part 1, Bureau of the Census, 1975, p. 961.
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Chapter VI
SAMPLE FREQUENCIES AND ESTIMATED RESULTS
Introduction
This chapter has two purposes. First, because the primary
hypothesis has been that career paths mitigate the effect of human
capital investment on earnings, it is first necessary to establish
that the hypothesized career paths exist. This is followed by a model
where experience is expressed as a homogeneous continuous variable.
Next, two sets of earnings models are presented, one of earnings
levels and one of earnings change. Before these discussions, however,
the sample is described.
I. Characteristics of the Sample
In order to gain a perspective on who is represented in this
sample, descriptive statistics are presented here for the entire
sample in 1972.
As discussed in the section on variable creation, the sample has
been limited to white males who held at least a bachelor's degree at
the time of entering the labor market. All workers in the natural and
life sciences, mathematics, computer science, and engineering were
included. Social scientists and miscellaneous occupations were
omitted. Also, foreign workers were excluded, unless there was
convincing evidence that a foreign worker was working for a U.S. firm
at a foreign work site. The sample size is 3364.
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A. Human Capital
Age, Experience, and Tenure. The mean age of the sample in 1972
was 41.1 years, with a standard deviation of 10.4. The median age is
40, and the range is 22 to 79. Despite this high maximum, only 41
people are over age 65, the traditional retirement age. Mean years of
professional experience (equal to the answer to an explicit question
in 1976 minus four) was 16.7 years, with a standard deviation of 9.7.
The minimum was zero, for new entrants, the maximum 54 years, and the
median 16 years. The table below shows the frequency distribution for
years of experience.
Table 1
Years of Professional Experience in 1972
Years Frequency % of Sample
< - 10 1118 33.23
11 to 20 1115 33.14
21 to 30 830 24.67
31 to 40 282 8.38
40 + 19 .56
Two-thirds of the sample had been in the labor market for twenty
years or less.
Job tenure in the most recent job was also calculated and
grouped. In this case, current job tenure equalled seventy-two (1972)
minus the starting year. This differs from actual tenure because most
workers continued in that job beyond 1972. The frequencies for the
tenure groups are:
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Table 2
Job Tenure in the Current job in 1972
Years Frequency Percent
< 5 1754 52.74
5 to 9 802 23.84
10 to 14 361 10.73
15 to 19 177 5.26
20+ 270 8.03
That three-quarters of the sample had been in their current job less
than ten years despite the fact that the sample represents a fairly
mature age cohort suggests a high rate of job mobility.
Education and Field. The highest degree held by a majority of
the sample in 1972 was a bachelor's degree, with 2259, or 67.2% at
that level. Eight hundred and twenty three, or 24.4%, has master's
degree, and 282 (8.4%) had doctorates.
Table 3 shows the professional field distribution of the sample
in 1972. As discussed in the section on variable creation,
professional field is a composite measure, where respondents are
sorted according to a set of ordered criteria, such as education, work
areas, and professional activities.
Table 3
Professional Field Distribution
Field Frequency Percent Field Frequency Percent
Computer 282 8.4 Medical Sci 3 .1
Sci. Chemist 276 8.2
Engineer 2436 72.4 Physicist/ 92 2.7
Mathematician 42
Statistician 18
Agricul. Sci. 32
Bio. Sci. 31
1.2
.5
1.0
.9
Astronomer
Atmospheric
Scientist
Earth Sci.
other.
Clearly, the large majority of the sample are engineers, with
only chemists and computer specialists constituting field groups of
any significance.
B. Labor-Market Variables
The frequency distribution by occupation for the job held in 1972
is very similar to that for professional field, with a few additions
that should be mentioned. Within engineering, there are twelve
subspecialities. The dominant types of engineering specializations
are chemical, electrical and electronic, and mechanical.
Table 4 shows the industrial distribution of the sample in 1972.
Industry
Air Craft
Elec. Mach
Mach., exc. elec
Ordnance
Prof .&Sci.Equip
College, Univ.
BusinessRepair
Eng.,Arch. Serv
Min. & Petr.
Res. Instit.
Trans.
Industri
Frequency
294
230
202
149
53
29
21
273
224
163
154
Table 4
al Distribution
Industry
Chemicals
Fabr. Metal
Motor Vehicles
Primary Metals
Other Manu
Agric.,FishForest
Construction
Fin.,Ins.
Prof.,Tech. Soc.
Retail,Wholesale
Other
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3 .1
131
18
3.9
.5
Frequency
494
96
78
132
335
25
72
32
4
30
234
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The largest single category, Chemicals and Allied Products,
remains the modal category for all three jobs in the 1972 survey.
Because educators were deleted from the sample, the very small number
in the college or university category represents those working in
university-affiliated research centers or those who are employed as
engineers on the nonacademic staff of an academic institution. It is
noteworthy that only 4.4% of the sample work in Ordnance while almost
20% of the sample were doing work supported by the Defense Department
in 1972. With the few exceptions mentioned above, the distribution of
workers by industry is relatively even, with a range between two and
ten percent.
Of the different types of employers, 91.4% were private sector,
3.5% were private nonprofit, and 2.5% were self-employed.
Geographically, 87% of the sample were concentrated into six
regions: 22.6% in the mid-Atlantic states; 17.4 in the
east-north-central region; 15.1% in the Pacific region; 11.9% in the
west-north central; 9.9% in the south Atlantic region; and, 8.2% in
New England. Eighty-six percent worked within SMSAs.
II. Career Paths
In the earlier chapter which reviews the literature on the career
paths of scientists and engineers, the major theme was that many of
those workers, who enter the labor force with an interest in technical
problem solving, eventually leave technically oriented jobs to begin a
managerial career path. And, a major reason for this career-path
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shift is that greater economic rewards are tied to managerial than to
technical activities. In order to model the differences in reward
structures that are associated with career path choice, it is
necessary first to establish that most of the workers in this sample
follow one of two types of career paths: all enter the labor market as
technical workers; most remain technical workers due to the combined
effects of their own proclivity for technical problem solving and the
pyramidal shape of most hierarchical organizaions; but, a significant
number shift to, and remain on, a managerial career path.
A. Establishing the Career Split
As described in the discussion of variable creation, career path
was not explicitly provided in the data set, but was constructed from
related variables. Two versions are used in the empirical model of
earnings changes, SUPATH, constructed from a direct question about
supervisory level, and OCCMAN, constructed from the self-declared
occupational code (See the chapter on variable construction for
specific definitions of these variables).
Table 5a shows the frequency of managers and technical workers
for each job, using the two different definitions.
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Table 5a
Path by Job
SUPATH
Technical Managerial
Job Frequency Percent Frequency Percent
Jobl 2946 88.28 391 11.72
Job2 2202 80.87 521 19.13
Job3 1580 72.15 610 27.85
OCCMANG
Jobi 2948 87.63 416 12.37
Job2 2357 82.56 498 17.44
Job3 2052 80.00 513 20.00
Table 5a shows the expected increase in both the actual number
and percentages of managers relative to technical workers as careers
progress from Job 1 through Job 3, regardless of which path definition
is used. However, as careers progress, the number of managers
increases more rapidly when the supervisory-level based definition is
used.
The progression from technical to managerial paths was also
documented by constructing a set of alternative career paths and
examining their relative frequencies. The two major paths were, of
course, all technical (T), and first technical then managerial (T to
M). Because respondents were first questioned at different points in
their careers, it was also possible that the first recorded job was
after the path shift had occurred, so an all managerial path was
possible (M). Then, three other paths were included that were
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expected to describe the careers of a small minority of the sample: a
backshift from managerial to technical (M to T); a backshift followed
by a swing back (M to T to M); and, the expected shift followed by a
backshift (T to M to T). Diagram 1 shows the frequencies of
percentages of the different path alternatives using the two different
definitions.
Regardless of which variable definition was used, that the career
paths of most of the sample are either all technical, technical then
managerial, or are described after the shift is supported by the
diagram. Using SUPATH, 91.6% are described by the hypothesized paths,
compared to 94.2% using OCCMANG. The major difference between the two
variables is that, using OCCMANG, more of the sample stayed in
technical jobs than when SUPATH was used.
Because the survey did not describe the first job after entering
the labor market of all of the sample, these alternative paths did not
necessarily describe the entire career paths of an individual. When
the alternative paths were examined according to whether the
respondent's first job was included in the survey, the result showed
that fewer of those on the managerial track had described their
first job, supporting the hypothesized eventuality of a split from a
technical to managerial path. Using SUPATH, of those on the
all-technical track, 60% had described their first job, compared to
30.5% of those on the all managerial track and 38.4% of those who had
gone from technical to managerial. Using the occupational definition,
57.2% of those on the all-technical track had described their first
job, compared to 7% of those on the all-managerial, and 34.1% who had
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made the split.
B. Comparison of Path Definitions: A Phased Transition Hypothesis
It was expected that after undergoing the rigorous training
needed for a scientific or engineering career that even those workers
who had shifted to the managerial track would describe themselves as
members of the occupation closest to their training; and, that
therefore OCCMANG would understate the number of managers relative to
SUPATH.
Because the use of a dichotomous variable was an admitted
oversimplification of the career choices available to scientists and
engineers, the possibility that the discrepancy between the two
definitions occurred because each captured a different phase of the
technical-managerial path transition was examined. In terms of the
two definitions, it was expected that although a worker might be a
manager according to supervisory responsibilities (i.e., SUPATH - 1)
there could be a transition period when that worker retains a
professional self-image as a technical worker (i.e., OCCMANG - 0)
despite significant supervisory responsibilities on the job.
To test this, the sample was divided into four categories: those
who were managers by both definitions, those who were technical
workers by both definitions, and two groups of those who were
technical by one defintion and managerial by another. Table 5b shows
the frequency distribution by group for the job described in 1972.
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Table 5b
Comparison of Path Definitions
Frequencies Percent of Sample
Managers by
Both Definitions 605 18.2
Technical Worker by
Both Definitions 1437 43.23
Manager by Supervisory
Level, Technical by
Occupation 1222 36.76
Manager by Occupation,
Technical by Super-
visory Level 60 1.81
Table 5b shows that a significantly large number of workers with
high-level supervisory responsibilities define their occupations as
scientists or engineers and that very few describe themselves as
managers but have few or no supervisory responsibilities, providing
initial support for this explanation of the difference between the two
path definitions. And, that there are more than twice as many of
workers who are managers by supervisory level only as managers by both
definitions does suggest a high degree of professional loyalty
regardless of actual job content.
Assuming the transition from technical to managerial is phased,
it would also be expected that there would be a difference in the age
distributions of those who are managers by supervisory level only and
those who are managers by both definitions. Table 5c shows the
frequencies and percent distributions of those two groups by age group
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for the job described in 1972.
Table 5c
Managers, by Managers, by
Age Group Both Supervisory % Sample in Age
Definitions Definition Group
20-25 4 .66 25 2.05 3.52
26-30 45 7.44 131 10.72 14.78
31-35 73 12.44 194 15.88 15.97
36-40 94 15.54 209 17.10 16.13
41-45 124 20.50 210 17.18 16.00
46-50 113 18.68 211 17.27 15.31
51-55 80 13.22 117 9.57 9.06
56-60 42 6.94 68 5.56 5.20
61-65 19 3.14 41 3.36 2.95
66+ 11 1.82 16 1.31 1.17
Assuming those who are managers by supervisory level only are in
transition from technical to managerial and those who are managers by
both as having made that transition, examination of the age
distribution indicates that more of those who are in transition are
below age 40 than those who have made the transition. Forty-five and
three quarters percent of those who are managers by supervisory level
only are under 45, compared to 35.7% of those who are managers by both
definitions. Comparison of the distributions of years of experience
yields similar findings: 64.3% of those in the supervisory-level
managerial category have had 20 years or less of work experience,
compared to 52.7% of those who are managers by both definitions.
In order to examine whether there were systematic differences
between the two types of definitions, the probability of falling into
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one of the four pathgroup categories was modeled. A logit model was
used where log(P /(1-P )) = XB + , where P is the probability of
being in one of the path groups and the X variables include experience
group, degree level, and industry. The model is additive; that is,
each of the I variables was expected to affect path group separately
and no interactions between the X variables was hypothesized. All of
the exogenous variables are categorical. The experience groups
include: less than ten years, ten to twenty years, twenty to thirty,
and over thirty years.
The chi-square statistic for each of the separate effects shows
that the hypothesis that being in a particular pathgroup category is
independent of experience, degree, or industry can be rejected at the
.0001 level for all effects (degree level: X2 - 34.3 (df - 6),
industry: 118.15 (df = 45), experience group: 158.98 (df = 9)).
The underlying hypothesis is that the transition from technical
to managerial career paths is gradual, and the specific expectation
for that as experience increases, an individual will be increasingly
likely to be a manager by both definitions rather than by supervisory
responsibilities only. The effect of degree is expected to be that
those with advanced degrees will have a greater loyalty to their
technical training and therefore be more likely to be managers by the
supervisory definition only. The effect of industry is expected to
vary with the structure of the industry, and the industrial category
variables were included primarily for control purposes.
The probability of being in a particular path group is p-
(1/(l+e-xb). Using the aircraft industry as an example, the
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probability of being a manager by both definitions for an individual
with less than ten years experience and a bachelor's level degree is:
p - 1/(1 + e-(-. 50 8 - 1.04 -1.2 - .085) - .0562. The comparable
probability for an individual with between twenty -and thirty years of
experience is .1462. The probability of being d manager by
supervisory definition only for an individual with ten years
experience and a B.S. degree is .3311. And, the probability of being
in that pathgroup for a comparable individual with twenty to thirty
years experience is .4878. 1
What these probabilities indicate is that for those in the
aircraft industry with less than ten years of experience, while there
is almost a 40% of having supervisory responsibilities, only 5.6% of
those will describe themselves as managers. And, of those with twenty
to thirty years of experience, there is about 63% chance of having
supervisory responsibilities, but members of that group are about
three times as likely to describe themselves as managers. Although
this is only a single industry example, these probabilities provide
support for there being a phased transition from the technical paths,
where despite an actual shift in job content from primarily technical
to primarily managerial responsibilities, it takes time to relinquish
a primary loyalty to one's profession and adopt a managerial (and
firm) orientation.
III. Estimation Results
As was described in a previous chapter, three types of models are
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estimated, a continuous experience model, an earnings-level model and
an earnings-change model. All use a loglinear functional form.
Incorporated in the presentation of the estimation results is a
discussion of the specification and interpretation issues associated
with each variable.
A. Coefficient Interpretation of the Loglinear Models
The functional form of the cross section models can be written
as: Y = aX b eb X b D or In Y = lna + blnX + b2 2 + b3D3 + ,
where a is the intercept, X and X are continuous variables and D is1 2
the set of dummy variables. b can be interpreted as an elasticity.
In this case, the only variable which is entered this way is the
change in the CPI index which appears in the earnings change models.
The dummy variables act as shift parameters and are interpreted as
indicating an effect relative to the deleted variable in each set of
dummy variables. In the cross-section model, there are three sets of
dummy variables. To avoid singularity, one variable was dropped from
each set. They were MS from education, OCCENG1 from the occupational
categories, and INDMANU from the industry classification.
The X2 variables have a slope effect, and as discussed in chapter
IV, are hypothesized to have an absolute effect on the log of
earnings. An interaction between the dummy variable and a continuous
variable is also expected to have a slope effect.
A general specification of the earnings change model is:
d ln Y = a + B1 X + B 2D +.M, where X, are continuous variables and D
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are dummy variables. In comparison to the levels model, when ability
is assumed to be fixed and bias the expected value of the residual and
thus the coefficient estimates, the net effect of ability in the
change model is zero.
B. Continuous Experience
In an earlier section, the presence of career paths was
empirically established. The next step is to document the differences
in labor market outcomes between the two paths. The expected
differences between managers and technical workers is based on a
hypothesized difference in both the nature and quantity of their human
capital accumulation. For this reason, the earnings models are
specified to permit the observation of differences between general,
firm-specific, and job-specific human capital. However, before
examining the human-capital investment components of the two paths, a
simple model that examines the return to each type of experience is
estimated.
In this model, total work experience is the sum of technical
experience (EXPTECH), managerial experience (EXPMANG), and, because
the entire career history of all of the sample is not always included
in the survey, the amount of experience when path is unknown (EXPDK).
To account for declining rates of investment, these three variables
are entered in both the linear and quadratic form. The definition
used for the managerial path was that based on supervisory level.
The expectation was that the coefficients for managerial experience,
EXPMANG, would be larger than for EXPTECH, and the quadratic form
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would be less negative. Four models were estimated, two earnings
levels models (See footnote 3 for an explanation of the exclusion of
the industry and occupational dummy variables) and two earnings change
equations, each with and without the industry and occupational
variables. Table 6 shows the estimated coefficients and their
t-statistics for both the earnings levels and earnings change models.
Table 6
Continuous Experience Models
Variable Level Models Change Models
** *
Intercept
EXPMANG
EXPTECH
EXPDK
EXPMANG2
EXPTECH 2
2
EXPDK
MOVEY
BAC
PHD
9.6872
(422.684)
**
.03220
(15.8187)
.0128
(8.493)
**
.0118
(10.792)
**
-. 0005
(-7.715)
-. 0007
(-2.304)
.00003
(.651)
.0148
(1.419)
**
-. 0875
(-7.259)
**
.1884
(8.663)
9.5856
(562.477)
**
.0346
(16.945)
.0124
(8.181)
**
.0128
(11.607)
**
-. 0006
(-8.271)
-. 0001
(-2.146)
.00003
(.702)
.0108
(1.020)
**
-. 0794
(-6.526)
**
.1466
(7.050)
.0778
(1.952)
**
.00919
(2.636)
.0047
(1.802)
**
-.007
(-3.819)
**
-. 0004
(-3.543)
**
-. 0004
(-5.450)
-. 0001
(-1.377)
-. 0195
(-1.088)
.0047
(.229)
*
-. 0816
(-2.209)
.0163
(.707)
**
.0097
(2.833)
.0036
(1.379)
**
-. 0065
(-3.563)
**
-. 0004
(-3.595)
**
-. 0004
(-5.047)
-. 00013
(-.6001)
GVTFND
NE
OCCENG2
OCCENG3
OCCENG4
OCCENGS
OCCOMP
OCCNASC
INDWAR
INDBASE
INDMANU
INDCHEM
INDSERV
INDPROF
INDOTH
INDK
LNCPICHG
*
.0298
(2.255)
**
.0463
(4.171)
-. 0850
(-5.177)
-. 0697
(-3.756)
-. 1068
(-6.257)
-. 1353
(-4.853)
-. 0767
(-4.496)
-. 1650
(-9.085)
-. 0106
(-.510)
-. 0561
(-2.851)
-. 0330
(-1.78)
-. 0140
(-.740)
-. 0192
(-.891)
-. 1028
(-3.866)
-.013
(-.549)
.0259
(.491)
**
.0419
(3.742)
**
.0433
(3.888)
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-. 0344
(1.531)
.0263
(1.392)
-. 0094
(-.335)
.0003
(.008)
.0066
(.230)
-. 0410
(-.867)
.0041
(.142)
.0461
(1.492)
**
-. 0856
(-2,421)
-. 1028
(-3.076)
-.083
(-2.638)
**
-. 0870
(-2.709)
.0280
(.764)
-. 0562
(-1.244)
-. 0495
(-1.221)
-. 0664
(-.742)
**
1.603
(20.386)
**
1.6044
(20.518)
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**
RNDCHG .00004 .00004**
(13.225) (13.247)
R2 .2956 .2599 .5499 .5415
In the earnings-levels equations, both sets of results provide
support for a steeper earnings schedule for managers. But, managers
appear to have a somewhat higher rate of decline in investment in the
model which excludes the industry and occupational variables. The
slope coefficients for managerial experience is .03 compared to .01
for technical workers. If it were assumed that one-third of a
manager's career is first spent as a technical worker, then it would
take 145.5 years for the earnings schedules of the managers and
technical workers to cross.
The coefficients for the earnings change models are partially
consistent with those for the levels variables: the rate of change for
managers is greater than for technical workers, but the effect of the
decline in investment is the same for managers and technical workers.
Setting the partial derivative equal to zero and solving for total
years of experience, it would take a manager 21.4 years to reach a
zero rate of earnings growth, compared to 12.05 for a technical
worker.
The results of these fairly crude models provide support for a
steeper earnings curve for managers relative to technical workers, and
at least in the model, for a slower decline in investment.
B. Experience-Components Models
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Both the earnings level and earnings change models were estimated
as separate path regressions and as a single regression with
interaction variables. The path definition used to separate
observations was the supervisory definition, SUPATH. The test used
was the Chow-test, an F-test that tests whether the parameter
estimates that result when the model is estimated using one sample
hold when the model is restimated using another. In this case, the
benchmank estimates are from the total sample, and the sum of the
separate regression estimates are compared to these. The null
hypothesis is BT=BM=BA, that is, that the coefficient estimates from
the technical sample equal those from the managerial sample and so
also those from the total sample.
For both models, the null hypothesis was rejected. For the
cross-section level models, F 28, - 12.373. And, for the
cross-section change model, the test value was 10.468. That the null
hypothesis can be rejected provides initial support for the argument
that there are systematic differences in earnings profiles by career
path.
1. Earnings Level
Single Equation with Interaction Variables. Based on the
specification tests discussed in the previous section, four single
equation-earnings level models were estimated: twc using the
supervisory-based managerial definition and two using occupation.2
The two supervisory path models (Models 1 and 2) were the full model
including all of the path-interaction variables and the second model
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excluding the industry and occupational dummy variables.3 Both
occupational path models (Models 3 and 4) included the industry and
occupational variables, but one excluded the path interactions
hypothesized to be equal to zero above.
The major distinction between the two path definitions to be kept
in mind is that almost all of those who describe themselves as
managers have supervisory responsibility, but only one-third of those
who are managers according to supervisory level call themselves
managers. So, for models 3 and 4, the non-managerial group includes
many workers with significant supervisory responsibilities. In
addition, as discussed earlier, there is some evidence that those who
describe themselves as managers are more experienced workers and may
be more senior managers.
Table 7a show the estimated coefficients for the earnings level
models. The t-statistics are in parentheses.
Table 6a
Cross-Section
Levels Equations Results
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
** ** ** **
INTERCEPT 9.4034 9.463 9.4228 9.421
(516.68) (392.76) (360.88) (367.24)
** ** ** **
BA -.0808 -.0846 -.0846 -.0844
(-7.217) (-7.573) (-7.449) (-7.426)
** ** ** **
PHD .1505 .1899 .1726 .173
(7.866) (9.423) (8.391) (8.407)
** ** ** **
EXP .0282 .0278 .0301 .0298
(10.928) (10.826) (12.187) (13.191)
2
EXP
TENURE
TEN2
NONTEN
NONTEN 2
MOVEY
MOVEDK
GVTFND
SUPATH
OCCMAN
PATH*EXP
PATH*EXP2
PATH*TEN
PATH*TEN2
PATH*NT 2
PATH*NT
PATH*EXTEN
**
-. 00041
(-4.614)
**
.0309
(16.864)
-. 00043
(-10.469)
**
.0477
(17.017)
**
-. 001
(-9.760)
**
.0247
(2.492)
.0462
(1.852)
**
.0464
(4.459)
**
.1699
(4.066)
-. 00088
(-.0163)
-. 00004
(-.228)
.0114
(2.503)
-. 00027
(-2.261)
**
.00078
(4.459)
**
-. 0171
(-3.430)
-. 000089
**
-. 00041
(-4.639)
**
.031
(16.926)
-. 00043
(-10.473)
**
.0452
(16.110)
**
-. 00093
(-8.838)
**
.0273
(2.757)
.0475
(1.923)
*
.027
(2.199)
**
.1332
(3.254)
.00077
(.146)
-. 00007
(-.413)
.0131
(2.899)
**
-. 00031
(-2.588)
**
.00068
(3.92)
**
-. 0144
(-2.932)
-. 00016
(-.309) (-.569)
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**
-. 0005
(-6.334)
**
.0333
(18.081)
-. 00046
(-11.260)
**
.0407
(14.303)
**
-. 0007
(-7.243)
**
.0237
(2.358)
.0400
(1.577)
*
.0297
(2.365)
**
.1672
(3.901)
0.0012
(-.212)
.00019
(1.006)
-. 0019
(-.375)
.00019
(1.216)
.00026
(1.420)
-. 004
(-.771)
-. 000001
(-.005)
**
-. 00048
(-6.400)
**
.0338
(18.599)
-. 00047
(-11.525)
**
.0386
(15.142)
**
-. 00063
(-7.456)
**
.0241
(2.400)
.0399
(1.588)
*
.0296
(2.355)
**
.1920
(7.837)
-. 0049
(-1.035)
*
.00024
(1.613)
.00026
(1.257)
EXTEN
NJTTR
**
-. 00107
(-5.611)
**
-. 0013
(-7.295)
.0421
(4.097)
NE
OCCENG2
OCCENG3
OCCENG4
OCCENGS
OCCOMP
OCCNASC
INDWAR
INDBASE
INDMANU
INDCHEM
INDSERV
INDPRO
INDOTH
**
-.001
(-5.464)
**
-. 0014
(-7.590)
.044
(4.270)
**
-. 0474
(-3.059)
-. 0256
(-1.459)
-. 0721
(-4.484)
-.093
(-3.560)
-.023
(-1.420)
**
-. 1236
(-7.209)
.0146
(.750)
*
-. 0441
(-2.411)
-.026
(-1.510)
-. 0049
(-.280)
.0138
(.691)
*
-. 0571
(-2.301)
.0213
(.959)
.0258
(.516)
.3977
-. 0067
(-.344)
**
-. 068
(-3.668)
**
-.0448 -.0472
(-2.556) (-2.694)
* *
-.0352 -.0362
(-1.970) (-2.024)
.02
(.977)
**
-. 0849
(-3.371)
.0098
(.436)
.0347
(.697)
.3768
.0182
(.894)
**
-. 0861
(-3.420)
.0075
(.333)
.0322
(.646)
.3749
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**
-. 0009
(-5.350)
-. 00106
(-5.930)
.0378
(3.604)
.0218
(1.171)
*
.0372
(1,872)
-. 0032
(-.172)
-. 0146
(-.518)
*
.0364
(1.926)
*
**
-.001
(-6.199)
-. 001
(-5.845)
.0378
(3.603)
.0214
(1.149)
*
.0367
(1.844)
-. 0033
(-.179)
-. 0163
(-.580)
*
.0385
(2.040)
*
-.0501 -.0503
(-2.473) (-2.482)
-. 0063
(-.319)
**
-. 0651
(-3.498)
*
INDK
R 2 .3771
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**
* Significant at the .01 level or greater.
Significant at the .10 level or greater.
The underlying hypothesis about career paths has been that, given
some set of external market conditions, career path mitigates the
effect of human-capital investment. There are three ways in which
path is hypothesized to affect lifetime earnings. First, it can have
a shift effect: the transition from a technical to a managerial path
can put an individual on a higher earnings curve. Diagram 2a shows
the simple shift effect. Path may also have a slope effect,
indicating a difference in the rate of earnings growth with time.
Diagram 2b shows the combined shift and slope effect. And, path can
also affect earnings in that it can slow the rate of decrease:
although managers, too, will invest at a decreasing rate, the
preferred set of investment opportunities will keep the rate of return
higher than that marginal cost of investment for a longer period.
Diagram 2c show the combined shift, slope, and quadratic effects.
2a 2b 2c
'1c
E E E
This hypothesis was tested in the model by the inclusion of a
dummy variable for path and path interaction with job tenure and
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tenure squared. As discussed earlier, the interactions between path
and previous experience were expected to be non-significant.
Using both of the path definitions, the shift effect was
supported. The coefficients for the path variables ranged from .13 to
.19, and all were significant at the .001 level or better. In the
case of the tenure-path interactions, the coefficients for both the
linear and squared variables were hypothesized to be positive because
they are meant to describe the relative effect of path on the
tenure-earnings relationship. In the case of both of the supervisory
based models, the coefficients for PATH*TENURE was positive and
significant at the .01 level or better. But, the coefficients for the
interaction between path and tenure squared, although significant at
the .02 level or better, were the wrong sign. Taken together, the
results of models 1 and 2 suggest that career path shifts a worker to
a higher earnings curve, where investment opportunities -are such that
earnings increase faster, but there is no disincentive for managers to
slow their rate of investment, and they may actually slow it faster
than non-managers.
In models 3 and 4, the path-tenure interaction coefficient is the
wrong sign and insignificant. However, the effect of the path-tenure
squared interaction is the correct sign, and, in the case of model 4,
significant at the .1 level. So, using the occupationally based
variables, path is expected to shift workers to a higher earnings
curve, and the relative investment opportunities are about the same
for managers and non-managers, but managers decrease their investment
at a somewhat slower rate.
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Path-Experience Interactions. In the earnings-level equation,
it was expected that the interaction between path and experience, path
and non-job tenure, and the interactions between path and those
variables squared would have no effect. So, the null hypothesis for
the earnings-level equation was: BPATH*EXP = BPATH*EXP = BPATH*NONTEN
B PATH*NONTEN 0.
The reason for this hypothesis was because, given the way these
variables were defined, they represented the interactions between
current job path and past experience, not past paths and past
experience. Hypothesizing these coefficients to be non-zero was
equivalent to proposing that there is a difference in returns to
previous experience. There are two likely sources of difference:
either most of the pre-job experience of managers was managerial; or,
there was no path difference in previous experience but there was some
systematic quality about those who are currently managers that caused
them to receive greater returns to past experience than non-managers.
Because the pre-job path differences were not known and could not
justifiably be assumed as randomly distributed between current
managers and technical workers, the weak hypothesis tested here was
that, holding quantity but not quality of previous experience
constant, current managers did not profit more than non-managers from
that experience. In other words, there was no systematic difference
in economic ability that is being described by the path variable.
When tested using the supervisory-based variable, F4  = 4.92, so
the hypothesis was rejected at the .05 level. However, using the
occupationally based path definition, the F-statistic was 2.05, and
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the null hypothesis could not be rejected at the .05 level. This
inability to reject the null hypothesis using the occupational path
definition supports the assumption that path and not ability account
for the earnings differences described by the coefficients on the path
related variables.
The null hypothesis is rejected when using the supervisory
definition, suggesting there is a difference in the rate of return to
prior experience. However, when the coefficients on the separate
parts of pre-job experience, PATH*EXP and PATH*NONTEN (and their
squares), which will be discussed in the next section, are examined,
there is a large difference in significance levels between the EXP
interactions and the NONTEN interactions, suggesting that the nature
of the experience is a major factor in earnings level.
In the case of the interactions between path and non-job
experience (hypothesized to have no effect in the previous section on
model specification), for all of the models where the interaction
between path and pre-firm experience and that squared are included,
the coefficients are never significantly different from zero,
suggesting that the rate of return to general human capital does not
differ between managers and non-managers. The interactions between
path and same-firm pre-job experience when the occupationally based
definition of path is used are not very significant (that BPATH*NONTEN
- 0 can only be rejected at the 40% level, and that BPATH*NONTEN2 w 0
can only be rejected at the 15% level).
In models 1 and 2, both coefficients for the same-firm,
different-job experience are highly significant, but the sign of the
VI-27
coefficient is not in the hypothesized direction. A plausible
explanation for these results is that, once in a firm, to become a
manager, a worker must invest heavily in acquiring firm-specific human
capital. Those investment costs result in an initial, pre-current
job, relative decline in earnings. However, because of the
expectation of overall higher earnings, the rate of decline in
investment in the pre-job same-firm period is slower for managers than
non-managers; so, B PATH*NONTEN> 0.
To summarize and interpret the results concerning the effect of
path on earnings level, there is a strong positive significant shift
effect, evident from the coefficient of the simple path variables.
The insignificant coefficients on the path-experience interactions
suggest that career path does not affect the rate of return to general
human capital. Once a move is made to the current firm, it appears
that there in an initial increase in investment costs by managers or
those who eventually become managers. And, the rate of this
investment decreases more slowly for this managerial group.
That this increase in investment costs occurs initially and may
be because of expected eventual higher earnings is supported by the
fact that the effect of path on pre-job same-firm experience is not
significant for the occupationally defined managers, the older
managers who may have been managers longer and whose careers have
moved further from that initial investment burst that comes soon after
joining the firm. For the relatively younger, supervisory defined,
managers, there is a significant positive return to tenure, but not
for the occupationally defined managers, suggesting that they are at
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the point in their careers where the earnings schedule flattens. The
anomaly in these results is the significant and negative coefficient
on the path-tenure squared variable for supervisory level defined
managers.
All of the usually defined human capital variables are of the
correct sign and highly significant (p-.0001). The return to a
bachelor's degree is less than, and that to a doctorate is greater
than, the return to a master's degree. Experience, non-job tenure,
and tenure all have a positive effect, and their values squared are
negative. The interactions between current tenure and both experience
and non-job tenure are negative and highly significant. This can be
interpreted as saying either, the greater the pre-job experience, the
lower the rate of return to current tenure; or, given some level of
prior experience, as tenure increases, the return from that prior
experience decreases. Both interpretations are consistent with the
hypothesis that earnings increase at a decreasing rate.
The return to geographical move is positive and always
significant at about the .01 level. The effect of government funding
is highly significant when the industry and occupational dummy
variables are omitted; its significance drops to between .02 and .03
when those dummy variables are included. The single regional dummy
variable, NE, which equals 1 if the region is the New England and
Mid-Atlantic states is also positive and highly significant.
Separate Earnings Level Regressions. These results are
reinforced when the separate models are estimated for each path.
Table 7b shows the earnings-level equations.
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Table 7b
Separate Regressions
Cross-Section Earnings Level Models
Variable
Intercept
EXPC
EXPSQ
TENURE
TENSQ
NONTEN
Managers
**
9.611303
(126.810)
.026857
(3.992)
-.000431
(-2.223)
.041324
(5.876)
-.000676
(-3.867)
**
.027597
(3.868)
-.000186
(-.917)
**
-.001179
(-3.199)
-.001130
(-3.445)
.093671
(3.167)
**
-.094337
(-2.839)
.024625
(.418)
.066409
(1.833)
NONTENSQ
NONTENTN
EXTEN
NE
BAC
PHD
GVTFND
INDBASE -. 044871
Technical Workers
**
9.461145
(409.271)
.028198
(12.618)
-.000411
(-5.402)
.031617
(19.287)
-.000441
(-12.139)
**
.046194
(17.856)
**
-.000943
(-10.257)
**
-.001510
(-7.105)
-.001046
(-6.312)
.027999
(;.754)
**
-.083755
(-7.712)
.233902
(11.872)
.018087
(1.500)
-.045874
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INDCHEM
INDMANU
-. 080262
(-1.144)
(-.955)
-. 008508
(-.188)
-. 002335
(-.054)
.092591
(.713)
.037145
(.653)
-. 058399
(-.685)
.018317
(.359)
.078798
(1.296)
.038859
(1.379)
.061714
(.845)
-. 155050
(-3.054)
-. 091592
(-1.484)
-. 056699
(-1.160)
-. 122665
(-1.968)
-. 080605
(-1.65)
.1936
INDK
(-2.451)
-. 003175
(-.177)
-. 032777
(-1.831)
.003194
(.065)
.014378
(.634)
-. 06106
(-2.558)
.012493
(.608)
.010588
(.548)
.023565
(2.422)
.039145
(1.636)
-. 123745
(-7.266)
-. 009951
(-,647)
-. 043886
(-2.902)
-. 005924
(-.354)
-. 066525
(-4.236)
-. 100835
(-3.833)
INDOTH
INDPROF
INDSERV
INDWAR
MOVEY
MOVEDK
OCCNASC
OCCOMP
OCCENG2
OCCENG3
OCCENG4
OCCENG5
.3873
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As is the case in Table 7a, the path differences between the
general human-capital variables, EXP and EXP , are negliglble.
Technical workers experience greater returns to same-firm,
different-job human capital, but that advantage deteriorates farily
rapidly. Although the coefficient for NONTEN is smaller for the
managers, the coefficient for NONTENSQ is not significantly different
from zero, suggesting that what human capital managers acquire in the
firm before their current job does not depreciate. Again, managers
experience greater returns to job tenure than technical workers. Of
the occupational categories, the most noticeable difference is for
OCCENG3, electricial and electronic engineers, where managers
experience significantly lower returns to that occupation compared to
technical workers.
In Diagrams 3.1-3.8, in the pages that follow, two sets of
earnings functions were plotted using the coefficients from the
separate regressions. The example used in these diagrams is a
bachelor's level chemical engineer in the chemical industry whose work
is funded by the federal government. Diagrams 1.1-2.4 show the
comparative earnings functions for this subgroup at four different
possible combinations of pre-job experience: no pre-firm experience
and two, five, ten and fifteen years of same-firm, pre-job experience,
respectively. Diagrams 2.5-3.8 show the same group with five years of
pre-firm tenure and two, five, ten and fifteen years of same-firm,
pre-job tenure.
It is evident from diagrams 2.1 and 3.2 that the earnings
functions for the two path are nearly parallel for the first decade of
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firm tenure. But after that, earnings for managers continue to grow
while earnings for the technical workers begin to level off. By 25
years of experience, the technical earnings function has begun to turn
down, while the managerial earnings function is just beginning to
flatten.
In Diagrams 3.4 and 3.5, where workers have had five years of
pre-firm experience, the period of parallel growth appears to last
closer to fifteen years, before the technical curve slows; and, it is
at about thrity years that the technical function turns down and the
managerial path actually flattens.
Taken together, these two sets of diagrams suggest that while the
managerial earnings function is consistently higher than the technical
function, substantial divergence between paths does not occur until at
least ten years of firm tenure has been accumulated. This suggests
that both groups acquire human capital that is of value to the firm at
comparable rates for those first ten to fifteen years, but after that
the technical human capital begins to depreciate while managerial
human capital appreciates, separating their functions.
2. Within Job Earnings Change Models. Five models of earnings
change rates were estimated, three using the supervisory-based
managerial definition and two using the occupational definition. Two
of the models using SUPATH are full models which include the same
variables as the levels equation (1 excludes the industry and
occupational dummy variables and 2 includes them). And the third is
the hypothesized change model discussed in the model chapter.6 Also,
included are one full model using OCCMAN and one hypothesized model.
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The advantage to the change model over the level model is that
individual ability is assumed to be held constant and does not vary
with path. Table 8b shows the coefficients and their t statistics for
the earnings change models.
Table 8b
Cross-Section
Earnings Change Estimates
Model
IVariable
Model
2
Model
3
Model
4
Model
5
INTERCEPT
EXP
TENURE
NONTEN
EXP2
TEN 2
NONTEN2
EXTEN
NOTENTN
SUPATH
**
-. 0925
(-2.662)
.0054
(1.166)
**
.1022
(7.47)
.0075
(1.512)
-. 00004
(-.261)
-. 0012
(-10.582)
-. 0001
(-.546)
**
-. 0022
(-6.389)
**
-. 0026
(-8.042)
.017
(.160)
-. 0561
(-1.251)
.0049
(1.058)
**
.1026
(7.498)
.0083
(1.635)
-. 00003
(-.216)
-. 0012
(-10.608)
-. 0001
(-.549)
**
-. 0021
(-6.196)
**
-. 0027
(-8.137)
.0072
(.098)
I I*
-. 0468
(-2.674)
**
.0912
(6.876)
**
-. 0011
(-10.130)
**
-. 0018
(-10.148)
**
-. 0022
(-10.618)
-. 056
(-1.163)
*
.0072
(1.642)
**
.1077
(7.699)
.0053
(1.056)
-. 00017
(-1.16)
**
-. 0012
(-10.772)
-. 0004
(-.218)
**
-. 0019
(-6.163)
**
-. 0024
(-7.434)
-. 0152
(-2.943)
**
.0921
(6.808)
**
-. 0011
(-10.003)
**
-. 0016
(-9.008)
**
-. 0019
(9.072)
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OCCMAN .0099
(.130)
PATH*EXP
PATH*NONTEN
PATH*TEN
PATH*EXP2
PATH*NT2
PATH*TEN 2
PATH*EXTEN
BA
PHD
MOVEY
MOVEDK
GVTFND
NE
.0118
(1.237)
-. 0047
(-.531)
.0106
(1.306)
-. 0004
(-1.476)
.00016
(.531)
.000002
(.008)
-. 0001
(-.199)
-. 0056
(-.285)
*
-. 0586
(-1.728)
-. 0153
(-.868)
*
.0883
(1.996)
-. 0398
(-2.161)
.016
(.877)
OCCENG2
OCCENG3
OCCENG4
.0127
(1.331)
-. 0028
(-.317)
.0099
(1.218)
-. 0004
(-1.527)
.00008
(.273)
.000002
(.110)
-. 00014
(-.292)
-. 0027
(-.133)
*
-. 0718
(-1.987)
-. 0138
(-.776)
*
.0912
(2.060)
-. 0304
(-1.375)
.0222
(1.196)
-0026
(.097)
-- 0057
(-.182)
.0115
(.399)
.0117
(1.131)
.0094
(1.029)
**
.0151 -.0129
(3.557) (-1.418)
-.0002
(-.661)
-.0003
(-.863)
*
-.00011 -.00022
(-.731) (2.362)
-.00013
(-.256)
-.0013
(-.065)
*
-.0769
(-2.11)
-.0202
(-1.131)
*
.0843
(1.894)
-.0355
(-1.592)
.017
(.915)
.0144
(.346)
.0031
(.087)
.0231
(.698)
-. 0032
(-.622)
*
.00034
(1.67)
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OCCENGS
OCCOMP
OCCNASC
INDWAR
INDBASE
INDMANU
INDCHEM
INDSERV
INDPRO
INDOTH
INDK
RNDCHG
LNCPICHG
-.000005
(-.691)
.117
(.443)
.5669
-. 0613
(-1.308)
.0189
(.654)
*
.0529
(1.721)
-. 0748
(-2.143)
-. 0864
(-2.632)
-. 0741
(-2.393)
-. 0807
(-2.563)
.0249
(.692)
-. 0576
(-1.292)
-. 0408
(-1.026)
-. 0885
(-1.008)
-.000003
(-.696)
.112
(.425)
.5708
-.000002
(-.259)
.1916
(.726)
.5617
-.037
(-.744)
.0246
(.734)
*
.0609
(1.696)
-. 098
(-2.819)
-. 1031
(-3.126)
**
-. 0905
(-2.911)
**
-. 1016
(-3.204)
.0226
(.625)
*
-. 0736
(-1.646)
-.05
(-1.251)
-. 08
(-.906)
-.000006
(-.878)
.0847
(.314)
.5661
-. 000001
(-.123)
.2211
(.821)
.5553
Of the path-tenure interactions, the coefficient for
SUPATH*TENURE is positive and significant; but, that for
OCCMAN*TENURE is not significant. The path tenure squared variable
coefficient using SUPATH was insignificant, but that using occupation
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was positive and significant at the .10 level. If occupationally
defined managers are assumed to be those further along in their
careers, taken together these coefficients suggest that initially the
managers experience faster earnings growth. Then there is a period
where the rate of growth of managers and non managers is the same.
And, towards the end of their careers, the courses of the two earnings
functions begin to diverge.
The signs-of the job tenure and tenure squared variables are as
hypothesized and significant. The interaction variables between
pre-firm experience and job tenure and pre-firm experience and non-job
tenure capture of effect of total experience in the labor market and
are negative and significant, as hypothesized. Because the
coefficient for the change in the logs of the CPI index is an
elasticity, the null hypothesis is Ho: B - 1, rather than B = 0.
Using an F-test, the null hypothesis could not be rejected for the
coefficients for either model 3 or 5, indicating that earnings for
scientists and engineers keep up with the changes in consumer prices.
Examination of the individual coefficients that were hypothesized
to be equal to zero in the section on model specification shows that
most are not significantly different from zero at the .01 level or
better, with the exception of EXP (model 4, only), NONTEN 2, PHD,
MOVEDK, GVTFND(model 1, only), OCCNASC, and most of the industry dummy
variables.
Separate Earnings Change Regressions. Separate earnings-change
regressions were also estimated for each path. Table 8b shows these
estimates.
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Separate Regressions
Cross-Section Earnings Change
Variable Managers Technical
Workers
Intercept
RNDCHG
LNCPICHG
TENURE
.013304
( .219)
.000003
( .168)
.203689
( .264)
*
.096074
(2.375)
*
-. 00101
(-2.469)
**
-. 00252
(-4.863)
**
-. 00179
(-3.832)
TENSQ
NOTENTN
EXTEN
R 2 .4016
**
-.065659
(-4.895)
-.000004
(-.737)
.151467
(.702)
**
.095739
(8.913)
**
-. 00112
(-13.755)
**
-. 001910
(-9.942)
**
-. 001772
(-11.755)
.7068
Aside from the systematically higher levels of significance for
the coefficients for the technical equation, due probably to their
larger sample size, the only variable that is noticeably different
between the two regressions is the intercept. That coefficient in the
technical regression is relatively large, negative, and significant at
the .0001 level, but the intercept is not significantly different from
zero for the managerial regression, indicating that, holding ability
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constant, technical workers can expect a lower level of earnings
change that is due simply to their career path.
FOOTNOTES
1 The table below shows the coefficient estimates and the probability
that the null hypothesis of independence can be rejected.
Estimate Prob.
-. 5077
-1.6420
.0032
Aircraft -1.1946
-.4056
-.1389
Elec.Mach .3243
-.3615
.0431
Fab.Metal -.0155
-.3939
-.3664
Ordnance .1067
-.3022
-.1199
Prof. Equip. .2975
.5805
.0620
Elec.Mach. .3787
.3804
.0589
Prim. Met. -.3816
-.9535
.0893
Construction .8043
.9016
.5987
Res. Inst. -.4176
-.6449
-.3185
Transport. .3217
.2310
.0815
Variable
Intercept
Industry
Variable
Exper. Group
< 10
30 >
10 - 20
Degree
BA
MS
Industry,cont.
Other Manu.
Colleges
Eng. Ser.
Other
2 Both the earnings-change and earnings-level equations were estimated
.0001
.0001
.9648
.0001
.2265
.2922
.0142
.1991
.7067
.9322
.2836
.0158
.6034
.4392
.4762
.3953
.2074
.8376
.1558
.3890
.8105
.0244
.0162
.4732
.0121
.0841
.0413
.0600
.0732
.0607
.1373
.5643
.6649
Estimate
-1.0398
-. 7801
-. 5600
.7272
-8563
-3518
.0240
-. 2533
.0841
-. 0852
-. 5620
-. 0171
-- 0269
-- 2879
-. 0986
.2543
.1224
.0880
.0916
1.1183
-. 0238
-. 9216
-. 6700
.1636
.7839
-8878
.1934
Prob.
.0001
.0001
.0001
.0001
.0001
.0023
.7768
.1155
.2291
.2919
.0001
.7951
.0077
.0571
.1796
.0788
.6382
.4742
.8594
.0393
.9490
.0001
.1052
.2247
.0230
.0876
.5503
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using both career path variables.
It is not possible to directly compare the two models which use
the two different types of measure without violating the hierarchy
principle. However, an impression might be formed by comparing each
model to the full model to determine if the use of either of the
measures affects the error sum of squares.
Using the earnings-level model, the coefficients were estimated
excluding all path variables and their interactions. Then, the model
was estimated that included SUPATH and its interaction with TENURE,
NONTEN, EXP, those variables squared, and EXTEN. Thus the null
hypothesis was: B B = 0. The test was ((ESS -
ESS )/P)/ (ESS /N F = PATH eTre .ONras the residual sum of
squares for the model which excluded the path variables, ESS that for
the full model, P, the number of parameters hypothesized to equal
zero, N the number of observations, and K the number of predictors in
the full model. The F statistic equalled 29.89 which is significant
at the .01 level, so the Ho was rejected.
The comparable result for the model excluding the occupationally
based path variables was 17.907, which was also significant, although
less so. Both were significant at the .01 level.
Therefore, neither could be designated as clearly superior in
explaining the earnings growth rate.
3 Because the industry and occupation dummy variables were included
solely to control for a set of complicated external market effects,
their coefficients could not be interpreted behaviorally. Therefore,
the hypothesis that these coefficients were equal to zero was tested.
Only the cross section models were used. An F-test was used to test
the null hypothesis of the coefficients being equal to zero.
For the models of earnings level, using the supervisory-based
managerial path definition, the calculated F = 6.723, allowing the
rejection of the null hypothesis at the .01 ei4'l. However, when the
same test was used comparing two earnings change models, F =
1.798, permitting the rejection of the null hypothesis at h .05
level, but not at the .01 level. This difference suggests that
industries and occupations are more likely to have a shift effect
rather than a slope effect on overall lifetime earnings.
The same test was run comparing the models using the
occupationally based managerial definition. The results were similar
but not as strong. The F-value for the level equation was 4.788, and
that for the change equations was 2.80. Both hypotheses can be
rejected at the .01 level, but the hypothesis for the change equation
is very narrowly rejected. A possible explanation of the difference
between the two types of models, those using the supervisory-based
definition and those using occupation, is that, given the apparent
"more-committed" managerial status of those who define themselves as
managers by occupation, there may be a difference in the structure of
earnings growth and so a difference in the earnings levels of senior
managers by industry.
4 Models 1 and 2 were also run using a continuous education variable,
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EDC, years of education. In both cases, EDC was positive and
significant. In the model omitting the industry and occupational
dummy variables, B D equalled .0777 (t-14.008); and, when the dummy
variables were inclued, B was .0902 (t-14.988). The substitution
of continuous education variables for dummy variables has virtually no
effect on the coefficient estimates of the other variables. The
inplication of this is that, for scientists and engineers, the return
to education is a return to what is viewed as human capital
accumulation; and, that the credentialling effect is not dominant.
5 As was discussed in chapter IV and summarized in Table 1 of that
chapter, the effect of career path on earnings change is hypothesized
to be different from that on earnings level. In the case of earnings
change, path was expected to have an effect only through its
interaction with current job tenure and tenure squared. In addition,
the human capital and labor market variables which did not change in
the course of the job were expected to have no effect and so were
excluded from the model. In 2 ther words, the null hypothesil was:
BPATH 2 BPAH*E.P B PATH*§XP = BPAgH*N2NWEN = BATH*NONgEN =
NON EEXP NONTEN  PB ha s~~ t t waG0V
BNONTEN - 0.E Xhe reason for0 S h yp hesi s t as epected
t the extent that any of these variables had an effect on
overall earnings during the current job tenure, that that effect would
be a shift rather than slope effect, and so have no impact on earnings
change.
It was necessary to test whether the exclusion of these variables
from the model was appropriate. Again, using the F-test, where the
unconstrained model was the full model, and the number of constraints
tested (P) equalled thirty, the F-statistic was 1.94 using SUPATH and
2.28 using OCCMAN. The table value of F30 is 1.41 at the .05
level and 1.61 at the .01 level, so the null hypothesis was rejected.
Examination of the full models suggests that the following variables
which are usually thought to have a shift effect may have an effect on
the rate of change: EXP, PHD, MOVE, GOVT, most of the industry
variables, and OCCNASC.
6 The test of significance used was ((B - 1)2/(seB)2), which has an F
distribution, with 1,T-K degrees of freedom.
IChapter VII
CONCLUSION
In this final chapter, the results of the different models are
summarized and discussed. This is followed by a section on possible
areas for future research suggested by the results presented here.
I. Summary of the Results
In the preceeding chapter, the existence of career paths was
established, and the results were presented for several versions of an
earnings model, where the focus of attention was whether or not there
was systmatic variation in earnings that could be attributed to career
path. The models that were estimated were: a continuous experience
model, two types of earnings level models, one using pooled path data
with interaction variables, and one using separate regressions for
each path.
A. Establishing the Career Paths
Because no question about career path was asked explicitly in the
survey, career path was measured by two different variables, one
describing level of supervisory responsiblity (SUPATH) and a
self-declared occupational category response (OCCMAN). A comparison
of the two variables showed that they measured somewhat different
aspects of career path. In particular, it was possible that a person
with significant supervisory responsibilities might not describe
2themselves as a manager, while it was highly unlikely that that those
workers who described themselves as managers did not have supervisory
responsiblities. A logit model showed that, given a high level
supervisory experience, the probability of describing oneself as a
manager increased with work experience. From this, the conclusion was
drawn that career path transitions take place gradually and this is
because the transition involves not just a change in job activities,
but also a shift in personal orientation. It also suggested that the
SUPATH variable would be the easiest to interpret because the
non-managerial group would be more homogeneous with respect to
.managerial status.
That these paths exist was established by the examination of the
frequencies of transitions from one path to another. The expectation
was that the majority of job histories would be described by one of
three paths: all technical, all managerial, and technical to
managerial. Regardless of which path definition was used, over 90% of
the sample followed one these three paths.
B. Earnings Models
Continuous Experience. In the models that were ultimately
estimated, a human-capital framework was used to examine differences
in earnings by path. In the earnings-level models, in particular,
special attention was paid to path differences in returns to different
types of human capital, general, firm-specific, and job-specific. A
more simplified concept could be tested, estimating returns to total
3experience on each track. This did not allow conclusions to be drawn
about different types of human capital formation, but would establish
that different paths implied different earnings schedules.
Therefore, two types of continuous models were estimated, an
earnings level and an earnings change model. In both models, the
coefficients for managerial experience were both larger (.03 compared
to .01 in the level models, and .009 to .004 in the change model) and
more significant than the coefficients for technical workers. In the
change models, the quadratic experience varibles were identical for
the two types of workers, and in the level equation, the coefficients
were more negative for managers in the equation that omitted
industrial and occupational dummy variables, but less negative for the
one that included them. The results for the earnings level model
provide strong support for there being systematic earnings differences
by path, which is reinforced by the results of the change model (where
it is assumed that individual differences that may be correlated with
path are controlled for by the structure of the model).
The next step was to separate experience into components that
could approximate different types of human capital to determine what
the underlying structure of the earnings differences between paths
was.
Experience Components. The first type of model estimated was the
earnings level model. The major disadvantage to this model was that
there was no way to control for economic ability that is likely to be
correlated with career path. In this case, the untested assumption
was that economic ability had a fixed effect, that is, that all
4individuals with the same economic ability would receive the same rate
of return on that ability and that for any given individual the effect
on earnings would be the same for all periods in their career. If
this assumption were correct, the coefficient estimates for the
correlated variables in the levels model could be assumed to be biased
but consistent.
With that caveat, the results for the level models, both when
estimated using interaction variables and using separate regressions
generally supported the hypothesis that path systematically affects
earnings. Regardless of which definition was used, the path shift
parameter was large and significant, ranging from .13 to .19 in the
models using interaction variables. In the separate regression, the
intercept for managers was 9.611 compared to 9.461 for technical
workers, representing a difference of $2079.36. The path pre-firm
experience interaction variables were never significantly different
from zero. In the separate regressions, as would be expected, the
experience variables are significant, but there is little difference
between the coefficient size for the two groups: BEXPIMA = .0268
compared to BEXPTECH = .0282. The coefficients for experience squared
are equal. The interpretation of this is that there is no difference
between the returns to general human capital for managers and
technical workers.
In both types of models, the return to-same-firm, different-job
tenure is greater for technical workers, but that advantage
deteriorates quickly. Part of the explanation for the hypothesized
earnings differences between the two paths has been that managers
5invest more in firm-specific human capital, which ultimately is
rewarded by the firm in the form of greater lifetime earnings.
Together, these coefficients suggest that the accumulation of firm
specific human capital is gradual, but non-declining. And, so it
follows that to realize substantial positive returns, a worker would
have to stay in the firm for a long time. In other words, managers
would be more likely to experience lifetime same-firm tenure than
technical workers.
When the supervisory definition of path is used, the path tenure
interaction and the tenure variable in the managerial regression
provide support for the expected greater return to firm- and
job-specific human capital for managers. The decline is steeper for
managers, however. The results from the separate regressions that
were plotted, using chemical engineers in the chemical industry as the
example, showed that, although the decline in earnings is more
precipitous for managers, it does not begin until at least ten years
after earnings growth has started to decline for technical worvers.
In the earnings change models, the results differ according to
whether the single-regression, interaction-variable model is used or
separate path regressions are estimated. In the single regression
model, the coefficient for the path-tenure interaction variable is
positive and significant when SUPATH is used and insignificant when
OCCMAN is used. Because there are many supervisory level workers in
the non-managerial portion of the sample when OCCMAN is used, the
insignificance of that coefficient is difficult to interpret.
However, the coefficient for SUPATH does support the hypothesis that
6earnings growth over the course of the job is greater for managers.
When separate regressions are used, the results are somewhat
different. First, by using the separate regressions, the intercept is
no longer constrained to be equal for both parts of the sample. When
this is permitted, the intercept for managers is not different from
zero, but it is negative and significant for technical workers. Of
the variable coefficients that are significantly different from zero
in the model, none differ in size or significance by path. In
contrast to the single-regression interaction model, this suggests
that managers have a higher rate of earnings growth, but it is not due
to a constant return to tenure, as suggested in the interaction model,
but rather a return to path, that actually operates as a negative
shift parameter for technical workers.
II. Discussion of the Results
The hypothesis that has been examined in this thesis has been
that career path choice systematically affects labor market outcomes,
in this case, earnings. The framework that has been used to examine
the role of career paths in the labor market has been the human
capital approach, where individuals are hypothesized to make
human-capital investment decisions that affect their productivity in
the labor market and determine both their earnings levels and turnover
patterns.
The major alternative hypothesis has been the segmented market
hypothesis, where the labor market is seen to have discontinuities
7that contstitute barriers to mobility and constrain the earnings
potential as well as the employment stability of various subsegments
of the labor force, regardless of their potential productivity.
Because of the nature of the data set that was used in this
analysis, it was not possible to differentiate between these two
hypotheses. What can be said, however, is that career path
systematically affects earnings. This is clear from the continuous
experience models. Whether this is because of a difference in the
investment choices and opportunities associated with each path, which
is the terminology used in this analysis, or because of institutional
differences that lead one path to one outcome and the other to another
can not be discerned. However, some of the results suggest that the
path differences in outcomes are probably not uninfluenced by
institutional factors.
A primary difficulty in using the human capital framework is that
it is difficult to separate investment decisions from innate economic
ability. This problem was addressed here by the estimation of
earnings change models, where individuals were assumed to be their own
control group. Earnings level models were also estimated in order to
get a glimpse of the effects of various shift parameters, but the
probable bias in the coefficients was not known.
The major general finding in the change models is that the higher
earnings of managers appears to be a return to path, not a
consistently positive return to the path-tenure interaction. This
does not appear to be the case for the cross-section change model,
where in the model using SUPATH, there is a positive significant
8coefficient for the path-tenure interaction. But, when the data are
separated into two subsamples, tenure is insignificant, and the
difference between the two paths appears in a shift parameter, the
intercept.
In the earnings-level models, this same distinction occurs, but
there is more support for a difference in earnings that grows with
tenure. In the combined single-equation model, there are large,
positive, and significant coefficients for the path shift variables,
and, in the model using SUPATH, a relatively small, but positive,
coefficient for the path-tenure interation variable.
The significance of this distinction is that if the differences
in earnings outcomes were due solely to patterns of human capital
investment, one would expect no special return to path, but a
consistently positive return to the path-tenure interactions.
Recalling diagrams 2a-2c in the preceeding chapter, these results
provide strong support for Diagram 2a, that path shifts the earnings
schedule, and mild support for 2b, that path affects the earnings
growth rate. There are clearly greater lifetime earnings associated
with the managerial career path; but, while there is some relatively
greater earnings growth momentum over the course of each job
associated with that path, constant higher growth rates do not appear
to be the major source of differences in earnings.
A second major finding was the consistent lack of difference in
the return to pre-firm experience between the two paths. Pre-firm
experience was assumed to represent general experiential human
capital. Part of the hypothesis was that managers would tend to
9invest more in firm-specific human capital, while technical workers
would retain a professional, rather than organizational, orientation
and would invest more in general human capital. And, technical
workers would experience greater returns to that human capital while
managers would receive greater returns to firm-specific human capital.
The lack of difference between the coefficients for pre-firm
experience for the two paths indicates that there is no difference in
the rates of return to general human capital for the two types of
workers. This also suggests that, given comparable levels of labor
force experience, any differences between the salaries of managers and
technical workers is due to the path upon which they are embarking,
not on what their previous experience has been.
This also raises a question about the extent to which path is a
proxy for differences in individual ability. This lack of difference
between paths in the coefficients to pre-firm experience occurs in the
earnings levels models where no controls for differences in individual
ability are assumed to be present. Unless it is assumed that pre-firm
experience represents a search period (which is unlikely given that
this is a long period for some workers), returns to pre-firm
experience should be higher for managers if they are actually the more
able.
The third finding was that managers had systematically lower
returns to same-firm, different-job tenure tenure. This challenges
the hypothesis that managers experience greater returns to firm tenure
than technical workers. However, the advantageous position of the
technical workers eventually disappears, as the coefficient for the
10
quadratic is negative and significant for technical workers but
insignificant for managers. One possible explanation, as is
hypothesized in chapter IV, is that those who come to the firm as
technical workers are highly paid for their skills, but these skills
deteriorate, while those who either come as managers or who are in the
process of moving to that track have to learn managerial skills that
do not grow dramatically in value but also do not depreciate.
Taken together, it can be concluded from these results that,
first, there are clear career paths within the labor market for
scientists and engineers, and there is not a lot of movement between
them once the transition from the technical to the managerial path has
been made. Second, there are earnings differences associated with
these paths. Third, the differences are not clearly the result of
incremental investment patterns, but seem to be a return to path
choice. The failure of experiential human capital variables to
explain earnings differences is particularly evident in the separate
regression change models, where there are assumed to be controls for
individual ability. And, fourth the lack of difference in returns to
pre-firm experience suggests that these paths are not simply measures
of differences in ability.
III. Future Research
The original motivation for his research was to examine the
question of whether white-collar labor markets were governed by a set
of implicit administrative rules that formed an internal labor market
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that determined earnings and employment stability. Or, was it a
relatively open market where earnings and employment depended on
skills and both factor and product markets. Scientists and engineers
were selected as the focus of the study primarily because of data
availability. However, as representatives of white-collar labor, this
groups has turned out to have some valuable qualities for the purposes
of generalizability.
First, they are a relatively homogeneous group, so much of the
diversity of the labor force that contributes to earnings variation is
controlled for. Second, the career path choice they face as a group
is a stylized version of a strategic dilemma many white-collar workers
face, how to avoid overspecialization that leads to an organizational
deadend. Rosabeth Moss Kanter, in Men and Women of the Organization,
describes the fear of "getting stuck" as a major concern of white
collar workers. While the technical-managerial dichotomy does not
capture all of the elements of this problem, it does begin to address
the relationship between the route one follows in an organization and
earnings.
What has been shown so far is only an introduction to the problem
of how labor market outcomes are determined in white-collar markets.
The questions about to be posed would still not provide a definitive
description, but would certainly add to the picture and can be
addressed using the same data set.
As discussed earlier, a crucial distinction needed to be made
is about the relationship between ability and career path, that is,
whether path is simply an indicator of ability and the technical track
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represents the career path of those who failed to enter management;
or, whether path truly represents career ladders within an internal
market and earnings and employment stability are attached to jobs
rather than people. This problem was addressed by the use of change
models, but this method required strong assumptions about the nature
of economic ability. The pre-firm experience variable also provided
some control the earnings level model.
Another way to test for this is to examine earnings functions in
the career period before each individual made their career track
choice and assume that any non-random portion of the residual
represents a combination of unmeasured ability and willingness to
invest on the job. Then holding constant that ability/willingness to
invest by including the residual as an exogenous variable, examine the
differences in earnings after the choice between career tracks has
been made.
A major question raised by these results is, given that there is
a difference in earnings by path and that most of this variation is
explained by shift parameter-, how does this difference occur? One
possibility is that the major opportunity for earnings growth occurs
between rather than within jobs.
Patterns of job tenure, per se, are not discussed in this
literature. However, together, earnings and tenure patterns could be
used to examine the different views of interfirm mobility and
reemployment. In contrast to Leventman's view of mobility as a form
of involuntary career instability, Davis and Trist [Davis &
Trist,1974] suggest that technical professionals use interfirm
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mobility to avoid stagnation. In addition, technical workers may be
more likely to to experience involuntary unemployment. Leventman
[Leventman, 1981] sees technical workers as slightly more likely to be
laid-off and experience continued career instability due to
overspecialization. One source of earnings variation that could not
be discerned from the results presented in the preceeding chapter is
the incidence of involuntary unemployment. If technical workers
become systematically involuntarily unemployed more often than
managers their earnings would be lower.
A major question raised by the literature on scientists and
engineers is whether the problem of technical obsolescence is due to
an inevitable ceiling on technical competence or induced, either
inadvertently or purposefully, by firm structure.
One question raised by several authors is the role of variety in
job assignments in leading to or preventing successful passage to
different career stages. A comparison of the evolution of work
activities between those who eventually become managers and those who
stay on a technical track should help document the role of
overspecialization in obsolescence. In addition, by examining the
relationship between the rate of increase in earnings and activity
specialization, that is, which comes first, a flattening of the
earnings function or an increase in job activity concentration, some
insight into whether poor performance (as measured by flattening of
the earnings function) leads to overspecialization or
overspecialization induces poor performance.
Another important question is, if these paths do not represent
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differences in ability, what motivates the worker choice between path.
Bailyn [1980] found in her study of M.I.T. graduates a greater
propensity for engineers, rather than scientists, to become managers.
In the course of the research conducted here, because of a discrepancy
between the number of engineers as defined by professional field and
those defined by self-declared occupation, it also appeared that it
was the engineers who are more likely to leave their technical area
for the managerial occupations.
However, this was not supported when explicitly tested in this
research. Using the supervisory-level based path variable, the
distribution of scientists on each path was compared to that of
managers. The null hypothesis was the hypothesis of independence,
that the path and occupational distributions were independent of one
another. This was tested using a chi-square statistic. The
chi-square for the first reported job was .2501 (df - 1), so the null
hypothesis could not be rejected even at the .25 level. The same test
was then applied to the third reported job, with the expectation that
by the third job more individuals would have made a path choice, and
occupational differences in career paths would be more evident by
then. The chi-square was equal to .3633 (df - 1), so that the null
hypothesis could still not be rejected. According to these results,
engineers are not more likely to leave technical jobs for managerial
jobs. so, at this point, it can not be said with confidence that
technical field predicts the probability of becoming a manager.
Each of the questions just presented represents an effort to shed
light on some aspect of the white-collar labor market, to better
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understand what accounts for the earnings distribution among a growing
sector of the labor force. A better understanding of the true
allocative mechanisms of white-collar labor is necessary to an
accurate understanding of the composition of the productive resources
available to the economy, helps educators and policy-makers best help
supply the economy with what it needs, and aids individuals in
deciding what is the best use of their own talents and resources as
they progress through the labor market.
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Name Number and street
C:Ly or town State or foreign country 010 J ZIP code
1i Part I - SOME FACTS A1CUT YOURSELF
Month and year 012
1. In what month and year were you born? 2. Sex 1 Male 22 Female
3. Whet is your present meital status? I C Now married 2 7 Separated or divorced 3 7 Widowed 4 M Never married
4. In what State or State or foreign country 04 If foreign country - Year
foreign country When did you come to the
were you born? United States to stay? 015
5. Citizenship (Mark only one box)
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certification, or registration? (For example, engineering
registration, medical license, teaching certificate.)
t 1 No 2 : Yes - Give title(s) at right -
129
Pugs;,. 2
FPact 11 EDUCATION AND TRAINING -
10. Hlow many years of education and foraal training have you COMPLETED? (Afark highest year COlPLl'TED)
Never attended school .............................................- Skip to qustion 16
Q 2 3 4 5 6 7 a 9 to is 12
Elementary and high school (grade or year) ...................... . .171 [ 1 .1 E7 (] E El (] [ L 171 El 1.1
LIeyond high school - College, junior college, law school, technical
Institutes, etc. (academic years if full course or requirement load I? ' 2 - a 4 6 6 7 a or more
carried, otherwise equivalent number of academic years) .............. 1[] EF I ~L E1 (0 C0 V
11. Did you receive a high school diploma? . . . . . . . . [~ No 2 [] Yes - In what year? 19 .
12. While you were in high school, did you take courses in any of the following subjects? (Afark as any us apply)
7]t -+ It you did not attend high school, mark tho box at left and skip do question 16
2 [~ Cencral science '1[~j Government or civics .P) I Iliology 4. 'rui ing
3 [] Econlomica 6 f_ Clemistry 2 [~ Psychology s [ Shop work
4 El Physics 7 [~ j Sociology 3 [ Mathematics
13. If you attended a school BEYOND the high school level, did you take courses in any of tIhe following subjects? (Afark a. many as apply)
.0-4 I [~ -- it you did rot atund a school beyond She high school level, mark the box at lot and skip to quaeation 16
a E Chemistry ,oc ] [~jMtemat lca 934 17 Computer Sciences O)$ I health Fields
a [~1 Physics a [] Statistic 2 [ ] a Economics 2 [ Arts and lilusnamaitica
4 [~] Earth Sciences a1El Agriculure or Forestry 3 [] Psychology 3 [ Ilusiness
5 [~)Engincering 41[~ Iliological Sciences 4 Sociology 4 1 1Education
14. L.ist below, beginning with the most recent and working back, each institution from which you have obtained or are currently obtaining forma1l training beyond the high school
level, and give the other information as requested. Ilse aicaiemic years if full course or reluiremtent load carried, otherwise the nukunher of equivalent acadeamic years.
Designate degrees by abbreviations, for exansmpe, AA, [A, MA, Phil. .. , Ml. etc. Uie a separoe line for each Jegree granted, worked for, or for any change in major
field of specialized study. liefer to enclosed 1.1st A for the code numbers of major fields. Do NOT incluie work taken by correspondence course, on-the-jo training,
appremnticesiip, or at em ployer's training school (rainin ' of this t pe shuild be replorted in quesation 16). If you need miore space, ottiach a separate sheet of papmrer and
give the saue type of in ortattion for cacth additional setool listeJr.
Colle e, university, or other Was this a Aticadaace Number of T w of Yeare
l~b ihjloliliiitol sitalacaith"fir: dogiee walked ale 'ree Ma~jor fieldlpo0ihsho nt o Year y~rza O for. if any, awarticd or Elntur code uid duscriptiona
Natme, city, and Siae intitution? ~ ~ -- -~ ~ Status equivalent or ntone to be from List A
or orogn counatry Fromt T6 (A A, flA, etc.) awiarded
MOST 04ECENT 937 O09 040 O  042 04 0 046 Codc Description
il[ Yes 19.-- 19 17 Pama-timase 19Oil Oil Oil
2 [ u x[ ]N ow 2 F'all-time x [ N one x []I None
S ECOND-T-1.AST 049 050 05 0 05053 055 056 Code Description
11Ej Yes 19-- 19 - [~l Part-time 19
Ol Oil
2 | ) N o- ) Full-time x I Nuone x [] Nonle
TI -TQ-L AST 0404 Code Dusc-ip"iou
- I~~} Y e ls 19 - 19 Ri P art-tim e 19 O_ _
2 (] No 2 [ ] Full-time x Il
,x IlNone x FJNonae ______________
FOU TVilI-TO-LAST 40 Code Descripion
1 E Yes 19 19 1 [1] Part-time 19 - I IOil Oil
z [] No a [] Full-time x [1 None x [~j None
Cradumate or
15. How did you finance this post high school training? (Mark as niany as apply) Undergra luute profaonual
Scholarship or fellowuhip (grant for which no serviceti.were req1 uired) from.
College o a vr u y. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . On il 079 '17
N aC o al S c lie n er t F o u n d a. i o . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . 2 E 2 CNalionil &iallce Froundation .. . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 2 ~j2(
Public Ilealth Service or National Inaiitutes of flealth . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7[
NlEA TiitleiV (U.S. Office of Education) ................................... 4 1 4[
Other - Specify fi[ 6 [17
Ieeaeurch or teaching na aista ltship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 {6(
Savingas or other current earnings not inacluided above . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 [ 7
Loans from public or private inatiutions . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a a
Aid front parenis. relatives, spouic, or alpoauae' relative. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . [71 91A
Veterans' Administration Educational lienmefitS (C.I. Hill, ~1~
Vocationial Rehabilitation, War Orplhans Pororas, etc.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . t 1 t
Eiiployer paid for training . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I
Other sources .............. ........................................................ .12 17 1211
Enter ite code number, 1-12 froama bove, of the single inost important eouscc (in
lermlas of dollar amuoutak) of funds usied in finanacing your education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Approximately what percentage uf your total expeneCa was covered by tihe m6osti imapuiant source? .%
16. Aside from the formal training listed in question 14, have you ever received or are you currently receiving any of the following types of training? (Mark as muiany as apply)
t[ Apprenaticeships ( Courses a adult Of the types of training marked, which ones do you
2 J Other formal on-the-job training programas ednention center consider the most useful in your present or lost job?
3 EMilitary training applicable to civilian occuautious 7 F Oiher training 084
4 [~) Exitcnsio or correspiondence courset Iter codes
6 Courses at eaployera training school a El None - Ga to qjuestioun t7 Oil x F1 None
Part Il - WORK STATUS
17. Were you employed lost week? (It you had a job Itroli ufich you were temapotraity absenat due to vacation, Iitlhsis, etc.. 4answer yes.)
II] Yes - Skip to questioan 20 z[ No - Go to question IS
18. If you were unot employed lost week, wore you principally - (Aurk only one box)
109 L 71 .ooking for wirk 2 11 Ifetired 3 [- llousewife 4 ] Student 5 [ Other - Specify-_
19. It0 [ - ii you have never bees employed, mnieark hlie box at the Jlt aid skip to queotion 45 on podo S.
-
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7 .t Poll IV - EMPLOYMENT PROFILE S
In this art of tihe questionnaire, we are asking questins about your last THREE civilian jola beginning witha mauor job you eld last week (or the last jol you ld)
and working back. Please include all jobs. not just scientific or technical jobs. In answering these questions. cons der a change in Jobs So have occurred if ther wete
significant changes in your duties, level of responsikiblty. or occupation, evemn thaough you may have coatinamued working for tha 
same employer. Please answer each question
for all three jobs. If you had more than one regalar job last week, report ont tie one which you considered to be your priamtary or mast important job. (Informaution about
second current regular job should he reported in questiuan 37.)
LAST CIVILIAN JOB SECOND-TO-LAST CIVILIAN JOB THIRD-TO-LAST CIVILIAN JOB
Job held lost week or mnost recent jolt
I Job A 1obB JobC
Naute Name Namue20. For whom did you work?
Name of comnp any, business. organization, gvenient
agency, or otlaer employer (or self-elmploye). . . . . . . . . . . .
I.ocation where you were employed . . . . . - . . . . . . - - - - -
City or county
State/foreiga country
-'"LLL
LWL
City or county Ctty or county
State/foreign country State/foreign counmtry
M~L
14LTh
Code De cription 1kCd Description l Code Descript ion
21. What kind of business was this? -
Enter code and description from List U. If te organization
conducted its activities at different locations, enter the
description of tihe activity at tie location where you
were employed.
22. What kind of work were you doing? i~ Code Description Code Description 0Code Dsription22.~~~~ ~~~ Whatt kidoC.kweeyudi
E.:nter code and description from 1st C.
23. What were your most Important activities or duties?
For examupl e: design electronic aiechanimnis in tle
industrial instrutmeta industry; or teuch elemneantary and
advanced courses in physics; or gather and analyze
statistical data on wholesale price movements.
24. What was your ob tItle?
25. Was any of your work being supported or sponsored by
U.S. government funds?
It yos - In what area(s) was this work?
Ot - Agriculture 06 - lealth
o - Atomic energy 07 - interntatiuona
03 - Defens.e
04 - Ilousing
- I:duam:&tioa
to - Public works
I- Space
00 -- I'ransportat ion 12 - lirbunm develpament
os - Natural
resourees
13 - Olther - Speocily
1 [ Yes7 2 1-1 No 3 [- on'tknow
listr caso(s) ro
list tat loftt
t 1 Yesy 211 No 3 (~)Don'tknow
Enter code(s) fram
list at loft
I:~R
t ] Y es a LI No a 3[ Don't
knowl
Eter ctdle(s)tro
list at Iul
\ 1
I0
I
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26. Were you primarily - (Murk only onlo box) (Mark only one box) (Mark only oo box)
I - Employee of private company. business, or individual
for wages, salary, or coimlissions?. . . . . . . . . . . - - - - -
2 - 'inployee of non-profit organization (except government)? a[ 2 2 
3 - Federal Government employee?. . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .- 3 LI 3 H 1 A
4 - State government employee? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4I 41-1 41
5 - Local government employee (city, county. etc.)? . . . . . . . '6
Self-employed in own busiless, professional practice, or Fi -
6 - Owa Iusiness - not Incorporated? . . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . 6 ~6 6
7 - Own business - Incorporated? . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 .1 7 t-1
* - Working without pay in family business or farin? . . . . . . . . [ I a, LI
27. Did you usually work full-time or part-time? El Full-time 2 l Part-time t [7j Full-time 2 l] Part-time I [:L1 Full-time 2 I Par2-lime
28. Between what dotes did you bold this position? From Froto Front
(Enter month and year for each job) - *10
To To To
x [ Or last week 14
29. About how much was your basic annual salary rate - (Exclide boinases and profit-saoring Iins. t self-isuployed, give an eastiaated equivaleant sulary rate, orreport
ricoamo before taxes and olthr dtuductic's such as Social Security contribulons Wt alter deducting Iasiess exxvises.)
(Report to necarest lundred dollars)
144 ilegining :egi"" "iig I
I - When you began the job?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . saliay I I salary I
Nu1msnber Numer il Number
2 - ft academically employed -For how many months was this? of nionths of as of 1ssonsis
3 - When you left the Job (or lost week, if currently employed)? saliry I slaslary
Number t Number ) U4 Nutsber 115
4 - it academically employed - For how many months was this? of imonths I of nlloottls I of susuntis I
130. In addition to your annual salary, did you receive any bonuses
and/or participate'in any profit-sharing plans (either cash I Yes 2 [~No a Yes 2 F No [o s 2 E-I No
paymanis .or stock acquisitions)? . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . -.-
t [ ]Y s [) o [ jYes a2~ No ]Y es 2{]N
It yes - Did these arrangements begin when you took Yes [1iNo- I 211No-pi
this Job? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .. . . . - - -. . . . . . They began in 19- They began in 19 They began in 19
31. Was the change between this job and the revious one, or 1
the acceptance of this job if not previously employed'
associated with a change in your residence?. . . . . . . . . . . . -No
City or county City or county City or couly
Before assuming this job?
fob T Statc/foracj" T
It yes - Where did you live - City or coutty City or cunty 12 City or county
After assuming this job? State/foreign coustiry Stae/freign coutry: Stae/foreign country
5b
FOnAM P4-1 It0-24-71t
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32. Here is a list of activities. For each job, estimate the percent
of total working tiie spent boil. in doing e work yourself, anod
in supervising and administering others doin the activities
detail ed below. Please account for total work ing time.
1. Teaching and training - pre paring and teaching couraca,
guiding and counelling stiudents or traineca . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Research - baslc and applied research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. Development - product. proces. and
technical development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Clinical practice - diagnosis, trentaent, etc., for
patie nta and clients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
S. Design - of equipment. processes, modela; also
drafting, drawinag, blue print . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
6. Quality control, testing, and evaluation - of equipiment,
materials. devicea, etc. ... . ., . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
7. Operations - production, mnaintmenance, construction,
installation, inspection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
8. Distribution - aales. traffic, purehasaing. customer
and public relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
9. Statistical work - designing and conducting saimple
and other surveys, aitatitical unulysis. furecasting . . . . . .
10. Consulting - an technical aspects of professional.
scientific, and mmanagement fields or products . . . . . . . . . . .
11. Computer applications - prograumming. data aytema
analysis, development of pirogrammminlg technliqueai,
controlling compulter operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
12. Other activities - Specify
YOUR ENTRIES IN EACH COLUMN SHOULD SUM TO 100%
33.
Mark the one statement which best describes your level of
Mark the one statement which best describes your level of
supervisory responsibility In euch lob.
I. Supervised no personnel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. iletponsibility for indirect or tiuff 61npervision (no linte atiio ity) -
3. Suiporvisedl tleami, unit. project, or section . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iMnagedl amajor udepilri lilt III or iivinioa... .. .. .. .. .. .. ..
I .... ... of orvi.mi~ation ......
L.AST CIVILIAN JOB
Job held last week or naost recent job
Job A '
SI,:CONi-TO-I.AST CIVILIAN JOB
Job B
Page 6
'IllIIt1)-''O-LAS'l CIVILIAN JOB
Job C
Perceni of total working timne Percent of total working tmlre Peecent of total working lime
2. % 2. 2. %
. % 3. g% 3. 16 %
4. g % 4. gi% 4. g .%
5. 6 % 5. O % 5- 9
6. 6. 6. 194
7. i's% 7. 1961 7. )%
8. 19g 8. 1$$ 8. gg
9. 2011 % 9. 202 9. 2OI %
10. 4% 10. 205 % 10. 206
It. 20V.: %0 I1. 70g %. 209
12. g 12. 12. ZI2 .
100 !1
(4f4rk uolly onae box)
2EJ
34II
100 %
(Iuark only ono box)
2 
3 1 1
100 %0
(Nark only oie box)
2 I
411
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35. Why did you leave this job?
It still worklpg at atom recent Job, mark here
1.
2.
3.
4.
S.
6.
7.
8.
Luid off front work or job terninated . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Iliger salary. essentially saine position and responsibility . . . . . .
hiigher salary and advancement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Improved working conditions ..........................
Change in type of work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
iletter opportunity for advancenent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Association with outstanding specialists in my field . . . . . .
Entered active duty In Armed Forces. . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . .
9. letirement .........................................
10.
II.
12.
Stay home and take care of family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spouse's change in job . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - -.
Move closer to other family nenshers . . . . . . . . . - - - - -. .
13. licturn to school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
14. telocato in different City, State, region, or country . . . . . .
15. Oiler...........................................
It more than one box mnarked - Which of the above was lhe.
,mast important reason?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
How did you acquire this Job? (klark moost inqiortait naeuias)
1. Promoiion within Bameac organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Told of position by acquaaintiance in orgaunization. . . . . . . . .
3. Told of position by acquaintance not in organization . . . . . .
4. Contact by official recruiter or personnel officer
of organiZation by letter or personal visit ...............
5. Found position at prolessional society ameeting. . . . . . . . . .
6. Found position through a public emnployment gecaty . . . . . . .
7. Found position through a private employment agency . . . . . .
0. Found position through college placenent office . . . . . . . . .
9. Answered want ad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...............
10. legan own business or professional practice . . . . . . . . . . .
II. Purchased business or professional practice . . . . . . . . . . .
12. Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
(Matrk as many as apply)
x 17] Curreuatly ensployed
in this job
411l
i
7 s-4 Ej
-011
*4 [~)
IS[]6 ,of
7 E)
sai[l]
'in-[ ----
'o []1
'5171~3
Enter code
?$ *
r
(Mark only one box)
2[1
3[
411
1
9 n
sonl
"1[~]
*a[~]
(Mark as meany as apply)
2 E3
3 [] 1
4 [~]
ifl t1 .
5[] -
11 
t2 [
4 1
04E]
Elater code
k )
(Mark
~~1
(Mark as mnany as apply)
211
43E]
SEl
7 [
a U-]
J44 to E-
1
14 EAtsaQ
Enser code
29.
36. What were you doing immediately prior to this job? (Mark only one box) (Mark only one box) (Mark only one box)
291 iaserd29ad2 20-3 ]It ou have not arc{ady If you have not already1. E~mployed ................................... I [- I nue qu1in 20-36 1 daslwereadqusttons 20-36 1(
about job it. please dku so. about Job C. please do so
2. linemployed and seek ing work . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 2 2
It yto hd a }ob ti i you had a job at3. In school ................................... 
.1 dolny thn prior to this - any timo prior to this
4. At hone caring for family . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 411 one. please answer 4 1 one, please answer 4 [ 1 Go to question 3?
.questios 20-36 questions 20-36
5. lictired~~~~ ~~~~ teprriy..................... job z It,~ it yogi1 about job C, It yogi A1
6. 111 .. .. .. .. .. .. ... ... ... ... ... ... .. ... ... ... 611 loava Itol already 61'-1 have toot alrtoady ti1
7. It Armed Femores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . bou done S". y dona so. yo6.tl . ........... ...................... . 6 ] a n t lr dy6 av n  ar a y6
ii.thder........................................... al , eL 'Fl .
(Mark only one box)
2[l
4 [3
6-[~ .
z7]
to E]
11 
12 [:]
t~)
onaly one box)
2
31
411517
7 El1
F11
1
iaf[~
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Before answering the next questions, please be'sure you have completed questions 20-36 for each of your last three jobs.
37. Second regular job - In addition to your major current job, did you have a second regular job l ust week?
24! 1 7 Y es 2 r No - GO to question 38
295e Code Description from List C
What kind of work were you doing? . . . . . . . . . .. n j
I. Wh - o291 Code Description from List B
In what kind of business were you working? ......
38. First full-time Professional job (Do not consider as your first full-time professional job part-time or summer employment.)
Was an of the jobs described above your first full-ime professional job?
2' f1l No - Go to question 39r
2 7 Yes - Which of these was your first full-time Professional job?
3 C] job A, the job you held last week or most recent job
4 CQ job B, the second-to-last job Ski, to question 40
5 C3 Job C, the thid-to-last job
39. What kind of work did you do in your first 29.Code Description from List C
full-time Professional job? . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .... . -T
In what year did you begin this job? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19
40. Prior to your first full-time professional job, did you hold a regular full-time NCN-PROFES.SICNAL JOB?
.What kind of work did ,you do in your last 30 Code Description from List C
regular full-time non-roiessional job before
2 Yes your first full-time professional job?.......
I n what year did you leave this job? .... .. .. 19 -
41. Complete the following statement: .303, Code Description from Lis t C
Based on my total education and experience, I
regard myself professionally as a (on) - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. .
Part V- INCOME
42. How many weeks did you work at all jobs in 1971 either full-time or part-time? (Count paid vacation, paid s ic leave,
and military service as weeks worked.) - Wa* only one box
1 "13 weeks or less 3 27 to 39 weeks s M 48 to 52 weeks
2 14 to 26 weeks 4 40 to 47 weeks a : Did not work in 1971
43. How much did you earn from all jobs in 1971 in OR
wages, salaries, commissions and bonuses?
(Esrimare to nearest hundred dollars.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . X None
Income from sources such as roylties, consultingfees. etc.. should be reported in question 44 below.
44. How much did you earn in 1971 from your own business, practice,
or partnership? Report income before personal income taxes and other
deductions such as Social Security contributions, but after deducting
any business expenses. (Estimate to neareet hundred dollars) . . . . . . . . _ x None
Income from wages, salaries, commissions. and
bonuses should be reported in question 43 above.
Part V1 - OTH ER
45. In the event it is necessary to contact you to clarify some of the
iniormation you provide, may we contact you by telephone?
1 7 Yes 2M No Area code Number
Enter the telephone number on which you can be reached .
If yes - If there is an altemate number on which you can Area code Numoer
be reached, enter it also. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...
46. Please enter the name of a person, other than N ame
yourself at an address other than yours,
through whom you can be reached. Address - Number and street
City State or foreign country ZIP code
Print your full name
FonM Ius-t Toae-ru f you have any comments or suggestions regarding this survey attach a separate sheet of paper
136
47. Date prepared
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APPENDIX 2
Inconsistencies Between the Survey Years
The NSSE is a biennial survey, and data from the 1974, 1976 and
1978 surveys were available for analysis. There were changes made in
the survey instrument from year to year, and a major task in this
research was to reconcile these differences to derive consistent
measures of the necessary variables. As was stated in the text, the
crucial variable of interest, career path, could not be measured
consistently from year to year, so ultimately, the post-1972 survey
information was not used. This appendix describes the differences
between the surveys and the efforts to reconcile the different types
of information provided in each.
Response Rates to the 1974, 1976, and 1978 Surveys. The panel
surveyed in the post-1972 surveys (here referred to as PMS74, PMS76,
and PMS78, rebpectively) is a subgroup of the 1972 survey. Survey
response rates varied by year. Of the 41,133 useable responses,
38,134 provided data from all survey years; 335 had data only from
PMS72 and 78; 1,378 had data for PMS72, 74, and 78; and, 1,286 had
data from PMS72, 76, and 78. According to NSF publications,I it
appears that response rate was fairly constant across occupations, but
there. was a tendency for those at the age extremities, under 34 and
over 70 in 1978, to respond at a lower rate.
There were questions in the 1974 questionnaire about education
between 1971 and the date of the survey, February, 1974, and about
jobs held in February, 1973 and February, 1974. In 1976, respondents
Appendix 2 - 2
were asked again about education from 1971 and to describe the jobs
they held in February, 1975 and February, 1976. In 1978, respondents
were a.sked about education since 1971 and the job held in February,
1978. These three questionnaires are very similar and ask fewer
questions than the 1972 survey.
Reconciling the Codes and Pesponses Between the Different
Surveys. After eliminating unwanted cases (as described in Chapter
V), the next step in the sample definition after eliminating unwanted
cases was to achieve consistency between surveys. There were two
types of inconsistencies. The first was either Cue to differences in
the questionnaires or to the responses codes used in the different
survey years. And, the second was due to respondents giving an answer
in one survey year that was contradicted by their answer in another
survey year.
Because it was expected the data from this panel study were to be
converted into employment histories, it was necessary to put the
information that was to be used to construct the work histories into a
format that was consistent from survey to survey. This was necessary
because once the work history was created, it would not be immediately
possible to tell from which survey the information used to describe
each job in the work history had been provided.
For the industry and occupation variables, the codes used in the
1974, 1976, and 1978 surveys were recoded to be consistent with those
used in the 1972 survey. Tables 3 and 4 in chapter V list the
industrial and the occupational codes, respectively.
The next step in the selection process was to identify those
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cases that either described jobs with no starting dates or that
provided inconsistent information. This latter type of problem was
most likely to occur between survey years, when respondents would
forget their response from two years earlier and provided inconsistent
answers.
A zero start date could be a legitimate response if an individual
were unemployed or not in the labor force, but a distinction had to
made between missing information and the possibility that the
respondent had not been employed at the time of the survey.
Respondents had been asked to provide the start date for whatever job
they held during a specific week, in particular, the last full week of
January, 1973 and 1974; February 9 - 15, 1975 and February 8 - 14,
1976; and, February 12-18, 1978. To determine if a zero start date
represented no job, the following method was used.
If the value of a variable called E4P (73,74) was equal to 1
(working full time during the week in question) or 2 (working part
time during that week), then a new variable, BNJOB (73,74) was created
and set equal to 1, indicating employment. If EMP equalled 3 (not
working), then another variable that described non-working status,
NOEMP (73,74) was consulted. If NOEMP equalled 2 (temporary lay-off)
or 3 (looking for work), then BNJOB was set equal to 2 to indicate
unemployment. Depending on the other values of NOEMP, BNJOB was set
equal to different values depending on whether the respondent was a
student, not working due to family responsibilities, retired, out of
the labor market for other reasons, or did not answer.
A slightly different process was used to generate values for
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BNJOB for the 1976 and 1978 surveys. Essentially, the information
provided from EMP and NOEMP in the 1974 survey was available from one
variable in the last two surveys, and the same range of values could
be generated for BNJOB for those surveys.
Having identified whether or not a person was employed on the
date in question using BNJOB, a variable NULL was created for each
date. NULL was equal to 1 when a zero start date meant there was no
job (unemployment or out of the labor force) or 2 if the zero meant
missing information. If there was a zero start date and BNJOB
indicated that a job should exist, then the existence of an occupation
was tested. If no occupational information was available, NULL was
set equal to 1, and it was assumed that no job existed. If the
occupational information was listed, then NULL was set equal to 2,
indicating that the start date for that job was missing. Cases where
NULL was equal to 2 were deleted.
Having eliminated the cases with missing start dates, the next
step was to reconcile inconsistencies in the chronological order of
the starting dates. These inconsistencies usually occurred between
survey years when an individual would provide one start date for a
job; then, when asked about their job in the next survey, would put a
start state that preceeded that given in the prior survey.
Respondents were permitted a two year margin of error when this
occurred, and the start from the earlier survey was assumed to be
correct and used for both dates.
And, the subsequent surveys were panel data describing up to five
additional jobs. So, a work history could contain a maximum of eight
Appendix 2 - 5
jobs. Because respondents sampled in 1972 were at various stages in
their careers, the number of jobs and the survey in which they were
described varied across individuals. For instance, older workers
would probably describe three jobs in the 1972 survey, but might
either not change jobs between 1972 and 1978 or retire. A younger
worker might have had only one job at the time of the 1972 survey and
move several times by 1978. So, the number of jobs described depended
upon career stages and individual propensity to move. Some bias in
any results presented here will occur due to the distribution of
career stages which were captured in the "snapshot" period of the
survey. The structure of the work history information provided in the
survey is shown in diagram 1 where each block represents a job, and
patterned blocks represent jobs described in the survey.
Diagram A2.1
Until it was clear that comparable information was not available,
work histories were constructued for the entire sample using
information from all of the surveys. To construct jobs from the later
surveys, the start date from JOBC was matched to the JOB73 date. If
they were equal, the JOBC start date was then compared to that for
JOB74, and so on, until a start date from a later survey differed from
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JOBC, signifying the beginning of a new job. Once a new job was
found, that start date became the new basis for comparison to find the
next new job. This process was continued until all job dates had been
compared and jobs were ordered.
The frequency and percent distribution of the number of jobs described
in all four surveys is:
Table A2.1
Frequency Distribution of Described Jobs
# Freq. % # Freq. %
1 97 2.88 5 763 22.64
2 260 7.73 6 398 11.83
3 724 21.52 7 114 3.39
4 984 29.25 8 24 .71
Education. As was the case in the 1972 survey, in the 1974 and
1976 surveys, respondents were asked to describe their more recent and
two previous educational experiences. Thus, it was possible that
degrees reported in the three surveys were redundant. In the 1978
survey, respondents were asked about the highest degree they had
received since 1972. A frequency run on those education variables
showed that, with a few trivial exceptions, the only degrees reported
were those in the 1972 survey, the most recent in the 1974 and 1976
surveys, and that in the 1978 survey. Therefore, only those degrees
were retained in the variable list.
Government Funding---In the 1974 survey, the question was
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rephrased, so that respondents could answer yes or no to support from
eighteen different federal agencies (as opposed to areas). In the
1976 and 1978 surveys, respondents could answer yes or no to support
from nineteen agencies. As described in the text, this list was
collapsed into four categories: defense, space, energy, and other.
Career paths. Each respondents' occupational category was
included in each of the surveys. Of the possible choices, six
categories were considered managerial. Although this variable was
consistent from survey to survey, as is indicated in Chapter VI, it
significantly understated the number of managers. Therefore, attempts
were made to use the information on job activities.
In the 1976 and 1978 surveys, respondents were asked to provide
the percent distribution of time spent on the job, choosing from
between nine (in 1976) and sixteen (in 1978) activities. They were
also asked to specify their primary and secondary activities from a
list of sixteen. In the 1974 survey, respondents were asked only to
specify their primary and secondary activities from a list of the same
sixteen activities. There was no accompanying question about the
distribution of time among activities. The list below shows the
sixteen activities and indicates whether the activity was included in
the 1976 time distribution list.
Activity In 1976 Survey
1. Management or Administration
of Research and Development yes
2. Management or Administration
of other than R & D yes
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3. Teaching and Training yes
4. Basic Research yes
5. Applied Research yes
6. Development yes
7. Report and Technical Writing no
8. Clinical Diagnosis no
9. Design yes
10.Quality Control, Testing no
11.Operations no
12.Distribution no
13.Statistical Work no
14.Consulting yes
15.Computer Applications no
16.Other yes
One possible way to create a definition of the type of job career
path that was consistent between surveys was to use the explicitly
specified primary activity. If the specified primary activity was
either of the two managerial activities (1,2), then the job was coded
as managerial. If consulting was the primary activity, then the job
was coded as consulting. If distribution was the primary activity,
the job was coded as sales. And, jobs with any other primary activity
were coded as technical.
There were two difficulties with this method. First, it was not
clear which primary and secondary activities should be considered to
be managerial. And, second, no primary and secondary activities were
Appendix 2 - 9
specified in the 1972 survey.
Allocation of Sales and Consulting. Although the distinction
between managerial and technical paths is of primary interest, there
were four types of paths specified. This was done because in the case
of consulting and sales, it was not immediately obvious whether those
activities should be classified as managerial or technical or be
considered as separate paths. By separating these two activities from
other two paths, it was possible to create four versions of the path
variables and determine empirically which definition produced the most
stable paths.
The first definition defined as managerial a job which included
the two management activities and consulting and sales. The second
definition (CONPATH) incorporated sales into the management path, but
allowed consulting to be a separate path. The third version (SALEPTH)
included consulting in the definition of management and allowed sales
to be an independent path. The last definition of the managerial path
(NARPATH) included only the two management activities.
To determine path stability, four sets of variables
(SPLIT-1,2,3,4) were created describing the transitions between jobs.
One set of split variables was created for each managerial path
definition. Each set had seven variables describing one job
transition, e.g., the transition from job 1 to job 2, from job 2 to
job 3, etc., indicating whether or not the job change represented a
path change, and if so, between which paths. The transition from the
technical path to the managerial path is expected. However,
empirically, there is some backtracking, where a person goes from the
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managerial track to the technical track. The purpose of separating
the consulting and sales activities from these two tracks is to
determine which definition of managerial and technical paths, those
including or excluding either or both of the consulting and sales
activities, will provide path definitions which minimize the amount of
backtracking.
To examine this question, the number of people moving from the
consulting track and the sales track to both the technical and
managerial paths were compared. Using the consulting track as an
example, if the number of people moving from consulting to technical
was approximately equal to the number going from technical to
consulting, then consulting would be considered a technical rather
than managerial activity. If the movement between consulting and
technical and consulting and managerial was about equal, that
suggested that either consulting was its own path, or that it could be
on either track and was thus indeterminant. If there were an
approximately equal number of people going back and forth between
management and consulting, and more than that going back and forth
between consulting and technical jobs, then consulting was considered
a managerial activity.
The table below shows the number going in each direction for each
job transition and the probability of transition given the starting
path at each transition and the job number in the career history. For
instance, given that an individual is in a technical job in job 1, the
probability of a move to a sales job in job 2 is .014. The comparable
probability of a move to consulting is .036. Note that the
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probabilities of a move to either sales or consulting will be
relatively small because the sending paths, technical and managerial
are much larger numerically.
SALES CONSULTING
Job
Trans T to S Sto T M to S S to M T to C C t T M to C C to M
12 37 24 17 27 94 53 25 40
23 25 23 16 28 75 68 34 37
34 18 13 14 20 64 51 29 46
45 12 14 8 7 30 30 15 16
56 4 4 4 1 11 14 6 6
67 1 0 1 0 8 1 3 1
78 0 0 0 0 2 1 1 0
TRANSITION PROBABILITIES
12 .014 .267 .031 .3 .036 .387 .049 .292
23 .011 .247 .017 .301 .034 .412 .038 .227
34 .010 .178 .013 .274 .035 .327 .028 .295
45 .010 .274 .008 . .137 .024 .248 .016 .132
The conclusion drawn from this table is that the probabilities of
movement in and out of sales jobs are small and relatively similar in
either direction. So, rather than arbitrarily put sales jobs in
either the managerial or technical category, cases where there was one
or more sales job would be deleted. In the case of consulting,
because the probability of moving from consulting to technical was
fairly high, about 40% in two cases, and was higher than that for the
move to managerial, consulting jobs were put into the technical
category.
Defining Primary and Secondary Activities. In order to create
1972 survey job path definitions that would be as consistent as
possible with those from the other surveys, the answer to the
supervisory question was redefined into percent of time spent in
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management. If the person said they managed a major department
(SUPER=4) or were a general manager (SUPER=5), then the percent of
time spent in management was set equal to 100. If they managed a
team, unit, project, or section (SUPER-3), the percent of managerial
time was set equal to 25. Otherwise, it was set equal to 0. This
managerial activity was added to the activity list, and the activity
which used the highest percentage of time was defined as the primary
activity.
In order to determine if the created primary and secondary
activities would be consistent with the explicit primary and secondary
variables, job path was determined in the same manner as for the 1974,
1976, and 1978 surveys. The method of defining primary and secondary
activities where they were not explicitly defined was tested using the
1978 survey data. In that survey, there was information about both
distribution of time among activities and explicit primary and
secondary activities. Comparison primary and secondary activities
were created by identifying the two activities where the two highest
percentages of time were spent and specifying them as the primary and
secondary activities.
In some instances, an equal percent of time might be allocated to
two or more activities. In that case, the activity which came first
in the activity list (see the first page of this appendix for the
list) would dominate, generating an arbitrary bias toward the top of
the list and therefore toward management. Also, if the explicit
primary and secondary activities were equal to zero, the created
primary and secondary activities were set equal to zero.
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Using this method, the correlation between the explicit and
created primary activities was equal to .907 and that between the
explicit and created secondary activities was equal to .789.
The values for the percent of time spent on managerial activity
for each supervisory level had been arbitrarily selected. In order to
determine if less arbitrary, "true", values existed, the following
test was used. First, the cases where a person held the same job in
1975 as in 1972 were identified. Then, given the supervisory level
reported in 1972 (SUPER = 2,3,4, or 5), the distribution of time
reported in managerial activities was examined. In this case, time
spent on managerial activities was the sum of the two managerial
activity categories, management or administration, R & D, and
management or administration, other than R & D. Cases where the sum
of the reported times equalled zero were deleted on the assumption
that for amy worker who was actually a manager, a zero value indicated
no response to the activity question. The table below shows the mode,
median, mean and standard deviation of the sum of managerial
activities for each supervisory level (SUPER = 2 is the lowest, and
SUPER = 5 is the highest).
SUPER Mode Median Mean Std. Error N 90% Bound
5 100 60 62.5 28.6 146 25.9
4 100 70 62.0 28.9 167 25.0
3 50 50 48.4 30.0 295 10.0
2 10 40 41.9 30.2 171 3.2
For all supervisory levels, it is clear that there is a
large amount of dispersion of time in managerial activities, and that
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there is not a clear cut-off point that separates managers from
non-managers. The last column in the table shows the percent of time
that could be used to assure that 90% of those in each category were
included (this was calculated by (X - 1.28( )). To use the lower
bounds in the last column would seriously bias the job definition
toward the managerial track.
Because of this dispersed distribution of percentage of time
spent in activities and because career path was the central variable
of interest, it was decided that consistency of measurement was
preferable to a longer work history, so only information from the 1972
survey was used. Two alternative measures of career path were used:
OCCMAN, the measure based on the self-defined occupational category,
and SUPATh, based upon the response to supervisory level.
Footnotes
"Analysis of Response in the 1972 Professional, Technical, and
Scientific manpower Survey by Occupation and Education in 1970 and Age
in 1972," in Characteristics of Persons in Engineering and Scientific
Occupations: 1972, Bureau of Census, Technical Paper #33, Apric, 1974.
"Selected Characteristics of Persons in Mathematical Specialities:
1978," Special Studies, series p-23, #120, Bureau of Census,
Washington, D.C., Sept., 1982.
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Industry Bridge
Industry Title Code for Code for SIC Code
(1974 Titles) 1974, 1976, 1972 (1967)
1978
Manufacturing
Aircraft, Aircraft Engines,
Parts 701 701 372
Chemicals an4 Allied
Products~ 702 702 28
Electrical Machinery,
Equipment & Supplies 703 703 36
Electronic Appartus, Radio,
T.V. & Communication 704 703 36
Electronic Computers,
Accounting, Calculating
& Office Machinery 705 703 36
Fabricated Metal Products 706 704 34
Machinery, Exc. Electrical 707 705 35
Motor Vehicles 708 706 371
Ordnance, incl. Manu. of
Arms 709 707 19
Petroleum Refining and
Related Industries 710 710 28
Primary Metal Industries 711 708 33
Professional & Scientific
Equipment 712 709 38
Other 713 710 2
2
Educational Institutions
College or Universities
(at least B.A. level)
Junior College or
Technical Institute
Medical Schools
Other
714
715
716
717
711
712
711
713
8221
8222
8221
82
(exc.8221,
8222)
Health Services
Hospital or Clinic
Other Medical or Health
Services
718
719
714
715
806, 8092
801, 803,
807, 8099
Other Kinds of Business
Agriculture, Forestry,
& Fisheries
Business, Personal &
Repair Service
Construction
Engineering or
Architectural Serv.
Finance, Insurance,
& Real Estate
Mining & Petroleum
Extraction
Private, Non-Profit Orgs.
Other than Ed. Inst.
720
721
722
723
724
725
716
717
718
719
720
721
01, 07, exc.
0713 & 073
70, 72, 731,
734, 736, 7398,
7392, 7393,
75, 76, 893
15, 16, 17
891
60-67
10-14
& Hospitals
Professional & Technical
Societies
Research Institutions
Retail & Wholesale Trade
Transportation, Communica-
tion or Other Public
Utilities
Other, n.e.c.
Public Administration
Uniformed Military Service
Federal Public Administration
State Public Administration
Local Public Administration
Other Government
726
727
728
729
730
731
732
733
734
735
736
722
722
723
724
735
726
727
727
728
729
729
3
892, 899,
861-865
7391, 7397
50, 52-59
40, 41, 42
44-49
3
-9190, 9490
9190, 9490
9290
9390
9390
Source: Standard Industrial Classification Manual,
Office of Statistical Standards, GPO, Washington, D.C., 1967.
Footnotes
1 Based on the product description in the 1967 SIC manual, Rubber and Misc.
Plastic Products, which are ordinarily SIC 30 are here included in the
category, Chemicals and Allied Products, SIC 30, PMS74 code 702 and PMS72
code 72.
2 Other Manufacturing includes the following SIC codes:
Lumber and Wood Products, exc. Furniture
Furniture and Fixtures
Stone, Clay, and Glass
Ships, Boat Building, & Repair
Railroad Locomotives
Mobile Dwellings
Cycles & Misc. Transportation
Food & Kindred Products
Petroleum Refining
Tobacco Manufactures
Textile Mill Products
Apparel
Paper & Allied Products
Printing, Publishing, & Allied Products
Leather & Leather Products
24
25
32
373
374
3791
375, 3799
20
29
21
22
23
26
27
31
Other Kinds of Business, n.e.c. includes the following SIC codes:
Entertainment & Recreation 78, 79
Legal Services 81
Museums, Art Galleries, & Zoos 84
Religious Organizations 866
4
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Appendix 4
FIRM DECISION MODELS
The three papers in this appendix address the problem of firm
behavior in the face of worker turnover. The review begins with
Walter 0i's paper on labor as a quasi-fixed factor, a paper which was
one of the first to discuss firm behavior in the face of fixed labor
costs. The other two papers provide analyses of firms as joint
producers of goods and services and training and model constrained
firm decision making.
Oi's [1962] paper can be seen as a sort of mirror image of
Becker's in that he examines the firm side of the fixed training costs
story. He proposes a short-run theory of employment based on the
concept that labor is a quasi-fixed factor of production. The
classical factor demand adjustment process includes a response to
changes in the rate of output and the substitution effect. But, Oi
argues that labor has become a quasi-fixed factor, where the total
cost of employment is partially fixed and partly variable. Among
other things, training costs are part of the fixed component and so
represent an investment by the firm in its labor force.
The total discounted cost of hiring an additional worker is:
C W (1+r)-t + H + K, where Wt is the expected wage in the tth
period, T is the expected period of employment, H is hiring costs, and
K is training costs. Profits are maximized when C = Y, where Y is
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discounted revenue. The net value of training to the firm is the
present value of the expected increment in the marginal value product
due to training, dM : V = dM (1+r) -. Training is profitable if V
t t
is greater than K.
The degree of fixity of a factor, f, is the ratio of fixed costs
to total employment costs. Fixed costs drive a wedge between wages
and marginal product, the size of the wedge being measured by f.
There will be some critical product price where long-run marginal
product will fall below long-run wages, resulting in layoffs for
workers with a positive f. So, expected product price becomes part of
the wage setting decision made by firms.
Although 0i's theory primarily describes firm behavior, his
empirical work and policy conclusions concentrate on fluctuations in
unemployment.
Pencavel [1972] examines the effect of the presence of specific
training on firm wage and turnover strategies. In his model, firms
must simultaneously select a wage rate and some tolerable level of
turnover given the effect that turnover has on their level of
production. In this model, the number of workers and the level of
specific training required to produce are exogeneously determined by
the firm production process, and firms incorporate the quit rate into
their wage strategy.
He hypothesizes a wage-turnover trade-off, where the optimal wage
level and quit rate depend on the ratio of specific to general
training, the efficiency of the firm labor force, and hiring and
training costs. Firms have a production function: X = X[a(Q)L], where
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da/dQ < 0, X is output, a is an efficiency index, Q the quit rate, and
L is person hours of labor. The firm seeks to maximize profits
subject to the constraints, dL/dt = A-QL > 0, where A is the number of
accessions, and positive training costs, H = sg(A), where s is the
ratio of specific to general human capital.
He derives the efficiency condition that the optimal quit rate is
that where the marginal negative effects on productivity are equal to
the hiring and training costs associated with turnover, or Q = Q(x),
where x = x(da/dQ,sdg/dA).
Using two-stage-least-squares, he estimates his quit and wage
equations simultaneously for nineteen two digit manufacturing
industries. One difficulty with his model is that he hypothesizes
that the ratio of specific to general human capital, s, is: s = s(W,E,
), where E is the level of education and is a vector of other
characteristics affecting the level of specific training. He then
assumes that ds/dw > 0, and that ds/dE < 0. This latter assumption,
that investment in firm specific skills is negatively related to the
level of formal education, is not supported elsewhere in the
literature. In addition, his use of quit and wage data by industry
requires the overly strong assumption that workers are homogeneous
with respect to the level of specific human capital investment within
industrial categories.
Parsons [1972] proposes a similarly complex system. His
objective is to develop a model of optimal sharing of specific
training costs between workers and firms and examine the implications
of these shares for quit and layoff rates. His hypothesis is that
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quits are negatively related to "worker-owned human capital and
layoffs are inversely related to "firm-owned" human capital. Firms
have to choose the optimal level of human capital per worker and
whether to buy (firm-owned) or rent (worker-owned) specific human
capital.
The firm is hypothesized to have a production function:
Qt = Q(S it), where S is specifically trained workers, and S2 are new
entrants who become trained after one period. The cost of training is
the foregone productivity of S2 in period one. The supply function
for trained workers is S S + St- t t + Rt, where qit It-! 2t-1 - q - + hr
is the number of quits, lyt is the number of layoffs, and Rt is the
number of rehires.
To maximize profits, firms can manipulate the wage rates of the
two types of workers and the layoff rate to employ the optimal number
of experienced workers, given the worker quit function. The worker
quit function depends on relative wages and the layoff propensity of
the firm. He derives efficiency wage and training conditions and
layoff conditions which together determine what share of specific
human capital the firm should optimally buy.
He then tests the hypothesis that quits are negatively related to
the share of worker financed human capital and layoffs are negatively
related to the firm share. To determine a direct measure of specific
human capital, he assumes that G = T - S (that is, that general human
capital embodied in the worker is equal to total investment minus
specific human capital) and provides general functional relations for
S and T. Using the predicted signs of the coefficients for the
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exogenous variables in the specific and total human capital investment
equations and the chain rule, he derives expected signs for the
coefficients for the predictors of quits and layoffs. The difficulty
with this is that, particularly in the case of quits, the hypothesized
signs are often ambiguous. Despite this problem, his results
generally support his hypothesis. However, he does not provide any
goodness of fit statistics.
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